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Abstract 
Though David Foster Wallace is well known for declaring that “Fiction’s about what it is to be 
a fucking human being” (Conversations 26), what he actually meant by the term “human 
being” has been quite forgotten. It is a truism in Wallace studies that Wallace is a posthuman 
writer whose characters are devoid of any kind of inner interiority or soul. This is a misreading 
of Wallace’s work.  
My argument is that Wallace’s work and his characters—though they are much 
neglected in Wallace studies—are animated by the tension between materialism and 
essentialism, and this dualism is one of the major ways in which Wallace bridges postmodern 
fiction with something new. My project is itself part of this post-postmodern turn, a 
contribution to the emerging field of cognitive literary studies which has tried to move beyond 
postmodernism by bringing a renewed focus on the sciences of mind to literary criticism. As 
yet, this field has largely focused on fiction published before the twentieth century. I expand 
the purview of cognitive literary studies and give a rigorous and necessary account of 
Wallace’s humanism.  
In each chapter I discuss a particular concern that Wallace shares with his 
predecessors (authorship; selfhood; therapy; free will), and explore how Wallace’s dualism 
informs his departure from postmodernism. I begin by setting out the key scientific sources 
for Wallace, and the embodied model of mind that was foundational to his writing and his 
understanding, especially after Barthes’s “Death of the Author,” of the writing process. In 
chapter 2, I unravel the unexamined but hugely significant influence of René Descartes on 
Wallace’s ghost stories, showing that Wallace’s work is not as posthuman as it is supposed to 
be. In chapter 3, I discuss the dualist metaphors that Wallace consistently uses to describe an 
individual’s experience of sickness. Focusing on the interior lives of both therapist and patient 
in Wallace’s work, I show that Wallace’s therapy fictions are a critical response to postmodern 
anti-psychiatry. Finally, in chapter 4, I reconcile Wallace’s dualist account of material body 
and essential mind by setting his work against both the history of the philosophy of free will 
and postmodern paranoid fiction.  
If Wallace’s fiction is about what it is to be a human being, this thesis is about the 
human ‘I’ at the heart of Wallace’s work.   
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Introduction  
“[An] alarmed call to arms”: Cognitive Science, the 
Humanities, and the End of Postmodernism 
 
There is a spectacle greater than the sea, and that is the sky; there is 
a spectacle greater than the sky, and that is the human soul. 
 To write the poem of the human conscience, were it only that 
of a single man, were it only that of the most insignificant man, would 
be to meld all epics into one superior epic, the epic to end all. . . . What 
a sombre thing is this infinity that each man carries with him. 
—Victor Hugo, Les Misérables (184) 
Wallace’s Humanist Fiction 
David Foster Wallace was a profoundly humanist writer. This is not to say simply that 
Wallace’s work is meaningful and moving, but that it is these things because Wallace was a 
humanist in the traditional sense, a writer whose subject, from the beginning of his career to 
its end, was the spectacle of the human soul and the “infinity,” as Victor Hugo puts it, “that 
each man carries with him” (184). Though Wallace is well known for his declaration that 
“Fiction’s about what it is to be a fucking human being” (Conversations 26), what Wallace 
actually meant by the term ‘human being’ has been quite forgotten. It is a truism in Wallace 
studies that Wallace was a posthumanist writer, one who was too theoretically sophisticated 
to write about human beings who have, as is traditional, some kind of inner essence or soul.1 
I will challenge this prevailing view. Though questions about the nature of human beings and 
the relationship between body and soul go largely undiscussed in Wallace studies, they are at 
the very centre of Wallace’s project and should not go ignored.  
What is a human being? Denis Diderot’s entry on “Man” in the Encyclopédie says that 
“Man is composed of two substances, one known as soul, the other known as body.” Yet the 
relationship between these substances, between what Wallace calls “bodies, minds, and 
spirits” (Infinite Jest 503), has been debated for millennia, and there is no easy definition for 
                                                          
1 Posthumanism is a loaded theoretical term, and one which I will discuss and define in much more detail in 
chapter 2. Very loosely, posthumanism is a critique of humanism and the view that human beings have an 
autonomous, indivisible essence (a soul, a self, an ‘I’) that inhabits a body. 
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any of these terms. Plato thought of the soul as “a long-lived thing” and the “body [a]s 
relatively feeble and short-lived” (Last Days 159), but the history of philosophy is, as George 
Makari puts it, the history of “the eternal soul” losing “ground to the fallible,” biological 
“mind” (Makari 135). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the belief that human 
beings possessed some immortal, immaterial essence came up against Newton’s clockwork 
universe and the increasingly undeniable idea that human beings might be made entirely of 
matter. Though René Descartes understood that all life, including the human body and brain, 
were mechanical, he did deny that the important bit—the soul, the ‘I,’ the thinking part of 
‘Man’—was part of the material universe. But it only got worse for the soul from there. John 
Locke reconceptualised humans as beings with bodies and “mind[s]” (Makari 150). For Locke 
it was no longer the soul that constituted a human being’s identity but the mind (though the 
soul was still tacked onto most models of mind for the sake of propriety).2 Locke’s mind is not 
divine and divorced from the machine-body, as the ‘I’ was for Descartes, but a fallible, 
material entity. As Voltaire puts it, in his essay “On Mr Locke,” “I am a body and I think. I know 
no more than that” (Letters 65).  
Wallace came to prominence alongside the emergence of what Fernando Vidal and 
Francisco Ortega have called the “neurocultural world,” a world in which these debates are 
in the air, and the “belief that human beings are essentially their brains” has “become 
extremely powerful” in popular consciousness (7). Yet despite Wallace’s status as perhaps the 
most well-regarded American novelist to emerge in the last few decades, and despite his work 
being the focus of considerable, and ever-increasing, attention, so little of that attention has 
been paid to Wallace’s treatment of character, the “fucking human being[s]” that his fiction 
is supposed to be about (Conversations 26). Are Wallace’s characters “essentially their brains” 
(Vidal and Ortega 7)? What is the nature of consciousness in Wallace’s work? What does 
Wallace have to say about the relationship between mind, body and soul, between madness 
and materialism, between free will and determinism? Though we know from Wallace’s 
writing and his archive that he had a deep interest in the philosophy of mind and 
                                                          
2 In the philosophical melting pot that was Enlightenment Europe, these terms became all the more confusing 
because they often could not be translated. As Makari explains, the “Latin mentis from the Greek menos, 
was ‘mind’ in English,” but this term “had no equivalent in French” (27). French writers translated ‘mind’ to 
‘soul’ and confused Locke’s distinction between the two. 
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contemporary cognitive science, very little has been said about the body and brain in 
Wallace’s work, and almost nothing at all has been said about the soul. 
Yet the human soul is absolutely central to Wallace’s project. Wallace’s declaration 
about the purpose of fiction always appears in the shortened form above, but Wallace 
continues:  
We’ve got all this ‘literary’ fiction that simply monotones that we’re all 
becoming less and less human, that presents characters without souls or love, 
characters who really are exhaustively describable in terms of what brands of 
stuff they wear. . . . What’s engaging and artistically real is, taking it as 
axiomatic that the present is grotesquely materialistic, how is it that we as 
human beings still have the capacity for joy, charity, genuine connections, for 
stuff that doesn’t have a price? (26-27, my emphasis) 
This idea that characters should have the “capacity” for souls, for “stuff that doesn’t have a 
price,” was not just a throwaway metaphor. In an interview near the end of his career, in 
2005, Wallace mirrored this language, explaining that he “envied and coveted” the “capacities 
of spirit” of “writers like St. Paul, Rousseau, Dostoevsky, and Camus,” who had, for Wallace, 
an ability to “render so fully, passionately, the spiritual urgencies they felt” (Conversations 
157). Again Wallace talks about people as if the very “qualit[y]” that make them “human” 
(157) is this “capacit[y] of spirit,” some space inside them for “souls” and “love.” Wallace 
studies have given no account of the capacity for spirit in Wallace’s writing, yet it is literally 
central. At the exact halfway point of Wallace’s enormous masterpiece, Infinite Jest (1996), 
the character Lucien flies out of his own body when he is assassinated. Wallace writes that as 
Lucien finally dies, rather a while after he’s quit shuddering like a clubbed 
muskie and seemed to them to die, as he finally sheds his body’s suit, Lucien 
finds his gut and throat again and newly whole, clean and unimpeded, and is 
free, catapulted home over fans and the Convexity’s glass palisades at 
desperate speeds, soaring north, sounding a bell-clear and nearly maternal 
alarmed call-to-arms in all the world’s well-known tongues. (488-89)  
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Lucien’s body is a “suit,” a literal container of the spirit inside it. Wallace detaches soul from 
body, essence from matter, as the ghost of Lucien, no longer trapped inside what Plato calls 
the “mortal . . . dissoluble” vessel (Last Days 149), is free of earthly limits and flies home.  
It is a peculiarity of Wallace studies that no one has discussed what the many ghosts 
in Wallace’s works might tell us about his understanding of character. Though critics such as 
N. Katherine Hayles (“Illusion”), Paul Giles (“Sentimental”), Elizabeth Freudenthal, Conley 
Wouters, and Simon De Bourcier focus on the nature of Wallace’s characters, they do not 
discuss the ghosts at all, assuming that Wallace’s fiction shares their theoretical position on 
the absence of an interior self. Other critics, such as Christopher Bartlett, Marshall Boswell 
(Understanding), Vincent Haddad, David Hering, Brian McHale (“Pale King”), and Toon Staes 
(“Work in Process”) read the ghosts as stand-ins—in the spirit of Roland Barthes—for Wallace 
himself. These two narrow approaches betray the complicated relationship that Wallace 
criticism has with Wallace. The former critics ignore Wallace’s ghosts as they ignore Wallace’s 
own conservativism, because both pose a challenge to their theoretical framework, while the 
latter critics do not ignore Wallace at all, but pay too close attention to his authorly ghost at 
the expense of all the others across his work. If Wallace’s ghosts are talked about at all, no 
one has suggested that they might tell us something about what Wallace thought of human 
beings other than himself. 
 It is no coincidence that both Wallace’s characters and his ghosts (which are literally 
the essence of a character) receive equally little attention. It is often Wallace the person who 
is the subject of criticism, both as an individual and in terms of the relationship that he created 
with his readers.3 Criticism that does focus on Wallace’s work is often organised around 
                                                          
3 A lot of recent work has focused on the complicated genesis of Wallace’s final, posthumously published novel 
The Pale King, in which Wallace himself appears as a character (Di Leo; Marsh; Miley; Staes, “Work in 
Process”;). Critics have explored the impact Wallace’s life and death have had on criticism of his work 
(Benzon; Bustillos; Adam Kelly; Roache; Thomas), and have taken a more critical view of Wallace the person, 
interrogating his personal politics and his problematic treatment of gender and race (Hayes-Brady, 
“Personally”; Himmelheber; Holland, “Hirsute”; Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts; Morrissey and Thompson; 
Santel). Different characters in Wallace’s fiction have been read as stand-ins for their creator: a way for the 
author to address, and build a relationship with, the reader (Bartlett; Haddad; Hering). In this vein, critics 
have also discussed the formal means by which Wallace forces the reader to work at this relationship (Cioffi; 
Gerdes; Jacobs, “American Touchstone”; Levey; Nadel; Staes, “Only Artists”; Williams), and how those 
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Wallace’s relationship with other writers.4 For the most part, however, the discussion centres 
around Wallace’s engagement with a body of thought or philosophy: Wallace was, as he put 
it, “obscenely well-educated” (Conversations 59), and there is a wealth of material for 
scholars to untangle.5 Though Wallace’s characters are of course mentioned across the board, 
they are treated as ciphers that Wallace uses to dramatize some larger argument or idea. 
Those critics that do focus on character share the posthumanist position that Wallace’s 
characters are hollow objects, devoid of any essential humanity, soul, or interiority (De 
Bourcier; Dulk; Freudenthal; Giles, “Sentimental”; Hayles, “Illusion”; Kaiser; Moran; Resar; 
Wouters). My argument is with these critics in particular.  
                                                          
readers have developed into a community and an audience (Fitzpatrick; Warren). Recently, one critic has 
argued that we should not waste our time reading Wallace at all (Hungerford). 
4 The early narrative of Wallace’s career was that he had an antagonistic relationship with postmodern literature 
and its predominantly ironic mode, from which he sought to distance himself (Boswell, Understanding; 
McLaughlin, “Post-Postmodern Discontent”; Cohen; Konstantinou). This standard narrative has since been 
complicated by critics who demonstrate that Wallace actually has a lot more in common with his 
postmodern predecessors than he liked to let on (Andersen; Foster; Harris; McHale “Pale King”; 
McLaughlin, “After the Revolution”; O’Donnell; Rando; Winningham). Other critics have situated Wallace’s 
works in contexts beyond American postmodern fiction, including the contemporary MFA Creative Writing 
program (Boddy; McGurl), poetry (Coleman; Jacobs “American Touchstone”), literary journalism (Roiland), 
and world literature (Thompson). Critics are now also starting to discuss Wallace’s influence on other 
writers (Boswell, “The Rival Lover”; Hoberek), a branch of Wallace studies that is sure to keep growing. 
5 Critics have focused on Wallace’s engagement with poststructuralist and postmodern philosophy and theory 
(Jon Baskin; Bresnan; Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable; Holland, “Mediated”), with the philosophy of free will and 
choice (Cahn and Eckert; Durantaye; Evans), and with philosophy more generally (Dulk; David Morris; 
Mullins; Ramal; Tracey; Vermeule). Critics have studied Wallace’s engagement with masculinity (Banner), 
place (Giles, “All Swallowed Up”; Houser; Nichols; Quinn), postmodern technology and entertainment 
(Ercolino; Frost; Sayers), therapy culture, pain, and illness (Bleakley and Jolly; Goerlandt, “Still Steaming”; 
Jones; Mortenson; Nash; Russel; Toal) information overload (Letzler), capitalism, politics, and boredom 
(Andrew Bennett; Boswell, “Trickle-Down Citizenship”; Clare; Collignon; Hamilton; Shapiro). Recently 
Wallace’s interest in religion has started to receive more sustained attention (Brick; O’Connell), as has his 
interest in maths (Natalini), while there have been articles and a monograph detailing Wallace’s informed 
engagement with taxation and economics (Godden and Szalay; Severs). 
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Toon Staes is critical of Wallace’s argument that “fiction that isn’t exploring what it 
means to be human today isn’t good art” (qtd. in Staes, “Wallace and Empathy” 40n. 5), 
suggesting that critics have so regularly “decried a lack of humanism in fiction . . . that the 
argument has lost all meaning” (40n. 5). I disagree. The distinction that Wallace makes 
between humanist and non-humanist writing matters, and is vital to our understanding of 
Wallace’s own work because it governs his construction of the characters that his work is 
about. Though, as Stephen J. Burn and Robert L. McLaughlin have both argued, we should be 
careful about setting Wallace’s work against a strawman postmodernist fiction that we might 
imagine is insincere, devoid of character, and deliberately inhumane, there is a clear shift 
from the work of Wallace’s postmodern predecessors to his own “post-postmodern” fiction 
(Burn, Jonathan Franzen 23-24; McLaughlin, “Post-Postmodern” 66). Previously this post-
postmodern shift has been characterised as a turn towards a “New Sincerity” (Adam Kelly, 
“New Sincerity” 136) or to “postironic belief” (Konstantinou 83). These frameworks follow 
Wallace’s cue in his essay, “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction” (1990), in which he 
argued that fiction needed to rebel against “TV’s ironic, totalitarian grip” on U.S. culture by 
treating “plain old untrendy human troubles and emotions in U.S. life with reverence and 
conviction” (Supposedly 73; 81). Jeffrey Severs has suggested that Wallace studies needs a 
new, “synthetic reading, based in his whole career and archive,” of Wallace’s post-
postmodern project (3). Where Severs looks at “value” in Wallace’s work, both economic and 
otherwise (3), my view—which complements Severs’s—is that Wallace’s antagonistic 
relationship with postmodernism can, in large part, be understood as a conflict concerning 
the nature of human beings and character. 
In the “E Unibus Pluram” essay itself, part of Wallace’s problem with contemporary 
fiction is that it is “hollow” (81), devoid of “enduring character” (80) because its characters 
are flat, ironic parodies of humans as they appear on television. This problem is keenly felt by 
Hal in Infinite Jest. The moment when Hal reflects on the contemporary US arts is much 
discussed in studies of Wallace’s post-postmodernism (Rando 575; Staes, “Wallace and 
Empathy” 39; Jacobs, “Order” 219; Toal 318-19), but the focus is always on irony, not on the 
passage’s humanism. Hal is said to be a product of postmodern culture not just because of his 
ironic pose, but because of what this does to him: it makes him feel empty inside, not “in 
there, inside his own hull, as a human being” (694, my emphasis). Later in the novel, Hal uses 
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Wallace’s exact phrasing when he tells his brother Mario to “‘Be a fucking human being for 
once, Boo’,” by which he means “‘Are you in there?’” (784). To be human is to have a capacity 
for spirit, yet posthuman theory—a thriving member of the “lively arts of the millennial 
U.S.A.” (694) that so unsettle Hal—sets out to dismantle the idea that anyone is “in there.” 
Wallace is actively writing against this position. I will show that Wallace’s subject was always 
the soul, the ‘I,’ the interior self (terms that will become clear in the following chapters), and 
his career-long engagement with the relationship between the soul and the body is one of 
the main drivers of his critique of postmodernism.  
  
“Theory after ‘Theory’” 
Wallace engaged seriously with the philosophy of body, brain, and mind, and during his 
lifetime the field moved beneath his feet. In 1992, Gerald M. Edelman wrote that “We are at 
the beginning of the neuroscientific revolution” (xiii). Neuroscience, which showed that the 
“mind is a special kind of process depending on special arrangements of matter” (7), promised 
to reveal not just the nature of the brain but of the mind and the self as well.6 The rise of our 
neuroculture coincided with a tumultuous period in the arts and humanities as they struggled 
to defend their own value (both economic and otherwise) as the sciences started to encroach 
upon what had previously been sacred territory. Yet for some critics in the humanities, such 
as those involved with the emerging fields of literary Darwinism and cognitive literary studies, 
this scientific revolution was a blessing. For critics who were frustrated with the extreme 
relativism, ontological uncertainty, and the denial of shared human nature that many felt 
                                                          
6 As Makari notes, “By 1815, all of these positions” on the various extents to which the mind was or was not 
material “had been established” (503). Until the late twentieth century, however, it was still only the “body 
or the material part of man” that had, as Diderot puts it, “been studied a great deal.” The mind remained a 
mystery: by the middle of the eighteenth century, the study of the brain’s “gray, wrinkled flesh” seemed to 
have revealed no secrets about its origins (Makari 452); near the beginning of the twentieth, Freud 
abandoned attempts at “mind-brain integration,” deciding that the “contribution from the brain on psychic 
states” was “unknowable” (509). In the latter half of the twentieth century, cognitive science seemed to 
offer a bridge, finally, between the study of mind and brain. 
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characterised postmodern theory, the study of the brain offered what seemed like stable 
ground to which they might escape.  
This uneasy negotiation between what C. P. Snow famously called “the two cultures” 
(4) is not a new struggle, but remains one of the primary concerns for literature and criticism 
at the turn of the millennium.7 Hard problems have emerged. What is the role of literary 
criticism if cognitive science has more to say about human beings? What is the role of fiction 
if what we think of as the internal, soulful self no longer exists? The emergence of Darwinist 
and cognitive literary studies, which aim to reconcile the humanities with the new sciences of 
life and mind, coincides with the corresponding ‘post-postmodernist’ movement in American 
literature that was instigated by writers such as Richard Powers, Jonathan Franzen, and David 
Foster Wallace. It is useful to map out these new fields in literary studies, partly because this 
will set out the theoretical ground for my own approach to Wallace, but also because it forms 
part of the cultural backdrop against which Wallace’s career plays out. These new kinds of 
literary study and Wallace’s writing are all part of this post-postmodern turn, and both turn 
to the brain as a way to challenge and address postmodern theory.  
There was a growing sense at the end of the twentieth century that postmodernism 
had, as Wallace put it, “to a large extent run its course” (“Interview by Charlie Rose” 22:05-
22:12). In Steven Pinker’s bestseller, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature 
(2002), for instance, Pinker claims that that the postmodern arts are coming to a long overdue 
end. He suggests that the go-to techniques and theories of twentieth-century artists and 
critics from modernism onwards—such as the “freakish distortion of shape and color” in 
visual art; literature’s replacement of “general readability” with “stream of consciousness, 
                                                          
7 In 1959, C. P. Snow argued in a lecture titled “The Two Cultures” that there was a “gulf of mutual 
incomprehension” between “literary intellectuals at one pole” and scientists at the other (4). T. J. Lustig 
and James Peacock note that, though Snow’s lecture “continues to frame current discussions of the 
encounter between literature and science” (1), the division has a longer history still, between T. H. Huxley 
and Matthew Arnold, for example, or the Romantics and the Utilitarians, and so on (3). As early as 1605, in 
Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning Divine and Human (1605), Francis Bacon wrote that there 
are two books, “the book of God’s word,” and “the book of God’s works”: studying God’s works can be 
done through scientific observation, but God’s word (like the soul and the arts) are matters of a different 
sort.  
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events presented out of order, baffling characters . . . [and] difficult prose”; and the 
metafiction, “irony,” and “self-referential allusions” that characterise postmodernism in 
particular (410-11)—are borne from the incorrect view that the minds of human beings are 
blank slates, shaped entirely by culture and therefore by rules that can be broken. According 
to Pinker, the postmodern humanities were an iconoclastic, reactionary academic 
phenomenon, one which grew increasingly obscurantist and anti-scientific in order to 
privilege nurture and ignore nature altogether.8 As a consequence, the humanities have 
grown out of touch with the real world because they claim that we should not value naïve 
ideas such as “beauty,” since these are thought to be entirely unobjective, culturally 
contingent, and not rooted in our shared biology at all (412). In Pinker’s view, the cognitive 
revolution is the answer, a means by which to re-bridge the arts with the sciences (31). 
However blinkered Pinker’s perspective of the last hundred years of artistic innovation 
undoubtedly is, his frustration with postmodern theory’s denial of human nature, and his 
optimism about the benefits that a scientific perspective would bring to the humanities, are 
in no way isolated. 
In a series of manifestos published between 1999 and 2002, Alan Richardson, Mary 
Thomas Crane, and Francis F. Steen, who could note the now “routine” calls to move beyond 
“the more bleakly relativistic and antihumanist strands” of postmodernism, offer an 
alternative: cognitive literary studies (Richardson, “Cognitive Science” 157; Richardson and 
Steen, “Literature” 2). It is baffling, notes Richardson, that contemporary literary theory, 
which takes so many of cognitive science’s findings for granted—the “fragmented self,” the 
                                                          
8 The now infamous ‘Sokal affair’ brought the conflict between the sciences and the postmodern humanities 
into sharp focus. In 1996, Alan D. Sokal successfully published a deliberately nonsensical paper, 
“Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,” in the 
postmodern cultural studies journal Social Text. In a later article discussing the hoax, Sokal admonishes the 
“currently fashionable postmodernist/poststructuralist/social-constructivist discourse” (339), arguing that 
postmodern theory which rejects the scientist’s “naïv[e]” belief in an “external world” (339) necessarily fails 
to “produc[e] any impact upon [that] world” (340). The novelist William T. Vollmann makes a similar 
argument about the state of the contemporary arts, filled as they are with a “structuralist smog . . . 
permitting only games of stifling breathlessness.” The solution? According to Vollmann: “We should portray 
important human problems. . . . We should believe that truth exists. We should aim to benefit others in 
addition to ourselves.” 
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“irresolvably problematic” concept of “individual agency,” and the privileging of “unconscious 
processes in mental life”—has “entirely ignore[d] that most interesting three pounds of 
matter inside the skull, showing no interest in the human brain and surprisingly little in the 
rest of the body” (“Cognitive Science” 159). As Tony E. Jackson puts it: 
If literature is a special expression of mind and culture, then can literary (or, 
really, any humanistic) study afford to keep itself separate from the area of 
research that is establishing itself as the scientific explainer of at least a certain 
level of mind and culture? (“Questioning Interdisciplinarity” 321) 
By the end of 1990s—proclaimed “the Decade of the Brain” by President George W. Bush— 
literary scholars had started to reconcile the scientific maps of body and mind with their own 
practices in order to move beyond postmodernism. 
Such studies include Ellen Spolsky’s Gaps in Nature: Literary Interpretation and the 
Modular Mind (1993), in which Spolsky argues that because there are “gaps” in the “human 
cognitive structure . . . vacancies between fragments of understanding” (2), this shows that 
cognitive theory can provide a “productive, materialist explanation” (12) for precisely the sort 
of subjects that literary scholars are well used to discussing. In Shakespeare’s Brain: Reading 
with Cognitive Theory (2001), Mary Thomas Crane adopts a similarly nuanced position with 
regard to cognitive science and literary theory. Though Crane suggests, like Spolsky, that 
cognitive science “shares” many of the “assumptions” of postmodern theory—such as the 
human subject being shaped by culture and ideology (20)—it also challenges and updates 
these ideas, “insist[ing],” for instance, “that there is an interaction between the biological 
subject and its culture” (21). Crane’s radical project is to “reintroduce into serious critical 
discourse a consideration of Shakespeare’s brain as one material site for the production of 
the dramatic works attributed to him” (3), rather than conceive of the author as a “conduit 
or space within which rival cultural structures collided” (35). Similarly, Lisa Zunshine, in both 
Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (2006) and the Introduction to Cognitive 
Cultural Studies (2010), aims to revivify literary studies by regrounding its theories in the 
biological models of mind that have long been “absent from the conceptual horizon” 
(Introduction 7). 
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Cognitive literary studies is not without its limitations. In his survey of twentieth-
century theory, Peter Barry acknowledges—in a chapter on “Theory after ‘Theory’” (287)—
the existence of cognitive literary studies, but notes that “cognitive readings” tend to “focus, 
not on the content as such of the work . . . but on the cognitive processes” of the reader, often 
at the expense of literary history and “matters of interpretation” (312-14). Though the 
cognitive literary critics surveyed above go some way towards regrounding literary theory in 
cognition and biology—which is itself a useful project—what they actually contribute to the 
interpretation of texts is, so far, quite limited. For example, Zunshine’s argument that the 
Theory of Mind (the means by which we interpret the minds of other people) is what makes 
fictional characters so interesting to human readers, is a useful, believable way to restore the 
human brain to the discussion of what, and why, we read. It is also, however, quite a 
commonsensical conclusion, and a rather less beautiful way of stating what writers have 
always known (e.g. “fiction’s purpose is to give the reader, who like all of us is sort of 
marooned in her own skull, to give her imaginative access to other selves” [Wallace, 
Conversations 22]). Likewise, Crane’s revolutionary statement that Shakespeare, who had a 
forehead and a hairline, “must have had a brain” (14), perhaps says more about the 
weaknesses of poststructuralist theory than the strengths of cognitive literary studies, though 
it is at least a promising start.9 
Though it is perhaps too early to say just how widespread or useful the revolution will 
be (especially as the cognitive sciences themselves continue to develop), it is already clear 
that literary studies becomes very lacklustre whenever it abandons its remit and tries to do 
science. To some extent, cognitive literary critics have avoided this problem by engaging with 
                                                          
9 Hans Adler and Sabine Gross published an article in 2002 challenging the optimistic claims made by Richardson 
and Steen, arguing that they run the risk of literary study becoming a “subdiscipline of the study of the 
human mind” (199), one which “obviate[s] any need to familiarize oneself with much of what has gone 
before in literary scholarship and history” (203). Richardson and Steen deny the charges, of course, and in 
an article in response they suggest that “there is ample opportunity for a constructive and mutually 
illuminating engagement” between the humanities and the sciences (“Reframing the Adjustment” 155), 
and that they “do not promote a scientific criticism that would seek to ‘determine’ literary meanings and 
deny the ‘openness’ of literary texts” (158). Whether or not one agrees that cognitive literary studies has 
so far succeeded in this, the criticism raised by Adler and Gross is important, if only for having marked out 
the pitfalls that a scientific literary study is always going to have to negotiate.  
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theory and staying literary, a move that was driven, in part, by the failures of its sister-subject, 
literary Darwinism. Emerging alongside cognitive literary studies in the 1990s, literary 
Darwinism is another major branch of scientific literary study that tries to “groun[d]” literary 
theory “in the large facts of human evolution and human biology, facts much larger and more 
robust than the conceptions that characterize the various branches of postmodern theory” 
(Carroll 103). Literary Darwinism has become, for many, an example of what not to do.10  
Characterised by a very close relationship with science (and popularisers of science, 
such as E. O. Wilson and Pinker), and by an unsurprising hostility, therefore, towards 
postmodern literary theory, literary Darwinism views literature through an evolutionary lens. 
One of the keystones of the field is an interdisciplinary collection of essays, edited by Jonathan 
Gottschall and David Sloan Wilson, titled The Literary Animal: Evolution and the Nature of 
Narrative (2005). The book is endorsed by E. O. Wilson himself, who, in the “Foreword from 
the Scientific Side,” writes optimistically that if “literary productions can be solidly connected 
to biological roots, it will be one of the great events of intellectual history. Science and the 
humanities united!” (vii). Wilson raises a familiar cry about the “confusion we have now in the 
realm of literary criticism,” and the “unbeatable strategy” that the literary Darwinists have to 
“replace it,” a method that will provide answers which “can be empirically proved to be either 
right or wrong or, at worst,” prove that the problem is “unsolvable” (vii). Noting that the last 
two and a half millennia of philosophical enquiry are simply wrong (“much of the history of 
                                                          
10 One of the earlier examples of cognitive literary studies was Mark Turner’s Reading Minds: The Study of English 
in the Age of Cognitive Science (1991), which Turner hoped would spark a complete rewriting of “our 
conception of the humanities . . . by grounding it in the study of human cognition” (viii). Turner shared the 
literary Darwinist’s hostility towards postmodern theory—calling contemporary literary criticism 
“ungrounded and fragmented,” like “chess about chess, a game about the concept of games” (3-4)—and 
saw similar promise in a consilient project that would give the central areas of study in the humanities a 
firmer footing. For instance, Turner argues that we, who are “organisms in the world,” “often conceive of 
time metaphorically as something that moves forward along a path, . . . [And] because we read in time, text 
inherits this metaphoric linear structure” (92; 76). In his early map of the field in 1999, Richardson distanced 
himself from Turner’s “studied indifference to recent literary theory,” seeing a more productive approach 
in those cognitive literary studies that did engage with theory, “allow[ing] them to speak to their colleagues 
in a familiar language, while offering to extend and indeed reground the poststructuralist program” 
(“Cognitive Science” 166-67).  
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philosophy up to present day has consisted of failed models of the brain”), Wilson looks 
forward to a consilient literary studies that employs a scientific “understanding of mind” (viii) 
to bolster its assault on empirically false theory.11 
 Though The Literary Animal has the admirable goal of challenging the “fear and 
mistrust of evolution in literary studies [that] is frequently accompanied by an even greater 
fear and mistrust of science in general” (Gottschall and Wilson, “Introduction” xxv), the 
literary studies within suffers from the frustrating lack of nuance that characterises Wilson’s 
and Pinker’s own summaries of the humanities. Though Boyd argues that an “evolutionary 
approach to literature can encourage literary scholars to learn from the strengths of science 
[empiricism, fact-checking, etc.] without abandoning their own expertise” (386), the readings 
actually offered are so reductive they evoke every cliché about the cold-heartedness of 
scientists. Daniel Nettle explains, to take one example, why dramatic dialogue is in a higher 
register than everyday speech: 
Given that dramatic characters are mostly strangers to us, then, the 
conversation will have to be unusually interesting to hold our attention. . . . 
One is reminded of the “supernormal” stimulus effect in animal behaviour. An 
egg elicits nesting behaviour from a female gull; a football elicits an abnormally 
strong nesting reaction. (66) 
Jonathan Kramnick argues that the literary Darwinists ultimately have nothing to say 
about literary texts, “apart from what it would extract elsewhere from the evolutionary 
psychological edifice” (“Against Literary Darwinism” 327).12 The problem with literary 
                                                          
11 Note that Wilson expects literary Darwinism will replace a failed literary theory altogether, not update or 
challenge it. Another landmark study is Brian Boyd’s On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and 
Fiction (2010), which sees “Evocriticism” as the solution to the “dilettantish smorgasbord (a dash of chaos 
theory here or Lacanian pseudopsychology there) exposed in the Sokal hoax” (386). Boyd prefers the term 
“evolutionary critic[ism]” over literary Darwinism because, “unlike those who have over the years labelled 
themselves as Marxist or Freudian,” he feels evolutionary criticism “should appeal not to a founding father 
but to a live and empirically accountable research program” (387-88).  
12 Kramnick takes particular issue with the science that the literary Darwinists use as a starting point: the idea 
that literature is an evolutionary adaption, and so can be proved to be useful for our survival. Because the 
literary Darwinists have failed to prove which features of our stories are innate, or why those innate 
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Darwinism, as many commentators have pointed out, is that it reads more like (arguably quite 
interesting) “anthropology and psychology than . . . criticism per se” (Crews xiv). Having 
adopted a wholly scientific methodology, literary Darwinism reductively treats literature as 
“an ecologically valid source of data” (Pinker, “Toward a Consilient Study” 163), sacrificing the 
very essence of literature that makes literary study an independent and interesting field in 
the first place.13 
This new kind of literary study has raised the ire of many, both within and without the 
academy. Jonathan Gottschall is the subject of a 2015 article in The Chronicle Review, which 
has the subheading “Jonathan Gottschall tried to save literary studies. Instead he ruined his 
career” (Wescott 6). In a scathing review in the New Republic, William Deresiewicz condemns 
Michael Suk-Young Chwe’s Jane Austen, Game Theorist (2014): “This, apparently, is how you 
achieve consilience: by pretending that artists are scientists in disguise.” In a 2014 editorial, 
Point Magazine laments the shift towards a scientific literary study that seems to have 
abandoned its old project of “enrich[ing] our sense of what is going on” in works of art: 
“English graduates are encouraged to gather in a ‘literature lab’ where the only required 
language is computer code (‘In this class there will be 1,200 books assigned,’ boasts one 
course description, ‘but students won’t read any of them’).” At some point, says Barry, “you 
do have to decide which you most want to spend your time studying, great literature, or the 
cognitive processes of the human mind” (317). 
 
 
                                                          
features are useful for the survival of stone-age minds (325), it therefore fails to answer the very questions 
it sets for itself.  
13 Tony E. Jackson has suggested that the problem with consilient literary scholarship is that it tends to privilege 
scientific knowledge over literary knowledge, a hierarchical distinction that has only been exacerbated by 
the anti-scientific relativism of some postmodern theory; there is a dangerous expectation that literary 
studies should “produce knowledge on some kind of par with the sciences” to prove their worth (“Literary 
Interpretation” 196). To be fair to Pinker, he himself recognises in a review of The Literary Animal that “It’s 
conceivable that evolutionary thinking will raise, and eventually solve, the scientific question of why we 
enjoy fiction without offering anything to the field of literary criticism” (“Toward a Consilient Study” 175). 
15 
 
How to Read Wallace’s Mind 
My intention is to study great literature. With that in mind, one of the most exciting branches 
of cognitive literary studies is cognitive historicism, because it does not impose modern 
scientific concepts onto older texts, nor use texts as evidence in a more scientific study, but 
rather it focuses on those texts that were explicitly interested in the debates about the mind 
and brain from their own time. Critics who have commented on the field from outside its own 
circle of participants, as Hans Adler and Sabine Gross have done, tend to point to Alan 
Richardson as the cognitive-scholar doing the most interesting, and most literary, work, and 
it is from his example in particular that I draw inspiration. Where Adler and Gross critique 
Steen’s article in the Poetics Today special issue for reading “like a somewhat dysfunctional 
conversation in which each of the two partners [the literary and the scientific] offers useful 
insights without referring much to what the other has to say” (201), they point to Richardson’s 
essay in the same issue as “easily the most stylistically polished and intellectually mature” 
(202). Though their point, ultimately, is that this is because Richardson is the least attached 
to what they see as the ailing cognitive movement—“his analysis is the least ‘cognitive’ in that 
it fits most comfortably within the framework of ‘traditional’ sociohistorical literary analysis” 
(202)—they allow that a specifically literary analysis, albeit one which foregrounds the 
sciences of mind, can be beneficial and illuminating.  
In his major study, British Romanticism and the Science of Mind (2001), Richardson’s 
aim is to challenge the simplistic “caricature” that people (including, significantly, scientists 
such as Pinker and Antonio Damasio [182-83]) have of the Romantics as a group who rejected 
Enlightenment thought, rather than a group who, in Richardson’s updated history, 
“fundamentally revised that postulate, looking to the body with its nervous system, brain, and 
‘organic’ mind rather than to a disembodied Reason as the ground for human uniformity and 
equality” (177). By bringing a focus on cognition to his own field, Richardson is able to 
“restor[e] a certain cultural weight—one certainly felt widely at the time—to figures and 
ideas” related to mind and brain in Romantic literature, which previous literary critics have 
neglected as being “of antiquarian interest at best” (3).14 
                                                          
14 Neil Vickers has argued that Richardson “reconstructs the science of the romantic era in a partial, one-sided 
way, giving undue prominence to materialism” (147). Vickers suggests that this is, in part, because 
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 David Foster Wallace’s deep and formative engagement with scientific models of mind 
and brain has been similarly neglected, despite the fact that they are threaded throughout 
his entire body of work. To give a few examples: in “The Planet Trillaphon As It Stands in 
Relation to the Bad Thing” (1984), the narrator describes “all the cute neuroses that more or 
less around that time began to pop up all over the inside of my brain” (7), while in the 
uncollected story “The Enema Bandit and the Cosmic Buzzer,” Mary’s “old instinctive Encino 
brain cells fired for a second” (HRC 27.9, 5). In The Broom of the System (1987), Rick recounts 
a story about children’s “hearts and brains . . . disposed to swell and bleed” (108), and another 
about a man who is moved by “the back part of his brain, the part that deals with basic self-
preservation” to take a therapist’s advice (184). Wallace opens Girl with Curious Hair (1989) 
with a “sky” that “looks cerebral” with its “gray clouds . . . bulbous and wrinkled and shiny” 
(3). Later he refers to the “smoothness of the brain” (139), and to habits that should be “a 
deep autonomic wrinkle in DeHaven’s brain by now” (326). “The human brain is very dense,” 
says Marathe in Infinite Jest (1996), and the novel itself is dense with neurological injuries and 
abnormalities, with references to the “brain-meat behind” the eyes (230), the “operant limbic 
system” (373), and “sheer cerebral stress” (843). In Wallace’s first essay collection, A 
Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again (1997), he writes about “the lizardy part of my brain” 
(8), “neurological dysfunction” (240), “Some evolutionary retrograde reptile-brain part of the 
C[entral] N[ervous] S[ystem]” (283), and David Lynch as a creator whose films tap into “a set 
of allusive codes and contexts in the viewer’s deep-brain core” (164). In Brief Interviews with 
Hideous Men (1999), Wallace refers to “brain-warmed water” (6), “neural plug[s]” (106), 
“brain damage” (172), and “horrendous neural resonance” (255). Wallace’s third story 
collection, Oblivion (2004), has many “intricate exploded views of the human brain” (285): in 
“Mister Squishy,” the limbic portions of Schmidt’s brain” are said to “pursu[e] [a] line of 
thinking” (31) while others’ “individual neocortices worked to process the visual information 
and to scan their memories” (38); the narrator of “Good Old Neon” tries “hypnosis . . . the 
Landmark Forum, the Course in Miracles, a right-brain drawing workshop,” etc., to fix himself 
(142-43); and the narrator of “Oblivion” refers to his wife’s “and myself’s brains’ respective 
wave patterns” (225). Wallace’s second essay collection, Consider the Lobster (2005), takes 
                                                          
Richardson is trying to sell his new approach to literature, meaning he is trying to find “parallels between 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century medicine and the cognitive science of our own day” (147).  
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its title from the essay on the “neurology” of lobsters and “Pain reception . . . known to be 
part of a much older and more primitive system of nociceptors and prostaglandins that are 
managed by the brain stem and thalamus” (245). In other essays in this collection, Wallace 
refers to the “neural resonances” of American audiences (62), to “rules of language . . . already 
hardwired into people’s neocortex” (92), and to a “cortex-withering” sixteenth-century Latin 
English-usage guide (100n. 50). In The Pale King (2011), Chris Fogle explains that working in 
an IRS office “might actually change your brain” (156), while Meredith Rand says the same of 
mental health institutions, “because the structure of the brain gets changed” (481). Wallace 
himself enters the novel to explain that “a quirk of temporal memory” is that “one tends to 
fill in gaps with data acquired only later, sort of the same way the brain automatically works 
to fill in the visual gap caused by the optical cord” (298). In one of Wallace’s last essays, on 
the tennis player Roger Federer, he writes that “For promising junior players, refining the 
kinaesthetic sense is the main goal. . . . The training here is both muscular and neurological” 
(23-24).  
Wallace had an interesting and complicated relationship with materialist accounts of 
the self. The biological brain is clearly a key thread through all of Wallace’s writing, but there 
is another thread entangled with it. In an interview with Laura Miller in the year that Infinite 
Jest was published, Wallace listed a number of works and writers who make him “feel human 
and unalone and that I’m in a deep, significant conversation with another consciousness” (62), 
including the poetry of John Donne, Richard Crashaw, Philip Larkin, and W. H. Auden 
(Conversations 62-63). There is a line of continuity through these writers, from Donne (“Our 
bodies . . . are ours, though they are not we, we are / The intelligences, they the sphere” [34]) 
to Crashaw (“Go, smiling souls, your new-built cages break” [468]), through Auden (“And each 
in the cell of himself is almost convinced of his freedom” [1473]) and Larkin (“for which was 
built / This special shell?” [59]), with which it is not difficult to imagine Wallace (“Joelle van 
Dyne is excruciatingly alive and encaged” [Infinite Jest 222]) feeling considerable affinity. It is 
significant that the philosophers Wallace also gives in this list—Socrates, Schopenhauer, 
Descartes, Kant, and William James (Conversations 62)—all affirm the existence of something 
like the soul, something numinous in the otherwise material universe. As Antonio Damasio 
puts it, philosophy of the self is split down two paths: where materialists such as “David Hume 
. . . pulverised the self to the point of doing away with it,” others such as “William James . . . 
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affirm the existence of the self” (Self Comes to Mind 11). The philosophers Wallace lists as 
making him “feel human” are, significantly, not materialists in the tradition of Hobbes and 
Hume, but rather more in the tradition of the counter-enlightenment, with the same 
“capacities of spirit” as St. Paul, Rousseau, Dostoevsky, and Camus, who Wallace lists in a later 
interview (157). This line of continuity becomes especially clear once we accept that for 
Wallace to “feel human” (Conversations 62) there has to be something “in there” (Infinite Jest 
784).15 
Lucas Thompson has recently argued that Wallace “was a highly unorthodox reader of 
world literature, invariably engaging with transnational texts in ways that are at odds with 
contemporary scholars’ accounts of appropriate reading practices” (13). Because Wallace 
makes “assumptions of commonality and comparable experience” (13), he might be accused 
of appropriating others’ literary devices or thematic concerns “for use within an American 
context” (155) in a way that “blithely erase[s] [the] cultural particularities” of the source (214). 
Though it does not necessarily excuse this practice, perhaps one way to explain Wallace’s 
appropriation of an enormous range of different sources is Wallace’s conception of human 
beings as having some basic, shared nature. Patrick Colm Hogan has recently argued that  
Today, there is little enthusiasm among humanists for the study of universals. 
Indeed, it is barely even a concept within the humanities, where the focus of 
both theory and practice tends to be on “difference,” “cultural and historical 
specificity,” and so on. (37) 
Like most other cognitive literary scholars, Hogan is at pains to point out that “All reasonable 
students of literature—including those engaged in universalist projects—recognize that 
particularist research and interpretation are extremely valuable” (40). A healthy “universalist” 
approach to literature would only recognise that this particularity is built upon the 
“background of commonality” (40) that all human cultures share. Hogan gives an example 
                                                          
15 As Paul Giles points out, Wallace was clearly “more enthusiastic about” the “metaphysical propensities” of the 
British poets than the “ossified emphasis on social class and hierarchy in traditional English novels” (“All 
Swallowed Up” 15). Wallace is not alone in the view that literature can, and should, be a source of humanity: 
in “Modern Fiction” (1921), Virginia Woolf makes a similar point about British fiction, arguing that it should 
abandon trivial “materialis[m]” for the sake of its “soul” (158).  
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from the “influential volume” in postcolonial studies, The Empire Writes Back (1989), in which 
“Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin maintain that the notion of universality is ‘a 
hegemonic European critical tool’” (37). Hogan argues that  
no racist ever justified the enslavement of Africans or colonial rule in India on 
the basis of a claim that whites and nonwhites share universal human 
properties. Rather, they based their justifications on presumed differences 
among Europeans, Africans, and Indians, usually biological differences, but 
often cultural differences as well. (38) 
As Kwame Anthony Appiah puts it, “What they truly object to—and who would not?—is 
Eurocentric hegemony posing as univeralism” (qtd. in Hogan 38). 
Wallace’s great subject is what it is to be conscious, what it is to be human, and he is 
able to read and understand and engage with Dostoevsky or Descartes because there is an 
underlying commonality between human writers from different times that precedes cultural 
particularity. As Richardson argues, “there is every reason to believe (again in keeping with a 
basic scientific worldview) that minds were no less dependent on brains in [other eras] than 
they are now” (Neural Sublime 12). Though there is “no reason to think” that people in 
previous eras “held this to be the case” (Richardson Neural Sublime 12), we can accept that 
brains in the past were basically the same as they are now, without ignoring an individual 
text’s context. Obviously, Wallace was in every sense an American, and tied up with his 
cultural moment, but if his work was only about what it means to live in America then it would 
be boring at best and unintelligible at worst to those of us who do not have that privilege. 
Perhaps it is Wallace’s intention to speak to what it is to be human across the board that 
found him a large audience.16 
                                                          
16 In the original version of his essay, “Perchance to Dream” (1996), Jonathan Franzen addressed what he 
understood to be the increasing “ghettoiz[ation]” among young writers who have been “discouraged from 
speaking across boundaries” by a literary culture in which marginalisation is a badge of honour: anything 
published in the “Dark Ages before 1950” was the “Symptoms of Disease,” while the work of “women and 
of people from non-white or non-hetero cultures” was “Medicine for a Happier and Healthier World” (47). 
Franzen quotes a letter from Wallace, in which Wallace argued: “Tribal writers can feel the loneliness and 
anger and identify themselves with their subculture. . . . White males are the mainstream culture. So why 
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The question is: what is it to be human, for Wallace? There is no simple answer. 
Wallace seems to reject scientific accounts of the mind as often as he draws on them, and all 
of his work is animated by the tension between materialism on the one hand and essentialism 
on the other. Taking a cognitive historicist approach to Wallace’s writing is an ideal way to 
explore this problem. It brings a much needed focus on the cognitive sciences that directly 
inform so much of Wallace’s work, while allowing that Wallace himself was not a passive 
reader—a mere transmitter of ideas—but a writer engaged in the debate taking place during 
his lifetime.  
It is surprising that cognitive historicism has limited its reach to literature published 
before the twentieth century, because the fiction written during “the Decade of the Brain” is 
necessarily going to be shaped by the very discussions from which cognitive literary studies 
itself emerged.17 To take one small example, we have undiscussed landmarks in the 
contemporary landscape such as Tom Stoppard’s The Hard Problem (2015), a play set at a 
brain-science institute, and steeped in these debates about arts and cognition and the nature 
of the “three pounds of grey matter wired up in your head” (7). Just like the turn towards a 
cognitive literary studies, The Hard Problem marks an interesting turn from Stoppard’s earlier 
works, such as the postmodern, metafictional Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead (1967), 
                                                          
shouldn’t we angry, confused, lonely white males write at and against the culture?” Wallace adds: “Just 
about everybody with any sensitivity feels like there’s a party going on that they haven’t been invited to—
we’re all alienated” (51). Neither Wallace nor Franzen is so naïve that they ignore cultural difference, but 
perhaps both writers engage with cognitive science because it is uncovers a shared bedrock beneath all 
human cultures, and offers a way to try and “spea[k] across boundaries” (48).  
17 In the Poetics Today special issue, one which is devoted specifically to “rethinking the history of literature and 
culture from a cognitive standpoint” (Richardson and Steen, “Literature” 2), the discussion ranges from 
Steen’s essay on Aphra Behn’s Love-Letters Between a Nobleman and His Sister (1687), to Zunshine on Anna 
Barbauld’s Hymns in Prose for Children (1781), and finally to Richardson on Austen’s Persuasion (1817). 
Though collected together in a ‘historicist’ special issue, Steen and Zunshine apply contemporary models 
of mind to much older texts (Steen 115-16; Zunshine, “Rhetoric, Cognition, and Ideology” 131). Unlike 
Richardson, whose cognitive perspective is warranted by Austen’s own “unprecedented emphasis on head 
injury” (Richardson and Steen, “Literature” 6), Steen and Zunshine thus invite the critique of Adler and 
Gross who accuse Zunshine of “reductionism” and suggest that Steen’s essay reads like a “dysfunctional 
conversation” (201-02). 
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in which “Words, words [were] all we ha[d] to go on” (31). If the foundational premise of 
cognitive literary studies is that literary study should not isolate itself, the field should include 
a focus on recent fiction about exactly the same debates its critics are trying to untangle.  
There have been some studies in this direction. A small number of critics have begun 
to discuss an emerging subgenre of contemporary fiction that is explicitly engaged with the 
neuroculture and the sciences of mind. This subgenre has been variously called 
“neuronarratives” (Johnson), the “neuronovel” (Roth, “Rise of the Neuronovel”), the 
“neurological novel” (Gennero 311), and the “neo-phenomenological novel” (Waugh 25), and 
tends to be viewed as marking a shift from the novel about “the workings of a mind” to novels 
“wherein the mind becomes the brain” (Roth). Though the classifications are somewhat 
varied, the studies themselves are narrow, limited to all of three novels—Ian McEwan’s 
Enduring Love (1997), David Lodge’s Thinks… (2001), and, occasionally, Richard Powers’s 
Galatea 2.2 (1995)—all of which have a humanist and a scientist character playing their part 
in the two cultures debate, and all of which come to much the same conclusion: that these 
novels are borne out of an anxiety about the value of literature in the neurocultural world.18 
Marco Roth’s term “neuronovel” has gathered the most steam.19 For Roth, writing in 
the neuronovel genre is a way for contemporary novelists to “engage in the kind of stylistic 
experimentation habitual to modernist novelists,” an experimental impulse that has 
apparently been marginalised to such an extent that novelists need to sneak it into their work. 
Roth sees the project as a failure because, where modernism described the stream-of-
consciousness of the everyman, the neuronovel tries (and necessarily fails) to take a strange 
                                                          
18 According to Jonathan Greenberg, both McEwan and the central character in his novel Enduring Love (1997) 
are converts to a wholly scientific worldview (McEwan himself contributed an essay to Gottschall and 
Wilson’s The Literary Animal, arguing that “Literature must be our anthropology” [18]). Greenberg argues 
that Enduring Love’s ultimate defence of the arts is quite “in spite of” McEwan’s authorial intentions (119-
20n. 20). 
19 Roth divides the “neuronovel” into a further two categories: “hard” neuronovels such as McEwan’s Enduring 
Love, in which a “neurologically abnormal” character is employed as a “foi[l]” against which other 
“normals,” like the reader and the narrator, are contrasted, and “soft” neuronovels such as Jonathan 
Lethem’s Motherless Brooklyn (1999), in which “the author inhabits a cognitively anomalous or abnormal 
person and makes this character’s inner life the focus of the novel, soliciting our sympathies.” 
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neurological condition as its subject and, with it, “combine the pathological and the 
universal.” Like those who are frustrated by the lack of literary nuance in emerging fields of 
cognitive literary studies, Johnson and Roth take a negative view of the neuronovel, seeing it 
as an attempt by novelists to be scientists themselves, to contribute ‘valuable,’ empirical 
knowledge to scientific study, as opposed to their old job of being literary.20 This pessimism 
about the state of the novel in a neuroscientific age is perhaps a result of the field’s extremely 
limited purview. When Roth, for instance, suggests that the neuronovel only emerged in 1997 
with the publication of McEwan’s Enduring Love—one year after Wallace’s 
neuroscientifically-informed Infinite Jest, to name one obvious exclusion—and then goes on 
to lament that neuronovels lack everything that Infinite Jest has—“society . . . different classes 
. . . individuals interacting . . . development either alongside or against historical forces and 
expectations” (“Rise of the Neuronovel”)—his pessimism seems like a foregone conclusion 
given the extremely narrow range of novels he has chosen to consider.21  
To categorise Infinite Jest as one of Roth’s “neuronovels” would be to do it a disservice. 
Wallace did not, as Roth says of the neuronovelists, draw on neuroscience in order to cherry 
pick odd neurological disorders, nor is his novel about the “brain” only, but about the very 
                                                          
20 Gennero and Andrew Gaedtke are also critical of the encroachment of science but come to slightly more 
optimistic conclusions about the role of literature. Where Gennero suggests that Powers “manages to build 
a bridge across the two cultures by introducing the concept of storytelling as an instrument of truth” (323), 
Gaedtke suggests (in an essay also on McEwan and Lodge) that the “neuronovel” turns “toward cognitive 
science to renew its techniques for representing consciousness,” while also “reassert[ing] the centrality of 
narrative as a core cognitive operation through which consciousness is forged” (196). 
21 In Cognitive Fictions (2002), Joseph Tabbi is one of the few critics to discuss authors outside of the McEwan-
Powers-Lodge triumvirate. However, Tabbi pays little attention to the ongoing discussion about cognitive 
literary studies, and, though he looks at some novels which are specifically interested in the sciences of 
mind, Tabbi’s main goal is to adopt the contemporary model of cognition and the mind and apply it as a 
metaphor to literature’s role as a “mind within the new medial ecology” (xi). Tabbi takes only a cursory 
glance at Wallace in order to reject the “retro-realist attitudes” that Wallace is said to represent (79), and 
suggests that a new “cognitive realism” is emerging that is “based on notation and reportability rather than 
representation” (xxv). Hence Tabbi’s suggestion that “today’s socially engaged fiction is likely to read more 
like a writer’s journal” (82): a category which includes works like David Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress 
(1988), but excludes an enormous number of contemporary works of literature which are deeply “socially 
engaged” and, in ways beyond the narrow confines of Tabbi’s definition, cognitively engaged as well. 
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“workings of [the] mind” that Roth says are absent from the neuronovel. Part of the problem 
with Roth’s category is that it seems closed off from the history of literature. As David Lodge 
puts it, “literature is a record of human consciousness, the richest and most comprehensive 
we have” (10). For Wallace, the contemporary sciences of mind are not some passing fad, but 
the tail-end of a millennia-long dialogue about what it is to be human, and his work is much 
better served if we situate it—as he himself did—as part of a much larger philosophical and 
humanist tradition. In an essay near the beginning of his career, in 1988, when Wallace was 
beginning to lay down his own artistic ambitions, he condemned the kind of writing produced 
by students who went into writing programs to avoid any kind of broader humanist education 
(49). This is not to say that Wallace is naïve or old-fashioned, or that he revels in what he 
disparagingly calls the “humanistic syrup of Howard’s End” (Both Flesh 89). Wallace’s work is 
not gooey and saccharine but humanistic in the sense that is about the horrifying fact that we 
are all trapped inside “the sixteen-inch diameter of bone that both births & imprisons” us 
(82). 
The only work on Wallace and the brain, and the groundwork for my own study, has 
been Stephen J. Burn’s. Burn has discussed the neuroscientific sources Wallace drew upon in 
his writing of The Pale King (“Paradigm”), and Wallace’s earlier engagement with writers such 
as René Descartes and Gilbert Ryle in Infinite Jest (Reader’s Guide). Though Burn is not alone 
in characterising Wallace’s work as part of the post-postmodern turn in literature—there are 
other excellent studies such as Marshall Boswell’s Understanding David Foster Wallace 
(2003), which describes Wallace work as a negotiation between naïveté and postmodern 
cynicism (16), and Mary K Holland’s Succeeding Postmodernism (2013), which frames Wallace 
and others as having a “new faith in language” and “the novel’s ability to engage in humanist 
pursuits” as a result (1)—my project draws in particular on Burn’s formulation of post-
postmodern literature as that which gives more weight to “genetic inheritance” and the 
science and philosophy of the mind, brain, and body (Jonathan Franzen 25). Though fiction 
about the brain is not new, nor would neuroscience necessarily be a foreign concept to a 
postmodern novelist, I will explore the extent to which Wallace and his contemporaries mark 
out a new kind of fiction through their engagement with contemporary models of the brain 
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and self.22 Other critics have noted the central role that consciousness plays in Wallace’s work 
(Boswell, “Constant Monologue”; Understanding; Roiland; Woods), as well as the importance 
of the body (Banner; Nichols; Russell), and of the self more generally (Dulk; Elderon; Hayes-
Brady; Henry; Hogg; Jansen; Timmer), but none of them discuss the soul, nor the relationship 
between soul and body, which is central to Wallace’s construction of character.23 By bringing 
a new focus on the relationship between soul and body to Wallace’s work, I will bring these 
disparate discussions of the self into clearer focus, and build on Burn’s work in particular by 
focusing more on the matters of spirit.  
Each of my four chapters will be organised around my interpretation of a sustained 
metaphor that Wallace builds up across his work. These metaphors are, in order, the human 
form, the ghost, glass, fire, and water. In each chapter I explore a problem in Wallace’s work 
that he shares with his predecessors (authorship; selfhood; therapy; free will), and use each 
metaphor to illuminate how Wallace’s humanistic, dualist treatment of that problem marks 
his departure from postmodernism. Part of the reason for a thematic, rather than a 
chronological, approach is that Wallace’s greatest works, those which best express his 
multifaceted, complicated approach to human nature, and those which most deserve our 
                                                          
22 Burn in particular has worked to correct the strawman notion that postmodern fiction had no interest in the 
brain, noting that “nature persists in much postmodern fiction through the movement’s often-overlooked 
negotiations with the mind’s biological substrate” (“Webs” 66). As Burn argues, we should understand the 
difference between Wallace and his predecessors as the difference between the “different cultural 
matrixes” to which they belong and within which new generations of writers have “each give[n] a different 
inflection to the concept of character” (Jonathan Franzen 23). With this in mind, I will discuss Wallace’s 
engagement with postmodern theories of the body in more detail in chapter 2. Burn has also discussed the 
“heightened resonance [of] the word soul” in post-postmodern fiction (“Mapping” 46), though he sees the 
soul in Wallace’s work as being shot through with scientific language. I will be in dialogue with Burn 
throughout the following chapters, as I take a different, more soul-focused approach to Wallace’s work.  
23 Beyond the body of published criticism, Peter Sloane has argued that “the central concern and theme of all of 
[Wallace’s] fiction” is embodiment (48). While I agree that the body is important, Sloane’s focus on the 
body at the expense of the mind neglects half of the picture; more than the body itself, Wallace’s central 
concern is with the ‘I’ inside that body. Though Sloane very briefly acknowledges Wallace’s ghosts, he 
concludes with Wallace’s other critics that they are merely “illusion[s] of dis-incarnation” (176). I will both 
demonstrate that Wallace’s treatment of the self is more nuanced than this, and show that Wallace’s 
engagement with the body is part of his critique of postmodernism, which Sloane does not discuss. 
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attention, are his novels, Infinite Jest and the unfinished The Pale King. Though I will take into 
account the whole range of Wallace’s writing, from his collected and uncollected stories to 
his reviews, essays, interviews, and archival materials, I will ultimately build to a sustained 
reading of one of these metaphors in one of Wallace’s major novels.  
The other reason for a thematic approach is that Wallace’s treatment of human nature 
is remarkably consistent across his career. Though Infinite Jest marks a turning point for 
Wallace’s work in a number of ways, after which the soul and the ghost become more explicit 
in his writing, it is a change in emphasis rather than in ideas. This is, in part, because Wallace 
worked on many of his projects simultaneously (sections of The Pale King and Brief Interviews 
with Hideous Men were written during the period when Infinite Jest was getting published, 
for example), yet even in the early stories, long before Jest, there is the same preoccupation 
with interiority and human nature. Lastly, though this is a single-author study, Wallace did 
not write in isolation, and each of my chapters will draw on a number of different texts, both 
scientific and literary, to contextualise Wallace’s own work. Often these texts will have been 
undiscussed in Wallace studies, and will shed new light on his fiction.  
In chapter 1, I set out the key scientific sources for Wallace, and explain the embodied 
model of mind that informed both Wallace’s fiction and his accounts of himself as a writer. 
Drawing on the epigraph to The Pale King from the poet Frank Bidart, we will see that Wallace 
and Bidart each developed a poetics of embodiment with which to critique postmodern 
theories about the death of the author and the dissolution of the self. Wallace takes the 
metaphor of the human “form” from Bidart both to articulate the relationship between mind 
and body in his characters, and to describe the model of literary influence that informs his 
writing process. We can illuminate significant aspects of Wallace’s fiction if we allow that, like 
his characters, Wallace had a brain, that he read things, and that he held certain beliefs when 
he sat down to write.  
Having established the fundamental importance of the body to Wallace, we will look 
in chapter 2 to the ghosts that populate his fiction. Here we will see that Wallace was not the 
posthumanist that everyone takes him to be. From his very early stories, Wallace always 
wrote about human beings as having interiority, a ghost-like, soul-like self inside their body. 
René Descartes’s major influence on Wallace is much neglected in Wallace studies, and in this 
chapter I will discuss the Cartesian philosophy that runs throughout Wallace’s work. My 
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argument is that all of Wallace’s characters are governed by the metaphor of the ghost in the 
machine. Setting Wallace’s work against a backdrop of postmodern and posthumanist theory, 
we will see that Wallace’s treatment of the soul marks him apart from an earlier generation 
who viewed the body as posthuman, malleable, and hollowed out. I suggest in this chapter 
that Wallace’s work is better understood if we situate it in the context of science fiction, which 
often has a more conservative approach to posthumanism, insofar as it sees posthumanism 
as a bad thing.  
Where the first half of my project considers the nature of human beings more 
generally, the second half will be more focused on contemporary issues around selfhood such 
as therapy and addiction, and will therefore largely revolve around Infinite Jest. In chapter 3 I 
challenge the notion in Wallace studies that all of Wallace’s therapist characters are 
caricatures. Typically, when it comes to therapy, Wallace is considered to be yet another male 
postmodernist writing in a male, postmodern, parodic tradition. By broadening our 
understanding of Wallace’s influences to include a number of new writers, including Vladimir 
Nabokov, A. M. Homes, J. G. Ballard, Ken Kesey, and, most importantly, Sylvia Plath—who has 
a significant presence across a surprising amount of Wallace’s work—we will see that 
Wallace’s therapists and his treatment of illness are not as narrow as critics have assumed. 
There is a central metaphor of the glass jar or wall that runs through Wallace’s therapy 
fictions, which Wallace uses to articulate concerns about entrapment, subjectivity, and 
materialist medical science. This glass metaphor is complemented by a fire metaphor that 
Wallace uses throughout Infinite Jest to connote pain, a metaphor he draws from much older, 
anti-materialist texts by writers such as William Blake, William James, Shakespeare, and 
Milton. Exploring how these two metaphors work together will reveal that Wallace’s 
treatment of therapy and illness is in fact far more nuanced than has previously been 
suggested, and has much to do with his understanding of the soul’s role in a materialist 
universe. 
In the final chapter I will reconcile Wallace’s dualist accounts of body and mind. 
Wallace was drawing throughout his work on a specific model of the embodied mind but, as 
we have seen, his work is also emphatically dualistic, driven throughout by the tension 
between that model and more traditional accounts of selfhood. To write about the soul and 
body in this way raises the problems that philosophers have tackled for centuries: to what 
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extent do human beings have free will? Is the essential soul or the deterministic body in 
charge? What does Wallace mean, ultimately, by the self? Setting Wallace’s work against a 
range of postmodern paranoid fiction, in particular by Joseph Heller and Don DeLillo, we will 
see that Wallace’s treatment of determinism marks a significant shift away from 
postmodernism. The body is not a boundless, malleable text in Wallace’s fiction, but a 
stubbornly material entity in which the interior self is contained. In this chapter I will unpack 
the central water metaphor that Wallace uses to describe addiction and its effects on people. 
Tracing this metaphor through Infinite Jest will clarify the nature of the self and the role of 
free will in Wallace’s fiction.   
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Chapter 1 
“It’s much more boneheaded and practical than that”: 
Authorship and the Body 
 
This page was once plant material, crushed and sluiced and pressed 
through a machine in a warehouse, the process overseen by a man 
plagued with a skin infection. . . . Naturally the pages, which told the 
story of an uneventful journey, became infected with his particulate 
matter. 
—Amelia Gray, “Viscera” (Gutshot 143-44) 
The Death of David Foster Wallace 
Over the course of David Foster Wallace’s life our model of the mind was dramatically 
redrawn. We now understand that our consciousness, which seems to us to play such a 
central role in our lives, is in fact a very small, and not particularly powerful, part of the whole 
mind-body system. Most of the mind’s activity, which is to say most of the brain’s activity, is 
unconscious, out of our control and outside of our awareness. The “mind is what the brain 
does” (Pinker, How the Mind Works 21), and the brain’s job is to regulate the body with which 
it is intimately connected. This marks a stark departure from earlier accounts of the human 
mind in the twentieth century, where the brain was thought to be “essentially the same thing 
as a general-purpose ‘universal computer’ that just happened to be connected to a body” 
(Ramachandran 143). To try and draw a line between brain and body, or to go even further 
and separate mind from matter altogether, is to neglect the fundamentally interdependent 
relationship between the two. By the end of the twentieth century, in popular accounts such 
as Antonio Damasio’s Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (1994), the 
mind is understood to be “embodied, in the full sense of the term, not just embrained” (118).  
As David Hillman and Ulrika Maude explain, in The Cambridge Companion to the Body 
in Literature (2015), the “body has always been a contested site” (1) and “approaches to the 
body . . . tend to display an eclectic theoretical pluralism” (2). For Arthur Kroker, for instance, 
“Nothing is as imaginary as the material body. Circulating, fluid, borderless, with no certain 
boundaries or predetermined history”: we should not think of ourselves as “inhabit[ing] . . . a 
solitary body of flesh and bone but [as] the intersection of a multiplicity of bodies, with life 
itself as a fluid intersection of humans and plants and animals and minerals” (3; 15). For Judith 
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Halberstam and Ira Livingston, our “bodies were never in the womb. Bodies are determined 
and operated by systems whose reproduction is . . . asexual: capitalism, culture, professions, 
and institutions” (17). We have to be careful about our terms, then, when discussing the mind, 
brain, and body in Wallace’s work. While I do not wish to be reductive, in this chapter I will 
show that Wallace was reading and relying on a very specific, scientific model of the body and 
brain throughout his work, and when I use these terms I am referring to the evolved human 
organism that came out of a womb and is made of skin and bone and synapse. Though I will 
address Wallace’s engagement with the above kind of theory in chapter 2, my use of a 
biological model of the material body in this chapter will set the precedent for my whole 
project.  
The relationship between mind and body is at the heart of Wallace’s final, unfinished 
novel, The Pale King. Ostensibly “more like a memoir than any kind of made-up story” (69), 
The Pale King is apparently based on Wallace’s own experiences in the IRS’s Midwest Regional 
Examination Centre in Peoria, Illinois, and Wallace himself appears both as a character within 
a body within the novel, who observes and interacts with the other characters, and as the 
memoirist in the metafictive ‘Author Here’ chapters: “Author here. Meaning the real author, 
the living human holding the pencil. . . . All of this is true. This book is really true” (68-69). 
Though the book is not really true—Wallace did not work at the IRS, for instance—the 
narrative conceit that The Pale King is a factual account signals Wallace’s intention to explore 
what it might entail if one were to be wholly factual, to actually write a narrative that 
accurately represents the experience of living inside a human body. In one memoirist 
footnote, Wallace explains that 
I’m not going to be one of those memoirists who pretends to remember every 
last fact and thing in photorealist detail. The human mind doesn’t work that 
way, and everyone knows it; it’s an insulting bit of artifice in a genre that 
purports to be 100 percent ‘realistic.’ (259) 
Wallace makes a distinction between reality and “artifice,” between the reality of “living 
human” beings—like the author “holding the pencil”—who are constrained by the limitations 
of their own physical bodies, and the artifice of a mind that can see and access everything, a 
mind that would have to be detached from its bodily constraints in order to do so. Wallace 
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rejects this fantasy of the bodiless mind and the bodiless narrator, and suggests that doing so 
is a necessary step in writing a narrative that represents how the mind really does work.24  
As Chris Fogle, one of The Pale King’s better-read characters (who knows about 
theories of the mind, about “type A personalit[ies]” and the “dominant superego” [176]), 
explains: 
For myself, I tend to do my most important thinking in incidental, accidental, 
almost daydreamy ways. . . . I think this experience . . . is common, if perhaps 
not universal, although it’s not something that you can ever really talk to 
anyone else about because it ends up being so abstract and hard to explain. 
(192-93) 
The problem for Wallace is that Fogle’s (and our) primarily unconscious, subliminal 
experience, is “hard to explain” and dramatize because it frustrates both our commonsense 
conception of ourselves and the fundamental artifice that underlies what Wallace calls 
“capital-R Realism” (Conversations 129): the idea that fiction can be narrated by a single, 
unified, reliable consciousness.25 So when Wallace claims that The Pale King “is really true” 
                                                          
24 Though the narration in The Pale King shifts into the third person at times to access the thoughts of other 
characters, in some ways transcending the boundaries of the author’s head, the narration in each individual 
scene always, as Wallace put it in an early interview, “antagonize[s] the reader’s sense that what she’s 
experiencing as she reads is mediated through a human consciousness” (Conversations 34). This is true 
across Wallace’s writing. In Infinite Jest, for instance, what seems like a distanced third person narration 
will turn out, after many hundreds of words, to have been from one person’s perspective after all: “And 
then the palsied newcomers . . . Don Gately’s found, then get united” (349). Wallace can imagine himself 
into many different minds, but each is “marooned in [their] own skull” (Conversations 22), just as Wallace 
himself, as we shall see, is ultimately limited to the boundaries of his own head when he is writing. 
25 Wallace talks a lot about Realism without ever giving a particularly satisfying definition of the term. Wallace’s 
frustration with what he calls “capital-R Realism” (Conversations 129) seems to stem from his conflict with 
the standard model of fiction in the MFA program he attended at the University of Arizona, a ‘Realism’ 
which was canonised by “older professors” who “scorned” Wallace and his contemporaries for writing 
about “pop culture or advertizing or television” (130). In a similar vein, in conversation with David Lipsky, 
Wallace characterises Realism as an out-dated relic of the age of Tolstoy: to write in such a way now, he 
suggests, would be to “impos[e] an order and sense and ease of interpretation on experience that’s never 
there in real life” (37). Wallace’s definition surely lacks some historical nuance (were Tolstoy’s life and 
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(69), though on one level he’s playfully pointing to the statement’s untruth, he is at the same 
time setting up The Pale King as a self-conscious interrogation of exactly what having a mind 
really entails. How does one write about consciousness, authorship, and the world, when the 
“epoch of the I”—of the reliable observer—“is drawing to a close” (Nørretranders ix)? This 
problem is keenly felt by Wallace because authors themselves, as he knew only too well, have 
bodies too.  
The “Author Here” sections of The Pale King have received a lot of critical attention, 
perhaps because one of the key areas of interest in Wallace studies has been Wallace’s 
metafiction, and the “Author Here” sections bookend a line of Wallace’s metafictive stories: 
“Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way,” “Octet,” and “Good Old Neon.” Yet despite 
a considerable volume of work on Wallace the writer, Wallace’s consistent descriptions of the 
author’s body, and of the embodied relationship between author and their work, has been 
almost entirely undiscussed. Because the Wallace character in The Pale King “disappears,” as 
Wallace put it in one of his notes, to become a “creature of the system” (548), critics such as 
Mark McGurl, Jeffrey R. Di Leo, Mike Miley, Stephen Taylor Marsh, and Toon Staes do not 
comment on the author’s body, but have instead interpreted the novel as enacting, in 
different ways, what Barthes famously called “the death of the Author” (Image 148).  
The critical consensus is that Wallace appears in the novel only to die and leave his 
work in the hands of the reader and the reading public (a move that has been “profoundly 
ironized,” as McGurl writes, by Wallace’s actual death [48]). For McGurl, the author-
character’s “disappearing from the novel is tantamount to disappearing into the system it 
represents,” which in Wallace’s case is “the contemporary institution of literature” itself (48). 
Mike Miley has argued that the disappearance of the author-character in The Pale King is a 
way for ‘David Wallace’ to try and kill ‘David Foster Wallace,’ the “persona” which, with his 
rising fame, had overshadowed the real man (202). Like McGurl, Miley argues that Wallace 
can never really kill the version of himself that is “a creature of the literary system” (203). 
                                                          
writing so simple?), though this can perhaps be put down to Wallace’s need to carve a space in the 
contemporary book market for his own brand of difficult, innovative fiction that rejects ‘Realist’ linearity in 
order to more realistically represent what it feels like to live amidst the “barrage” of “input” that assaults 
modern brains (Lipsky 37). This line of thinking is once again picked up in The Pale King.   
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Jeffrey R. Di Leo—for whom a theoretical “resurrection of the author is simply not acceptable” 
(123)—claims that Wallace never wanted The Pale King published, and that his intentions and 
presence as an author have been manufactured by his publishers for cynical reasons: “Funny 
how the sovereignty of the dead conveniently emerges when there is an opportunity for 
corporate profit.” (132). Like Miley, Di Leo says that the persona of ‘David Foster Wallace’ is 
the only one the reader can ever know. Stephen Taylor Marsh and Toon Staes trace a similar 
line, making a distinction between the fleshy David Wallace, who is necessarily absent from 
the text, and the paper David Foster Wallace, to whom we have access. For Marsh, The Pale 
King enacts the death of the author. He argues that “Wallace, the physical one, cannot be 
found in” The Pale King (115), just as we should not try to find “the flesh-and-blood” author 
in Wallace’s other works: “Wallace’s background . . . does not alter the underlying creative 
labor or final artistic drive of the novel, arising out of the implied author David Foster Wallace” 
(117, my emphasis). Staes uses the same language as Marsh in his essay on The Pale King, 
arguing that “Readers construct an image of the author while they read that in all likelihood 
differs widely from the flesh-and-blood person” (“Work in Process” 81, my emphasis).  
Each of these critics explicitly rehearses the same Barthesian paradigm about the 
death of the author and the birth of the reader (McGurl 48; Di Leo 124; Miley 196; Marsh 122; 
Staes, “Work in Process” 81). Though the death of the author is, unfortunately, a fact for 
Wallace studies following Wallace’s suicide, and while I share the view of these critics that we 
should not chase crude biographical readings of Wallace’s work, what I will argue in this 
chapter is that we are wrong to ignore the flesh-and-blood author completely. When Wallace 
writes about the act of writing he describes, very specifically, an embodied self, an authorial 
consciousness that writes from inside a body and brain. As Wallace puts it in one interview: 
talking about the work after the fact is “very different than what it’s like to actually do things” 
(Conversations 135). “[S]itting in a bright, quiet room in front of the paper it’s much more, 
uhhh does this make me want to throw up? . . . It’s much more boneheaded and practical 
than” the “critical discourse” that happens in interviews after-the-fact (135). However we 
want to frame the work, it emerges in the first place from inside a bone head.  
All of Wallace’s fiction, from his first published story “The Planet Trillaphon As it Stands 
in Relation to the Bad Thing” (1984) to The Pale King, is animated by the problematic 
relationship between mind and body, and his essays and reflections on authorship are no 
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different. As Seán Burke puts it in Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern (1995), 
“Authorship, like cosmology, remains a source of fascination for believers and non-believers 
alike since the issues which it raises reflect any given society’s sense of being in the world” 
(xv). Wallace’s understanding of the nature of authorship comes from the same place as his 
understanding of the self more generally. Once we recognise how central a role the sciences 
of the brain and embodied mind play in the work that Wallace has produced, then we can 
understand how central a role embodiment plays, for Wallace, in the process of production 
itself. Where Wallace studies have until now tread familiar ground regarding the death of the 
author, in this chapter I will argue that Wallace’s model of the embodied author is best 
understood as part of a society-wide shift in what Burke calls our “sense of being in the 
world,” a shift that challenges Barthes in particular, and postmodern theories of authorship 
and selfhood more broadly. Lee Konstantinou is the only critic to suggest that Wallace 
explicitly rejects Barthes, arguing that Wallace transforms the “sham honesty” of postmodern 
metafiction into a tool that tries to genuinely “cause the reader to experience a form of 
connection with Wallace as a writer . . . not ‘Dave Wallace’ the character, but the author” (98, 
my emphasis). While I will also argue in this chapter that Wallace rejects Barthes, my focus in 
this chapter will be on the embodied author and the bodied relationship between Wallace 
and his work, not on the relationship between author and reader, and not on the problem of 
irony, “postironic belief” or “nonnaïve noncynicism” which are the basis of Konstantinou’s 
article (85).26 
While some critics have discussed the significance of the body in Wallace’s work, only 
Jeffrey Severs and Stephen J. Burn have (briefly) discussed the connection in Wallace’s writing 
between the body and the authorial self. Severs, drawing on Wallace’s biography, 
                                                          
26 Adam Kelly does also gesture away from Barthes when he argues that in Wallace studies (because of Wallace’s 
influential statements about his own ambitions as a writer) “Barthes’s dead author” has been supplanted 
by “intention . . . co-exist[ing] with theory, resulting in fresh forms of critical engagement.” Stephen J. Burn 
has argued, however, that “a willingness to consider Wallace’s statements more critically will strengthen 
future Wallace studies”: “Surely Wallace—who was educated while Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault reigned 
in the humanities—would not have expected his claims to be so rigidly legitimated by his authorial 
signature” (467). Though I am primarily concerned in this chapter with the importance of embodiment for 
Wallace, both as a writer and in his fiction, I will return to the problem of authorial intention. 
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persuasively argues that the John Keats poem about “This living hand, now warm and 
capable” (qtd. in Severs 20) was Wallace’s “standard for a text’s ability to offer an embodied 
relationship to the reader” (20), though this is a small point in Severs’s larger argument that 
the authorial hand is markedly different from the “‘Invisible Hand’ of self-correcting capitalist 
markets” (20). Burn is the only critic to emphasise the centrality of the material brain in 
Wallace’s work, and argued in “‘A Paradigm for the Life of Consciousness’: Closing Time in The 
Pale King” (2012) that, in the light of Wallace’s own reading in contemporary neuroscience, 
the novel can be read as a “dissociative projection of the mind that dramatizes the 
unconscious, rather than the conscious” (386). Neither critic dwells on the role of Wallace’s 
own body and brain in the writing process. In this chapter I want to build upon Burn’s work 
on the neuroscientific sources for The Pale King, and explore the undiscussed but significant 
connection between the body and authorship for Wallace both in that novel and throughout 
his work.27 To understand Wallace’s role as a bodied author-character in The Pale King, we 
first have to understand how Wallace engaged with the contemporary model of the 
embodied mind throughout his career. 
 
The Mind behind Wallace’s Work 
The contemporary model of the material, embrained mind governs all of Wallace’s writing. 
This is the case even at the level of setting: each of Wallace’s three novels is literally set inside 
                                                          
27 The body in Wallace’s work has received some attention in other contexts. Clare Hayes-Brady, for instance, 
sees the “question of embodiment” as being “critical to a reading of Wallace’s gender politics,” with his 
“bodies tend[ing] to conform to the physical, active male and the ethereal, passive female” (“Personally” 
71). Similarly, Olivia Banner argues that Wallace’s story “The Suffering Channel” “demonstrates . . . just how 
fragile . . . ‘solidly masculine bodies and [their] texts’ feel at the turn of the century” (89). Catherine Nichols 
takes a different view of the body, arguing that through Infinite Jest’s grotesque bodies Wallace rejects the 
postmodern carnival, that celebrated space where rules and order breakdown. Wallace’s carnival is quite 
different, a “troubling” place (6) where characters’ selves are not liberated by masks but “suppress[ed] . . . 
beneath” their masks’ “deliberate artifice” (13). Emily Russell argues that Nichols treats Wallace’s disabled 
characters as “a means to an end” (168n. 7), and instead reads Wallace’s work as “destabilizing dominant 
norms” about the body (166), seeing parallels between the “freakish textual for[m]” of Wallace’s novels 
and “the bodies of the characters” within: “unusual physical bodies provide a model for reading the textual 
body and vice versa” (147).  
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the human head. Firstly, most of the action in The Broom of the System takes place in “East 
Corinth, Ohio,” which has the “luxuriant and not unpopular shape” of the “profile of Jayne 
Mansfield” (45). Wallace explains that if one looks down onto the town from “Shaker 
Heights,” one sees “a nimbus of winding road-networks,” “a sinuous . . . curve of . . . highway,” 
and “a huge, swollen development of factories” (45). Like the underlying veins and 
musculature of a human face, the complicated road “networks,” “sinuous” (we might also 
read: sinew-ous) highways, and swollen developments are all very bodied descriptions of the 
constituent bits and pieces that go together to make up the whole town. Just as our individual 
cells and neurons have no knowledge of the larger system in which they play a part, the 
constituents of the town—the roads and residents that make it up—are “unaware of the 
shape of their town” (46) from the inside. Though from the outside one sees the shape of the 
head, it is the sum of its parts, as the human head is the sum of its internal workings.  
As Wallace writes later in the novel, the “head” is  
positively dominated and defined by the shape of the skull underneath. The 
skin stretched tight over that skull. A skull that seems to me perhaps to 
threaten to burst through and end the whole charade. Yecch. (300) 
The human face is mere “charade,” another artifice. The reality that we try to avoid seeing is 
that we are all boneheaded biology underneath. For Wallace to set the action of his first novel 
inside an enormous human head emphasises both how central boneheadedness is to his 
aesthetic, and the extent to which the contemporary model of the embodied mind is in the 
zeitgeist: the idea that the mind is skull-bound is literally what Wallace’s characters live inside. 
As Wallace would later write, as the epigraph to Everything and More: A Compact History of 
∞ (2003), “It is not what’s inside your head, it’s what your head’s inside” (ix). Just as Wallace’s 
head was inside an intellectual climate where it was understood that the mind is embodied, 
so too are the characters and settings inside Wallace’s head necessarily shaped by what 
Wallace’s head was inside: it’s bone heads all the way down.28 
                                                          
28 The Everything and More epigraph is actually written in “esoteric ancient Greek,” and I have quoted Wallace’s 
translation of it from his interview with Caleb Crain (Conversations 125). 
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Though Wallace hints at something more ethereal inside East Corinth’s head with the 
word “nimbus,” which can mean a “halo” (OED), we can also read the description of a “nimbus 
of winding road-networks” as one that roots that nimbus to the ground. The interconnecting 
highways do not make a single circle—a “halo”—but instead wind together to make up a kind 
of cloud, a complex weather system comprising discrete, interflowing parts. This 
mind/weather metaphor is one that Wallace picks up again and again throughout his writing. 
In “Little Expressionless Animals” Wallace sets the scene with the “gray clouds” that look 
brainlike, “bulbous and wrinkled and shiny. The sky looks cerebral” (Girl 3). We see it again in 
Wallace’s essay, “Getting Away from Already Pretty Much Being Away from it All,” in which 
he charts his cognitive experience—given his “basic neurological makeup” (Supposedly 132)—
of the Illinois State Fair. The essay’s overarching subject (Wallace’s cognitive experience) is 
foregrounded by Wallace’s description of the “fog,” on the essay’s second page, “hang[ing] 
just over the fields like the land’s mind” (84). What this sustained metaphor tells us is that 
Wallace views the mind as being land-dependent: like a road network and a weather system 
it is messy and hard to pin down, but necessarily shaped by the ridges and folds of the ground 
over which it flows.29 
Though a go-to move in Wallace’s fiction, we can see something similar going on in 
other fiction from this period. Compare Wallace’s bulbous grey clouds, for instance, to Denis 
Johnson’s description in Jesus’ Son (1993) of the “clouds like great grey brains,” a simile that 
gestures towards the drug- and violence-induced “storm” to come in the narrator’s own brain 
(5). The brain is dotted throughout Johnson’s collection. In “Work” he describes the narrator 
and Wayne pulling “copper wire” from an old building (58), which, following the brain imagery 
at the beginning of the collection, reads like an empty skull being stripped of its brain-wiring. 
                                                          
29 Wallace would pick this up again in his later stories. In Infinite Jest, when Hal and Stice are in a “moment of 
total mentation” and unconsciously focused on their tennis, the “air” around them matches their mental 
state: “now so clear it seemed washed, after the clouds” (653). This calmness is in contrast to “Oblivion,” a 
story about a sleep-deprived character’s “disorientation” (Oblivion 191), which significantly opens with that 
character on a golf course “when the thunderstorm broke” (190). The grey brain-clouds snap open, 
foregrounding the narrator’s more local cerebral problems. Similarly, we have Sylvanshine’s description in 
The Pale King of mind-like clouds that are “disappointing” once “you were inside them . . . It just got really 
foggy” (16).  
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This kind of patterning takes place in Wallace’s work too, such as in Infinite Jest, where he 
describes the hospital building for strung out addicts as being “stripped of equipment and 
copper wire” (193). However, where Broom and Wallace’s early stories make brief references 
to brains and heads in the way that Johnson also does around this time, in Infinite Jest the 
bodied setting is constant and explicit.  
As Paul Quinn explains, Infinite Jest’s  
metro Boston is not so much a Body Public, or Body Politic, as a Body 
Institutional. MIT’s “cerebral rooftop,” complete with “convolutions,” (IJ 950) 
provides the brain; the Enfield Tennis Academy (E.T.A.) is shaped like a heart, 
and boasts an inflatable lung; many-institutioned Enfield is itself positioned as 
an extended “arm” of the city. (89)30 
As with Broom’s skull-shaped town, Infinite Jest is governed—though much more consistently 
than the first novel—by a pattern of physical containment and entrapment. This pattern 
stretches to the scale of the whole country, with the novel’s citizens living trapped inside the 
“walled nation” (127) of “Experial[ist] America” (421); it continues at the scale of buildings, as 
Quinn has noted; and it goes right the way down to the scale of characters such as Hal, who 
“lace[s]” fingers “behind his upraised head . . . cupping his own skull” (110). The small head-
shaped setting in Broom becomes a central, sustained metaphor in Infinite Jest, where the 
citizens of the Organization of North American Nations are, on all scales and in every sense, 
“excruciatingly alive and encaged” (222).  
Along with this expansion from a town’s head-shaped map in Broom to the map of the 
entire North American continent in Infinite Jest, the word “map” itself takes on a whole new 
significance for Wallace. In the argot of Infinite Jest’s future Boston, characters talk about 
their addiction to various forms of pain-relief as something that threatens to “eliminate their 
own map[s] for keeps” (220), just as, on a much larger scale, the novel’s Organization of North 
                                                          
30 Stephen J. Burn calls this the “bodily gestalt” that governs Wallace’s fiction from Broom onwards (“Webs” 64). 
Tom LeClair noted as early as 1996 that the world of Infinite Jest “resemble[s] a prodigious human body” 
(35), while Heather Houser also pays particular attention to the bodied landscape in Infinite Jest, arguing 
that Wallace “imbricates the body in [the novel’s] environments” to induce disgust and therefore empathy 
for the environment in the reader (131).  
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American Nations is willing to reconfigure its own map to relieve itself of the responsibility of 
dealing with its own waste (407). This term “map” is not just, as Clare Hayes-Brady argues, a 
synonym for “identity” (Unspeakable 72), but it also very specifically articulates the 
relationship between mind and matter. Like Wallace’s description of the fog as the “land’s 
mind” (Supposedly 84), a map is separate to, but dependent on, the geography that it 
represents. The word “map” is a mainstay in the sciences of mind, which Wallace significantly 
defines in Infinite Jest as the study of the “topography” of the “human body’s brain” (48, my 
emphasis). The neurologist A. R. Luria, who gives his name to the character “Luria P.” in the 
novel (1030n. 156), describes the dark age of brain cartography, when “the textbooks . . . 
were filled with vague suppositions and fantastic conjectures that made maps of the brain 
scarcely more reliable than medieval geographers’ maps of the world” (23). In The Man Who 
Mistook His Wife for a Hat (1985), which Wallace had also read (Conversations 118), Oliver 
Sacks describes the beginnings of “cerebral neurology, which made it possible, over the 
decades, to 'map' the human brain, ascribing specific powers—linguistic, intellectual, 
perceptual, etc.—to equally specific 'centres' in the brain” (3). In The Language Instinct 
(1994), Steven Pinker, to whom Wallace also alludes in Jest (987n. 24), explains that the “brain 
is divided into maps of visual, auditory, and motor space that literally reproduce the structure 
of real space" (303). Wallace was clearly aware of the word’s use in this context: in one of the 
interviews in Brief Interviews with Hideous Men, he describes “entire psychological maps . . . 
being redrawn” (91). In Infinite Jest Wallace does occasionally use the term to refer to what 
seems to be the face—“Gately likes Green because he seems to have got sense enough to 
keep his map shut when he’s got nothing important to say” (276)—but it is mostly used in 
instances where ‘face’ would make no sense: “She hung herself . . . as in eliminated her own 
map” (848). I suggest that where ‘face’ is an appropriate interpretation we might still read 
the term as being about the mind and brain beneath that face. Almost all uses of the word 
“map” in Infinite Jest (except when discussing an actual map) might be read in this way, with 
facial expressions and body language being expressions of the brain topography 
underneath.31  
                                                          
31 When the term “map” is used to describe the character Lenz “Demapping rats” (Infinite Jest 541), this suggests 
either that it applies to any form of life with a brain and some level of mind, or that Lenz is unable to imagine 
what it is like to be anything other than his own relentless self. 
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Though Wallace would not read Tor Nørretranders’s The User Illusion (1998) until after 
the publication of Infinite Jest, Nørretranders sums this idea up best. “Consciousness,” he 
explains, “is one’s very own map of oneself and one’s possibilities of intervening in the world” 
(292). Consciousness is a map of the body and brain’s terrain, a simulation of the real world 
that we have no direct, 1:1 access to. I suggest that Infinite Jest’s “map” comes from the 
sciences of mind that formed so much of the foundation of Wallace’s work. The word reminds 
us that Wallace’s characters exist in a world in which they think about themselves in 
neuroscientific terms, as people whose maps are chained to the matter those maps describe.  
We can see then that when, in his final novel, Wallace describes the IRS as a large scale 
version of a human skull and brain, this is the endpoint of a long pattern of such imagery in 
his fiction.32 In The Pale King’s second chapter, when Claude Sylvanshine stresses about “what 
you gave attention to vs. what you willed yourself to not,” his reflections on one individual 
mind’s problems segue into the problem of “organization structure[s]” (14) more generally. 
The problem for small structures such as Sylvanshine’s brain and large ones such as the IRS 
are the same: “information and the filtering and dissemination of information” (14). Wallace’s 
later description of the “administrative structure and organization of the IRS” as being “so 
complicated, and consist[ing] of so many branches, sub-branches, divisions, and coordinating 
offices and sub-offices . . . that it appeared impossible to comprehend” (247-48) continues 
this pattern, recalling once again the language that scientists use to describe the brain. The 
sub- and sub-sub pathways and divisions, all of which are co-ordinating simultaneously, 
mirror the structure of the brain’s seemingly incomprehensible matrix of neural pathways. 
Later still, the IRS’s computer system is said to be so complex that its structure of pathways 
cannot be completely upgraded, because one cannot “divert all that traffic” while the old 
“freeway[s]” are replaced (412n. 1). Hence why  
                                                          
32 The pattern of imagery is not fully worked out in The Pale King because elsewhere in the novel the IRS is 
described as the “nation’s beating heart” (103). In one of the cut scenes included in the paperback edition, 
an unnamed narrator reflects that “It is also possible to see the federal government as the people’s heart 
as a People—as the Constitution is Our brain—and the Service as the forceful contractions of that heart” 
(551). Wallace typically resists simplicity, but perhaps this pattern would have been made more consistent 
in later drafts of the novel. 
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many of the fixes and upgrades were temporary and partial and, in retrospect, 
wildly inefficient, e.g. trying to increase processing power by altering 
antiquated equipment to accommodate slightly less antiquated computer 
cards . . . requiring all kinds of violent alterations for Fornix equipment that 
was already old and fragile. (412n. 1)  
This alludes, too, to the “wildly inefficient” evolution of the human brain, in which newer 
systems are built on top of the pre-existing, “antiquated” equipment that belonged to the 
species from which human beings evolved. As Damasio puts it, “Nature appears to have built 
the apparatus of rationality not just on top of the apparatus of biological regulation, but also 
from it and with it” (Descartes’ Error 128). The problem for The Pale King’s characters is that 
in this model they, who are described in one instance as “some long gray line of faceless 
supplicants” (262), effectively make up the IRS’s anonymous grey matter. Like the characters 
in Wallace’s previous two novels, they are largely unaware of the enormous complexity in 
which they play a very small part. The working of their own brains is alien to them, as they 
are alienated by their work in an enormous, brain-shaped office.  
Though the model of the embodied, embrained mind is clearly central through all of 
Wallace’s writing, we know that he was drawing on a very specific contemporary model when 
he wrote The Pale King. This model is articulated in Tor Nørretranders’s The User Illusion: 
Cutting Consciousness Down to Size (1998), Timothy D. Wilson’s Strangers to Ourselves: 
Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (2002), and, to a lesser extent, Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow: The Classic Work on How to Achieve Happiness (1990) and Malcolm 
Gladwell’s Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking (2005), all of which were in Wallace’s 
working library.33 Though the minds of Wallace’s characters in his earlier fiction were clearly 
the product of their bodies and brains, in The Pale King he draws specifically on the model of 
                                                          
33 Burn briefly mentions Nørretranders, and focuses in some detail on Wilson, in his article “‘A Paradigm for the 
Life of Consciousness’: Closing Time in The Pale King.” Where Burn focuses on Wilson’s model of the 
unconscious mind, in particular with regard to the character Claude Sylvanshine and his “sensory overload” 
(384), I will draw primarily on Nørretranders and a little on Wilson to look at questions of embodiment and 
the self. Staes and Severs also briefly mention Nørretranders’s The User Illusion, but use it to refer only to 
information overload, which I will not be doing here (“Work in Process” 75; Balancing Books 171; 242). 
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mind as it is articulated in these four works, a model that has a primary focus on the small 
role that consciousness plays within the whole mind-body system.  
In The User Illusion, for example, Nørretranders explains that the last decade of the 
twentieth century saw the “breakthrough in the scientific acknowledgement that man is not 
transparent to himself” (161), that the conscious self is mostly blind and plays a very small 
role in all that makes up the human being. A wide acceptance of this idea was delayed in the 
middle of the century by the hysteria in the 1950s concerning subliminal advertising, but by 
the last decades of the twentieth century, the fact that “most of the information that passes 
through a person is not picked up by consciousness, even when this information has a 
demonstrable effect on behaviour” was becoming increasingly widespread and accepted 
(161).34  
Nørretranders’s argument is that 
There is a difference between the I and the person as a whole. . . . The I is the 
conscious player. The Me is the person in general. . . . The term Me embraces 
the subject of all the bodily actions and mental processes that are not initiated 
or carried out by the I, the conscious I. (257-58) 
Like a computer’s user interface, which masks the complex machinery and code that are the 
real language of computer systems, our consciousness is simply the human mind’s “User 
Illusion” (291-92). The illusion we all have is that the conscious self, the ‘I,’ is aware of—and 
in charge of—everything, when actually it is just a small part of the whole person, the ‘Me,’ 
                                                          
34 As widespread as it was, indeed, in the beginning of the century, when Sigmund Freud wrote that “the research 
of the present time . . . seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must 
content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind” (qtd. in Tallis 71). 
Nørretranders acknowledges Freud and the dominance of the unconscious at either end of the century, 
noting the change in attitude by those in the natural sciences who previously “looked down on the 
psychoanalytical tradition, with all its talk of unconscious drives,” only now to criticize the psychoanalysts 
for not taking the unconscious “seriously enough!” (166). Wilson does explain, however, that there is a 
difference between what he calls the adaptive unconsciousness and the Freudian unconscious, with the 
former being a description of the many nonconscious, inaccessible systems that make a healthy mind 
function, and the latter a “bubbling cauldron below” that one could access if you could only “remov[e] 
repression” (219). 
42 
 
which takes into account the hugely complex matrix of nonconscious processes going on 
between mind, brain, and body. Nørretranders’s book is, in part, a history of information 
theory, and so he gives the example that “every single second, millions of bits of information 
flood in through our senses. But our consciousness processes only perhaps forty bits a 
second—at most” (125). It would be impossible (and nightmarish) if we needed to consciously 
sort through all this information, or to consciously regulate our myriad bodily processes. By 
the time those small forty bits reach our consciousness, all the processing has already been 
done by something other than what we think of as ourselves.  
Wilson equates the adaptive unconscious (a term “meant to convey that nonconscious 
thinking is an evolutionary adaption” [23]) to a “collection of city-states,” which function 
below consciousness and account for most of the activity in the mind and body (7). Like the 
Jayne Mansfield-shaped city in Broom, a healthy, functioning brain is a complex community 
of different interconnected systems that, together, produce a map—a representation of 
those systems—that is the conscious self. Because consciousness is just the map of this terrain 
and effectively—to paraphrase Wilson’s title—a stranger to itself, it is a mere observer of the 
consequences of most of the ‘Me’’s activity that goes on “outside [its] purview” (48). The 
slow, “conscious verbal self,” explains Wilson, “often does not know why we do what we do 
and thus creates an explanation that makes the most sense,” with “no realization that [its] 
explanations are works of fiction” (97). The remarkable consequence of this is that other 
people therefore understand our own behaviour better than we can, and that we must be 
perceptive self-biographers of our own strange actions in order to understand ourselves. As 
Csikszentmihalyi explains, our capacity for conscious thought is limited by the mechanics of 
the brain: the “nervous system has definite limits on how much information it can process” 
(28). The key to happiness, then, is to embrace that fact, to try not to control everything but 
simply “achiev[e] control over the contents of our consciousness” (2).35  
Gladwell’s Blink is an effectively secondary or tertiary source that summarises the 
more expert works of both Damasio (59) and Wilson (11), an approach that has raised the ire 
of experts in the fields he condenses. Steven Pinker, for example, criticises Gladwell for 
                                                          
35 “Csikszentmihalyi” is the uncommon name given to one of the students at E.T.A. in Infinite Jest (1072n. 324), 
suggesting Wallace read his book much earlier than Nørretranders’s or Wilson’s. 
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“unwittingly demonstrat[ing] the hazards of statistical reasoning and . . . occasionally 
blunder[ing] into spectacular failures” (“Malcolm Gladwell”). Blink will play a smaller role in 
this chapter, therefore, but I include it for a number of reasons. Wallace certainly admired 
Gladwell’s capacity for “plainness, lucidity, and the sort of magical compression that enriches 
instead of vitiates” enough to include Gladwell’s essay, “What the Dog Saw,” in The Best 
American Essays 2007 collection that he guest-edited (“Deciderization”).36 It is also a very 
useful source in the context of a much broader neuroculture, because Gladwell’s bestseller 
status demonstrates that the contemporary model of our largely unconscious minds is 
increasingly part of what Jonathan Lethem calls the “world-mind”: the “collective brain” that 
we can excavate from different generations’ bookshelves (Ecstasy of Influence 13-14). The 
powerful unconscious, which has us, as Gladwell’s subtitle puts it, “Thinking without 
Thinking,” is increasingly part of our collective consciousness and the way we view ourselves 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
It is this model of the mind and selfhood that Wallace draws on to construct his 
characters, and which his characters draw on to understand themselves, throughout The Pale 
King. From Wallace’s archival notes we can see that he was reading and quoting from 
Nørretranders a great deal (at least four separate times in one notebook, HRC 40.8b), and 
that he had absorbed this model into his own thinking. In one collection of notes about 
Wallace’s “Fear, lack of confidence,” he writes: “Realize that it’s in ‘me,’ not in the real ‘I.’ . . . 
It feels bad, but I can also observe it feeling bad. . . . The ‘I’ is what observes it” (HRC 36.1). 
There are numerous examples of this model filtering into the novel itself. One group of 
characters are said to “all ha[ve] unconscious habits of which maybe only Hurd, as the new 
one, was fully aware” (353-54), an echo of Wilson’s point that “other people might know us 
better than we know ourselves” because they “form impressions from our automatic, 
uncontrolled actions” (84), and Nørretranders’s point that through our unconscious habits 
“others have access to a knowledge of the millions of bits in our brains that never reach our 
consciousness” (151). Similarly, Nørretranders’s and Gladwell’s summary of research into 
                                                          
36 In what might be a minor coincidence, Wallace’s editor since Infinite Jest, Michael Pietsch, is also thanked in 
Gladwell’s acknowledgements in Blink for being one of a number of people who “guided this manuscript 
from nonsense to sense” (264). Wallace also had Gladwell’s The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make 
a Big Difference (2002) in his library. 
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‘priming,’ the understanding that we are primed to understand things a certain way because 
the unconscious mind can pick up on “a stimulus that is so brief” (Nørretranders 170) that it 
stays “behind that locked door of our unconscious” (Gladwell 53), is adopted by Chris Fogle, 
who explains a born-again Christian’s experience with this exact language:  
It’s hard to explain. What the girl with the meadow on her boots had left out 
of the story was why she was feeling so especially desolate and lost right then, 
and thus why she was so psychologically ‘primed’ to hear the pastor’s general, 
anonymous comment in that personal way. (216) 
Throughout the novel the characters are tormented by the feeling that they are 
indeed strangers to themselves, an ‘I’ inside a ‘Me,’ a consciousness living inside a foreign, 
unconscious body and brain. The first character-focused chapter traces the panicked mental 
circuitry of Claude Sylvanshine, who is struggling to revise for his exam because “studying any 
one thing would set off a storm in his head about all the other things he hadn’t studied” (11). 
The analogy Sylvanshine thinks of is that “It was like trying to build a model in a high wind” 
(11): that is, the conscious, apparently autonomous part of him is trying to build something 
and structure his knowledge, but the “high wind,” an inexorable natural force beyond his 
conscious control, blows the pieces away. Sylvanshine’s stress about his mind’s inability to 
focus applies more generally to his sense of himself. He “view[s] himself as weak or defective 
in the area of will” (14), the possessor of “at most one marginal talent whose connection to 
him was itself marginal” (9). Sylvanshine is a stranger to himself, a character once-removed, 
someone who merely observes his own abilities that are to the side of him, and to which he 
cannot really lay any claim. He is weak in will because he does not get to choose what to think, 
nor how the “cyclone” (26) of his mind copes with thinking. Wallace carefully frames his 
characters’ ‘I’’s as sitting on the edges of their dominating ‘Me’’s. For example, thoughts 
“occur” to Sylvanshine as if out of nowhere: “Yaw was way in a mirror, it occurred for no 
reason” (16). Note that the sentence does not read ‘it occurred to him,’ the implication being 
that the thought occurs elsewhere, to somebody else, and he merely watches it happen. 
Though Sylvanshine is peculiar—what Wallace calls a “fact psychic” (120)—his way of thinking 
is not unique to him but true across the board. Lane Dean Jr., for instance, reflects that he has 
an ID number that “some part of him still refused to quite get memorized” (379), alluding to 
the fact that the character’s memory is a subsystem inside of himself, a process he can 
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observe but cannot control. The systems below consciousness can “refuse” the conscious 
controller, who, as it turns out, controls very little.  
Though the model becomes more precise between Wallace’s first novel and his last, 
the same understanding that the mind is fundamentally embodied is at the core of all of his 
work. How then does this model inform Wallace’s ideas about authorship? How does this 
embodied model of selfhood complicate the theories of authorship that dominated in the 
postmodern period from which Wallace emerged? The Pale King is the first of Wallace’s 
novels in which he himself appears as a named character, and it is the first of his novels 
prefaced by an epigraph. That the epigraph itself raises questions about authorship and 
embodiment, thereby priming the reader for the contents of the novel to come, suggests that 
Wallace chose it carefully. 
 
“Cognitive Questions” 
The Pale King’s epigraph reads: “We fill pre-existing forms and when we fill them we change 
them and are changed.” This line is taken from Frank Bidart’s prose poem “Borges and I,” 
which is collected in Desire (1997). There has been a surprising lack of critical interest in 
Wallace’s relationship with Bidart’s work, despite the careers of both writers being 
“animated” by the “‘mind-body’ relation” (Bidart, “Interview with Halliday” 239) and by their 
critiques of postmodernism. When Bidart has been discussed in Wallace studies, critics have 
treated either the poem, “Borges and I,” or just the epigraph to Wallace’s novel, in complete 
isolation. Severs reads the epigraph as a description of the way the characters spend their 
time filling “the blank tax forms that make up” their “work” (55). David Hering, Daniel R. Kelly, 
and Shannon Elderon interpret the epigraph quite vaguely, either as a gesture towards the 
debate about authorship and authorial intention (Hering 165n. 3), or to mean that “our 
culture’s options” regarding identity construction “do not even seem to be fixed” (Kelly 129), 
or to suggest that “narratives” have the power to “change their narrators” (515). Marsh’s 
reading is clearer, as he suggests that the “forms” in Bidart’s poem mean, for Wallace, the 
form of the autobiographical genre that he plays with in the novel. For Marsh, the Wallace 
character is as much a product of the “tropes of autobiography” as he is in charge of them: 
he is altered by the genre form he fills (121). Though Philip Coleman recognises that Wallace’s 
46 
 
choice of epigraph signals his wider interest and engagement with poetry, Coleman similarly 
treats it as a statement about genre, and reads the word “forms” to mean both the novel 
form that ‘kills’ the author-character, and the non-novelistic forms that Wallace crosses into: 
“The ‘novel,’ then, acts as a kind of ‘pre-existing form’ for Wallace, but the ‘filling in’ of that 
‘form’ is a process engaged in by author and reader alike” (15). 
Though Bidart’s poem is of course about filling literary forms—it shares Borges’s 
story’s title, and part of the poem is about filling the form of Borges’s story and changing it 
into something new—I suggest that the “forms” of Bidart’s poem are in fact a metaphor for 
the embodied experience of human beings. Stephen J. Burn is the only critic to recognise that 
Bidart’s poem is, in part, about “a paradigm for the life of consciousness,” something that 
resonates with Wallace’s “career-long fascination with consciousness” (“Paradigm” 372-73). 
It is certainly possible that Wallace only read Bidart’s poem when it was first published in the 
collection of responses to Borges, Who’s Writing This? Notations on the Authorial I with Self-
Portraits (1995), and viewed the poem in isolation in the way his critics have. However, 
contrary to Marsh’s suggestion that “the final inclusion of the quote as an epigraph seems to 
be attributable to Pietsch” (125n. 19), there are multiple notes in Wallace’s archive that 
confirm the epigraph was his own choice, and suggest that Wallace had read the whole 
collection of which the poem was a part.37  
We cannot know for certain if Wallace read more of Bidart than just this poem, but it 
seems likely that he, at the very least, owned the collection. As Paul Giles points out, Wallace 
always gravitated towards poets with “metaphysical propensities” (“All Swallowed Up” 15), 
and Bidart and Wallace share deep roots in the philosophical tradition and a frustration with 
postmodernism.38 Bidart’s poem, “Borges and I,” does not emerge out of nowhere, but rather 
                                                          
37 One of Wallace’s notes reads: “EPIGRAPH Frank Bidart, Desire, FSG 1997, p. 9: ‘Borges and I’: ‘We fill pre-
existing forms . . .’” (HRC 36.3), suggesting it was in fact his decision. A second note that gives the full citation 
of “Desire” again (HRC 36.4) is printed on Illinois State University paper, indicating that Wallace’s choice of 
epigraph may have taken place between 1997 (Desire’s publication) and 2002, when he left his teaching 
position there (Max, Every Love Story 266-68).  
38 Where Wallace is somewhat unique among his contemporaries for having an academic training in philosophy, 
Bidart originally intended to become a philosophy major himself, and his critique of postmodernism is in 
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as part of a long career of writing about embodiment and selfhood, and it is important to 
understand the poem in that context. Once we recognise that the poem belongs to a larger 
collection, in which the line “we fill pre-existing forms . . .” appears elsewhere, in a context 
which emphasises that the word “forms” does not necessarily mean paper forms (Severs, 
Balancing Books 236) or genre forms (Marsh 121; Coleman 15) but very specifically the human 
form, we will see that Bidart may have been a more important source for Wallace’s novel than 
has previously been suggested. Given that the epigraph effectively articulates Nørretranders’s 
model of the ‘I’ and the ‘Me,’ a model of selfhood in which the ‘I’ fills the ‘Me’ and is changed 
by it, it is easy to imagine how this meaning of the poem would have resonated with Wallace 
in the writing of his final novel. These affinities, not to mention Wallace’s confession that he 
“rip[s] poetry off a lot” (Conversations 38-39), suggest that it is likely he read on.  
 “Borges and I,” first of all, is a response to Jorge Luis Borges’s story of the same name 
(1960). In Borges’s postmodern parable, the narrative speaker, the ‘I,’ describes himself as a 
separate entity to Borges the writer, “the one things happen to” (282). Jorge, the ‘I,’ is 
“destined to perish, definitively,” because it is ‘Borges’ who readers know, and ‘Borges’ who 
is immortalised in language and literature. Jorge will not be remembered because everything 
about him is “giv[en] over” to Borges. Like ‘David Wallace’ and ‘David Foster Wallace,’ the 
persona of the writer overshadows the real man. Though Jorge tries to retain some weight, 
imagining new things and topics in order to “free myself from him,” these new thoughts are 
likewise taken up by the worldly writer Borges, and cut away from the ‘I.’ It is inevitable, then, 
that Jorge increasingly “recognize[s]” himself “less in [Borges’s] books” (282), and even this 
last imagining—the text that makes up the parable we are reading—is like a suicide on the 
page under the name Borges. “I do not know which of us has written this page” (283), reads 
the narrative’s last line, but the tragic irony is that, having been written, the ‘I’’s last attempt 
at self-definition has become just another “game” for Borges (282), and the ‘I’ now has 
nothing left.  
Borges’s story is quintessentially postmodern, charting as it does the dissolution of the 
self into language and oblivion. The story dramatizes a view of authorship that would later be 
                                                          
part motivated by his early frustration with academic philosophy’s turn to postmodern “linguistic 
scepticism” and the “desolation of positivism” (“Interview with Halliday” 226). 
48 
 
described by Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes in two of the seminal postmodern 
formulations of authorship: Foucault’s “What is an Author?” (1969) and Barthes’s two essays, 
“The Death of the Author” (1967) and “From Work to Text” (1977). For Foucault, writing is 
not a way for someone to “express” the “deepest” parts of their “self” (Aesthetics 222) but a 
way of a “creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears,” just as Jorge 
vanishes in Borges’s story (206, my emphasis). For Barthes, the author is, famously, dead, and 
“writing” is understood to be “the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin” (Image 
142). In “Work to Text” Barthes returned to this problem, arguing that the Author “becomes, 
as it were, a paper-author: his life is no longer the origin of his fictions but a fiction 
contributing to his work . . . the ‘I’ which writes the text, it too, is never more than a paper-I” 
(Image 161). Borges enacts this death of the author. The self who writes, the originator of the 
work, vanishes into the text it produces to become nothing more than a “paper-I.” Borges’s 
real self—the “living human holding the pencil,” as Wallace puts it (Pale King 68)—dissolves 
throughout his brief “flight” through time, untouched by the world and losing everything to 
‘Borges’ (283).  
In a talk describing the genesis of his own poem and his “poetics of embodiment” 
(“Pre-existing Forms” 118), Bidart explains that he “felt almost violently that [Borges’s story] 
did not reflect my own writing life. It did not reflect my own relation to my writing self” 
(109).39 In his prose poem, Bidart calls the “desolating landscape” in Borges’s story “seductive 
and even oddly comforting, but, I think, false” (Desire 9). Borges’s model is a “Sweet fiction” 
(10) because it imagines a “magic space” where the ‘I’ is completely separate from the life of 
the writer (9). Bidart rejects this “paradigm for the life of consciousness,” because it imagines 
that there is a “disparity” between the self and the body, between the “essential self and [the] 
worldly second self” (9). For Bidart, the conscious ‘I’ is not separate and dissolving, but 
fundamentally embodied, tied to the world and changed in the act of writing. In other words, 
                                                          
39 This talk was given at the University of Chicago and as the Ben Belitt Lecture at Bennington College, and later 
published in Salmagundi. The poem itself, Bidart explains, was commissioned by Dan Halpern, who had 
“asked many writers to respond to Borges's "Borges and I," by writing something of approximately the same 
length, using it as a springboard” (109). The responses were published by The Ecco Press as Who’s Writing 
This? Notations on the Authorial I with Self-Portraits (1995), and recently republished by Harper Perennial 
as Who’s Writing This? Fifty-five Writers on Humor, Courage, Self-Loathing, and the Creative Process (2009).  
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when Bidart the writer makes his poems and the ‘I’ is “changed in making them” (10), the ‘I’ 
is not dissolved but brought to life. The author is not absent at all. 
Wallace was interested in Borges’s significant place in twentieth-century literature.40 
In “Borges on the Couch,” a review of Edwin Williamson’s Borges: A Life (2004), Wallace claims 
that Borges is  
arguably the great bridge between modernism and postmodernism in world 
literature. . . . He is modernist in that his fiction shows a first-rate human mind 
stripped of all foundations in religious or ideological certainty. . . . And the 
[postmodern] mind of those stories is nearly always a mind that lives in and 
through books. (Both Flesh 293)41 
Wallace’s model of the relationship between the modern and the postmodern is strikingly 
similar to how other literary critics have categorised literary periods in the twentieth century. 
In A Dialectic of Centuries: Notes Towards a Theory of the New Arts (1978), Dick Higgins argues 
that “something strange happened in our cultural life around 1958” (3). Where, in the first 
half of the twentieth century, “the common denominator among most of the typical 
innovative arts and philosophy . . . are a concern, an obsession even, with the process of 
cognition” (7), since 1958 “the focus has come off the individual and his identity. . . . It came 
to be, instead, on the object qua object, the poem within the poem, the word within the 
                                                          
40 Lucas Thompson is the only critic to discuss the relationship between Wallace’s and Borges’s work in detail, 
persuasively arguing that Wallace’s “B.I. #59” is a rewriting of, among other sources, Borges’s “The Writing 
of the God” (72). Thompson notes that Wallace “had little or no interest in the particular cultural context 
within which Borges’s work was written, since his overriding concern is with the broader thematic, 
metaphysical content of Borges’s stories” (87). 
41 Wallace’s scathing review takes issue with Williamson’s focus on Borges’s biography and authorial intent, 
especially given that Borges himself, in ‘Borges and I,’ “anticipates and refutes the whole idea of a literary 
biography” (285n. 1). Of course, in his review of Joseph Frank’s biography of Dostoevsky, Wallace also wrote 
that “a comprehensive reading of Dostoevsky’s fiction is impossible without a detailed understanding of 
the cultural circumstances in which the books were conceived” (Consider 258), which quite contradicts the 
later review. As William H. Gass puts it in his own essay on authorship, “Many and sharp are the 
philosophical rocks in this apparently calm cool pool” (285). In the rest of this chapter I will bring some 
clarity to Wallace’s complicated position on authorship and intention. 
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word” (8). Higgins characterises this as the shift from asking “Cognitive Questions” to asking 
“Postcognitive Questions” (1). This definition is used by Brian McHale to preface his influential 
Postmodernist Fiction (1987), in which he argues that the “dominant of modernist fiction is 
epistemological” because it tends to foreground ‘cognitive questions’ about knowledge and 
the human mind: “What is there to be known?; Who knows it?; How do they know it, and 
with what degree of certainty?” (9). In contrast, the dominant of postmodernist fiction is 
“ontological,” because it foregrounds ‘postcognitive questions’ about the nature of reality 
and existence itself: “Which world is this? . . . What is a world? . . . Which of my selves is to 
[do something in this world]?” (10). As Wallace says in his review, first the modernists were 
“stripped of all foundations,” then the postmodernists had only text to go on (Both Flesh 293). 
Bidart is a forerunner of what Peter Boxall has called the “rapid expiry of postmodern 
orthodoxies” and twenty-first-century literature’s return to a new dominant, that of the 
“stubborn materiality of the body” (16).42 As our maps of the mind have been redrawn, 
writers such as Bidart and Wallace have bridged the postmodern, post-cognitive “mind that 
lives in and through” text (Wallace, Both Flesh 293) with a new “paradigm for the life of 
consciousness” (Bidart, Desire 9), one that understands consciousness to be fundamentally 
embodied within a physical form. Just as Borges, for Wallace, bridges the modern self and the 
postmodern self, Bidart bridges postmodernism’s paper I with a bodied I. Keeping in mind 
Stephen J. Burn’s point that “post-postmodernism explicitly looks back to, or dramatizes its 
roots within, postmodernism. . . . [A] development from, rather than an explicit rejection of, 
the preceding movement” (Jonathan Franzen 19), it is important to recognise that Bidart does 
not completely reject the Borgesian truth that the author is figuratively divided between 
private and public self. As Bidart writes in “Homo Faber,” “Whatever lies still uncarried from 
the abyss within me as I die dies with me” (Desire 12). Yet Bidart is distinctly post-postmodern 
because he takes Borges’s parable of selfhood and ontological doubt and re-embodies its 
                                                          
42 McHale takes the term “dominant” from Roman Jakobson, who says it “may be defined as the focusing 
component of a work of art: it rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components. It is the 
dominant which guarantees the integrity of the structure” (41). My view, that the dominant of post-
postmodern literature is cognitive questions (in the literal sense) and a renewed focus on the body and 
brain, complements other takes on Wallace’s work, such as Severs’s argument that Wallace’s post-
postmodern characters are in a “quest for balance and ground” (50). 
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central questions. The line “We fill pre-existing forms and when we fill them we change them 
and are changed” (9) is a model of consciousness that recognises that the ‘I’ is embodied and 
intertwined with whatever it creates. Unlike Borges’s ‘I,’ which is truly separate and desolated 
by ‘Borges’s’ parasitic texts, Bidart’s ‘I’ is in a relationship with the work in which one changes 
the other. In Bidart’s “Borges and I,” Borges’s post-cognitive questions are still raised, but 
they are chained back to the body and brain.43 
Though we cannot know if Wallace read all of Bidart’s work, he certainly read and 
admired the poet Zbigniew Herbert, whose collection Mr Cogito (1974) Wallace discussed in 
an early review in almost precisely the same terms as Jeffrey Gray uses to characterise Bidart’s 
work.44 In this review, Wallace names Herbert as one of the few living poets in the 
postmodern era who has found a way to “marr[y] the stuff of spirit and human feeling to the 
parodic detachment the postmodern experience seems to require” (Both Flesh 122). Herbert 
                                                          
43 In a 1993 article in Contemporary Literature discussing Bidart’s place in late twentieth-century poetry, Jeffrey 
Gray argues that Bidart’s poetry challenges the postmodern “view of the author as absence—or, at most, 
as effect, not cause, of the signifier” (714). Gray argues that Bidart manages to situate himself in a nuanced 
place between the two extreme poles of late twentieth-century poetry: between postmodern theory at the 
one end, especially theory of the deconstructive sort which “attempts to purge poetry of origin, narrative 
voice, and affect,” and, at the other extreme, an earnest—arguably naïve—lyricism, which privileges 
emotional expression and rejects postmodern theory altogether (714). This description of Bidart’s project 
fits quite strikingly with descriptions of Wallace’s—by critics such as Charles B. Harris—as that which tries 
to “develop a literary form that accepts human reality as defined by poststructuralist thought while moving 
away from the strain of antihumanism in such thought” (116). Just as the clumsy term post-postmodernist 
is rather more descriptive and useful than if we were to classify such literature—which is doing many pre-
postmodern things—as modernist, it would probably be more accurate to say here as well that Bidart and 
Wallace are not asking cognitive but post-post-cognitive questions: i.e., they do not naively reject 
postmodernism’s post-cognitive problems, but are a development on from them that returns in many ways 
to what we would have to call, in hindsight, the pre-post-cognitive. As soon as something is introduced as 
being ‘post-’ anything else, it gets very messy.  
44 Wallace’s “Cogito” review has received little attention. Coleman refers to the review as part of a larger 
discussion of Wallace and poetry, though he explains that “It would take another essay to work out the 
precise ways in which Wallace’s work was informed by his enthusiastic appraisal of Herbert’s” (12). Lucas 
Thompson briefly considers Wallace’s appraisal of Herbert, and uses it as a starting point in considering 
Wallace’s interest in Eastern European literature more generally (123). 
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stands out to Wallace as a postmodernist who “grapples with the Big Questions of human 
existence,” a feat that makes most contemporary American poetry—which ironically 
“renders” such things “facile or banal”—“loo[k] sick” in comparison (121-22). Mr Cogito, 
which was originally published just three years before Bidart’s The Book of the Body (1977), 
has many parallels with Bidart’s poetry. As the title makes clear, Herbert is interested in 
cognition and thought, and the poem that opens the collection, “Mr Cogito Studies His Face 
in the Mirror,” might be read, like Bidart’s “Borges and I,” as a bridge between postmodern 
and post-postmodern conceptions of self.  
In Jacques Lacan’s description of the mirror-stage of child development, the image a 
child sees in the mirror is said to be “found empty” (2): the child has no essential, internal self 
to discover, but must begin to conceive of itself through language. Lacan rejects Descartes’s 
cogito, that thinking thing that says ‘I think therefore I am,’ because what “one ought to say 
[instead] is: I am not, wherever I am the plaything of my thought” (183). The conscious, 
essential, Cartesian cogito is absent from Lacan’s view.45 When Mr Cogito studies his face in 
the mirror, he does not see absence but the “whole soul” marked by the weight of thousands 
of generations: “the ears that protrude two fleshy seashells / no doubt left me by an ancestor 
who strained for an echo / of the thunderous march of mammoths across the steppes” (271). 
Rather than a lack, Mr Cogito’s reflections prove that he exists: in Descartes’s famous phrase, 
cogito ergo sum. The mirror-stage is equally unsettling, the self he discovers equally estranged 
from our everyday sense of self, but here it is not made in language but emphatically 
embodied, “locked into the chain of the species” (271) and what Wallace calls, elsewhere, 
“the whole evolution from hunting-gathering nomadism to cultivation and community” (Girl 
268).46  
                                                          
45 I will discuss and clarify Descartes’s terms and his model of mind in chapter 2. 
46 Marshall Boswell has argued that in Infinite Jest “Wallace also seems to have Lacan in his sights when he 
characterizes ‘the internal self’” (Understanding 155) not as a Lacanian “product of a lack” (130) but as a 
“‘not-quite-right-looking infant . . . with big wet eyes and froggy-soft skin, huge skull . . .’” (155). Though 
there are interesting parallels between Wallace and Lacan, given their shared interest in the complex 
unconsciousness, my argument is similar to Boswell’s: the central importance of interiority and the 
conscious ‘I’ in Wallace’s writing marks him apart from Lacan, in whose view there is only an “abyss” (Lacan 
188). 
53 
 
Wallace was clearly interested in how particular authors bridged one literary period 
and another, and seemed to find in writers such as Borges and Herbert a model for his own 
critique of postmodernism. This suggests that Wallace may have also found, in Bidart, a 
valuable source for his own project. To understand the full importance of the Bidart epigraph 
that Wallace chose for The Pale King, we need to look beyond “Borges and I” to the poem 
that takes up more than half of the collection Desire. “The Second Hour of the Night” is a 
retelling of what “Ovid tells us that / Orpheus sang”: the tale of Myrrha, who was cursed and 
transformed into the myrrh tree after sleeping with her father, Cinyras.47 The poem is about 
the appetites of the body that torture the person inside that body. Bidart describes Myrrha’s 
torment as she is consumed by a desire for her father that cannot be satisfied without awful 
consequences. She tries to kill herself, because “What she wants she does not want” (34), but 
her attempt is frustrated. Eventually she plots to sleep with her father, and succeeds, but is 
cursed for the act.  
As the poem comes to its close, Bidart repeats the line from “Borges and I”: “We fill 
pre-existing forms, and when / we fill them, change them and are changed” (56). The 
metaphor, in this context, is explicitly about selfhood. Myrrha and her child are born into 
“pre-existing form[s]” and locked, therefore, into whatever “fate” is “embedded in the 
lineaments” of those forms (33). Throughout the story, Myrrha’s desire for her father is her 
fate, because she is “not free not to desire” (46) that which is deeply rooted in the 
“lineaments”—the very material—of the form into which she was born. Myrrha loathes her 
own innate, pre-existing “‘nature’” (53), loathes her body and her brain because she is 
“damned” if she tries to satisfy her defining (and immoral) desire, and damned if she tries to 
                                                          
47 Bidart’s “The Second Hour of the Night” is the second in an ongoing sequence of epic poems. Their titles are 
taken from the myth of the Egyptian “‘Book of Gates,’ [in which] Each night during the twelve hours of the 
night the sun must pass through twelve territories of the underworld before it can rise again at dawn” 
(“Interview with Travis” 85). The Russian-doll layers that open the poem (Bidart tells what Ovid told that 
Orpheus told) is a good example of the way Bidart turns a postmodern technique towards different ends. 
Where Bidart describes a line of inheritance through which a story is passed down from writer to writer, 
John Barth’s “Menelaiad,” for instance, is a retelling of a story from the Iliad and Odyssey that actively defies 
the reader to pin down a source. The story begins with “Menelaus here, more or less,” and the sentences 
are gradually buried beneath more layers of retelling and quotation: ““ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘By Zeus out of Leda,’ I 
commenced” (Lost in the Funhouse 153).  
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“deny” it, because it “is not in [her] / power to deny” (54). As Bidart puts it in another poem, 
“Guilty of Dust”: 
WHETHER YOU LOVE WHAT YOU LOVE 
OR LIVE IN DIVIDED CEASELESS 
REVOLT AGAINST IT 
WHAT YOU LOVE IS YOUR FATE (In the Western Night 15) 
Whether or not ‘you’ (your conscious ‘I’) love what you (your material form: your body and 
brain) loves, what your form loves is your fate. The epigraph, then, “We fill pre-existing forms 
and when we fill them we change them and are changed,” describes what it is to be an ‘I’ that 
fills a ‘Me,’ to be a small self trapped inside a body and a brain.  
Bidart’s “Borges and I” is about the life of a writer, of course, but it is about the life of 
a writer whose entire work is governed by metaphors of embodiment and by his critique of 
postmodern disembodiment. For Wallace to frame his third novel with Bidart’s poem 
suggests that he was making a statement about his own position, and his novel’s position, in 
a much larger shift towards a literature beyond the postmodern. I suggest that the word 
“forms” in the epigraph does not just refer, as others have suggested, to paper forms or genre 
forms, but to the human form. Wallace never uses Nørretranders’s terms for the ‘I’ and the 
‘Me’ explicitly, though this model of mind clearly informed Wallace’s writing. Wallace does, 
however, consistently use the language of Bidart’s epigraph to put Nørretranders’s model 
into more ‘poetic’ terms. The ‘I’ does not fill the ‘Me’ in The Pale King, but the self fills its 
form.  
Compare Myrrha to Wallace’s character Claude Sylvanshine, for instance, who thinks 
himself “ill-suited” to deal with terror and stress,  
the way some people are born without limbs or certain organs. . . . The 
neurology of failure. What if he was simply born and destined to live in the 
shadow of Total Fear and Despair, and all his so-called activities were pathetic 
attempts to distract him from the inevitable? (16) 
The phrase “ill-suited” is linked to both the mind and nervous system (“neurology”) and the 
body (“limbs [and] organs”), implying that the phrase can be taken at face-value: that is, 
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Sylvanshine is not cut out to deal with terror and stress because he is literally wearing the 
wrong suit, the wrong physical body and brain that have his destiny—“to live in the shadow 
of Total Fear”—built in. Sylvanshine’s “so-called activities,” the actions that other people 
might imagine originated from his ‘I,’ are actually going on outside of his conscious awareness: 
he is merely the passive observer of his own behaviour. We see Bidart’s “form” throughout 
the novel. The author-character explains that as a child he understood his “problems with 
sustained concentration as evidence that [he] was an unusually dilute or disorganized form 
of human being” (294, my emphasis). The man in the “suit and gray hat” in the park “look[s] 
across at the opposite side where little forms on camp chairs sat there in a row” (43, my 
emphasis). Children in Toni Ware’s trailer park are said to make “strange agnate forms on 
pallets” (55, my emphasis), where the word “agnate” means “relat[ed] through the male line” 
(OED) and describes, therefore, the pre-existence of the children’s forms in a shared father’s 
genes. The novel’s author explains that he is not allowed to include “a certain unnamed 
relative” in the book, nor “any likeness thereof in any capacity, setting, form, or guise” (81, 
my emphasis). Chris Fogle describes himself as a “‘rebel’ who really just sponged off of society 
in the form of his parents” (167, my emphasis). This means, of course, that he sponges off 
society through his parents, but it also suggests that Fogle literally shares his parents’ forms: 
he sponges off of society from inside the “form of his parents.” Note that this line is prefaced 
by his realisation that he feels about his roommate “probably the way my father felt about 
me” (167), because his father and himself share the same body, blood, and therefore—to 
some extent—the same thoughts.  
The metaphor of the self filling a pre-existing form fits exactly with Wallace’s intuitive 
understanding of the self as he described it in an interview in 1993. As he put it then, human 
beings are “trapped inside a self (a psychic self, not just a physical self)” (Conversations 32). 
In other words, to be conscious is to wake up inside a pre-existing form and realise that you 
are trapped, chained to a body, brain, and mind that rule your existence so long as you occupy 
them. The Pale King is of course about paper forms too. It is a novel about boredom and 
deskwork, and the most action-packed chapter is in the book’s middle, §25, which contains 
three full pages of “Brown turns a page. Ann Williams sniffs slightly and turns a page. Meredith 
Rand does something to a cuticle. ‘Irrelevant’ Chris Fogle turns a page. Ken Wax turns a page” 
(312). What the characters spend most of their time doing, as the Wallace character notes 
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when he is moving through the centre, is “reading files or filling out forms that might 
conceivably have had something to do with their assigned work, but most of them were 
staring vacantly into space” (302). Though this description (and the novel’s epigraph) have 
the neat, literal meaning that the characters’ jobs in bureaucratic America are to fill out 
countless paper forms, with the full context of the epigraph in mind we can read this sentence 
quite differently, to mean that as they are doing paperwork they are at the same time filling 
out their physical forms (which “might conceivably have . . . something to do with their 
assigned work,” but only if they’re lucky). The characters in §25, and throughout the novel, 
are uncomfortably embodied in their physical forms, forms which define them but from which 
they are unhappily estranged. As Wallace writes: “suffering takes many forms” (439).48 
 
“The Nature of the Fun” 
How does the poetics of embodiment that governs all of Wallace’s fiction also shape his 
understanding of himself as writer? Like Bidart, who dramatizes his disagreement with Borges 
by adapting, and engaging with, Borges’s story, Wallace read and engaged with postmodern 
theory. He acknowledges, for instance, that “Barthian and Derridean poststructuralism’s 
helped me” to understand that “once I’m done with the thing, I’m basically dead, and 
probably the text’s dead . . . language lives not just in but through the reader” (Conversations 
40). Yet at the same time, in the same interview, Wallace stresses that he wants to “reaffirm 
the idea of art being a living transaction between humans” (41). Wallace’s theoretical 
sophistication continually clashes with his more conservative ideas about the role of 
                                                          
48 At the end of the “Second Hour” Myrrha is turned into the tree that bleeds myrrh, a “resin" which is both 
“sweet” and “bitter” (55) to match Myrrha’s fate (bitter despite the sweetness of her desire for her father). 
The Pale King’s §6, about two young Christians dealing with an unwanted pregnancy, was originally 
published in The New Yorker under the title “Good People,” though Wallace’s agent, Bonnie Nadell, on a 
panel discussing Wallace after his death, quotes from an email in which Wallace explained that he originally 
wanted to title the story “Sap”: “I’d originally had one or two sentences about trees filled with sap in the 
park . . . and the piece’s title was ‘Sap’” (qtd. in Nadell, “Editors on Wallace” 35:40-38:40). Though he 
eventually turned from the title, I wonder if the central importance of the tree’s “sap” might not have been 
an echo of the bitter “sap” (Desire 55) of the myrrh tree and Myrrha’s own struggle with her fate and her 
unplanned child which is so similar. 
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literature. This idea of the transaction between living humans occurs again and again in 
Wallace’s interviews. He talks about trying to create something “like a real full human 
relationship” between “the writer’s consciousness” and the reader’s (34), and about 
“communicating with a reader who cares something about that feeling in the stomach which 
is why we read” (61). He argues that what “fiction and poetry are doing is what they’ve been 
trying to do for two thousand years: affect somebody, make somebody feel a certain way, 
allow them to enter into relationships with ideas and with characters” (18, my emphasis). In 
the same interview, Wallace declares that he’s the only “‘postmodernist’ you’ll ever meet 
who absolutely worships Leo Tolstoy” (19). For Tolstoy, art is  
not, as the metaphysicians say, the manifestation of some mysterious idea . . . 
it is a means of human communion, necessary for life and for the movement 
towards the good of the individual man and of mankind, uniting them in the 
same feelings. (40) 
How can feelings be shared in a relationship between the living reader and the “living human 
holding the pencil” (Pale King 68) if the latter is a bodiless, originless, abstracted dead entity 
entirely absent from the text?  
Wallace seemed torn on this problem, and interested in the issue enough to devote 
two essays to it—“Greatly Exaggerated” (1992) and “The Nature of the Fun” (1998). In both 
essays, Wallace’s use of bodied language to describe the writer-reader relationship is of 
central importance. In “Greatly Exaggerated,” a review of H. L. Hix’s Morte d’Author: An 
Autopsy (1990), Wallace attempts to untangle the academic debate about “authorial vital 
signs” (Supposedly 141), only to conclude that “For those of us civilians who know in our gut 
that writing is an act of communication between one human being and another, the whole 
question seems sort of arcane” (144). Wallace frames himself as a civilian, not an academic: 
someone who gets to trust his “gut” feelings instead of abstractions. It seems so obvious to a 
civilian that the academic “cultivation of absence rather than presence . . . the erasure of 
consciousness” (140) flies in the face of common sense. Whether or not we care about the 
author after the fact, it cannot be the case, as Wallace concludes, that “no one did it” (145). 
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Wallace’s concluding point is taken from William H. Gass’s Habitations of the Word 
(1985), specifically the essay that shares Barthes’s title: “The Death of the Author.” In this 
essay, Gass writes that the  
death of the author is not an ordinary demise, . . . [it] signifies a decline in 
authority, in theological power, as if Zeus were stripped of his thunderbolts 
and swans, perhaps residing on Olympus still, but now living in a camper and 
cooking with propane. He is, but he is no longer a god. (265)  
Killing the authority of the author is a useful theoretical move that critics make, but the text, 
for Gass, still has a source. Whether or not we allow that an author is an authority on their 
own work, their work always has to have come from them. Gass describes the author’s 
composition as follows, in significantly intimate, bodied language: 
it is a thing whose modulated surfaces betray the consciousness it contains, 
and which we read, as we read words, to find the hand, the arm, the head, the 
voice, the self which is shaping them, which is arranging those surfaces—this 
second skin—to reflect an inside sun, and reveal the climate of an inner life. 
(267)  
Though the author may be dead theoretically, in boneheaded practice they exist: they have 
hands that “shap[ed]” the text, and, as Bidart also recognised, are “profoundly alter[ed], 
sometimes” by their own work (284). The author necessarily exists in the world inside a body, 
and therefore the text itself is a kind of body that contains some remnants of them. The text 
is not a papery “tissue of quotations” (Barthes, Image 145), but fleshy tissue that betrays the 
self from which it originated.  
Wallace’s second essay on authorship, “The Nature of the Fun,” was written soon after 
the publication of Infinite Jest and is ostensibly more about himself as a writer at a particular 
point in his career. Like “Greatly Exaggerated” before it, “The Nature of the Fun” owes a debt 
to another author, Don DeLillo, and Wallace builds the essay around the “best metaphor [he] 
know[s]” for a fiction writer and their work, from DeLillo’s Mao II (1991). Wallace writes:  
A book-in-progress [is] a kind of hideously damaged infant that follows the 
writer around, forever crawling after the writer . . ., hideously defective, 
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hydrocephalic and noseless and flipper-armed and incontinent and retarded 
and dribbling cerebrospinal fluid of its mouth as it mewls and blurbles and cries 
out to the writer, wanting love, wanting the very thing its hideousness 
guarantees it’ll get: the writer’s complete attention. (Both Flesh 193) 
This bodied metaphor captures for Wallace the complicated love-hate relationship that a 
writer has with their own work. The work is imperfect and horrible, “because its deformity is 
your deformity” (194), because its body is a product of the author’s own body. Wallace writes 
that something “happen[s] to [the work] in the parturition from head to page” (194), where 
the word “parturition” means, significantly, the “action of giving birth to young” (OED). To 
create a work is to give birth, to produce a body through your own body. This central 
metaphor, not to mention Wallace’s description of the “whole thing” as a “genuine 
relationship, of a sort” (194) is strikingly similar to Bidart’s formulation of authorship in 
“Borges and I,” where the author is said to have a bodied relationship with their own work 
that changes them as much as they change it. Where Wallace differs to Bidart is in his 
concerns about the audience. “Being read on the AM subway by a pretty girl” is at first really 
fun for Wallace, but the pursuit of attention is dangerous (197). The way to keep making good 
art is to write not for attention (which produces writing no one would want to pay attention 
to) but to  
go deep inside yourself and illuminate precisely the stuff you don’t want to see 
. . . this stuff usually turns out (paradoxically) to be precisely the stuff all writers 
and readers share and respond to, feel. (198)  
There is a person who is writing here, one who is wrestling with their own vanity and their 
hatred and love of what they have created. Contrary to the postmodern view that writing is 
not for the expression of the self—that an author’s “life is no longer the origin of his fictions” 
(Barthes Image 161)—Wallace suggests that to write is to constantly struggle with what is 
“deep inside yourself.”  
It is significant that in this essay Wallace uses the phrase “It has something to do with 
Work as Play” (198) to describe his epiphany about writing only for himself. This, I suggest, is 
an allusion to Barthes’s essay “From Work to Text,” in which Barthes makes the distinction 
between the “work,” which is a crude, limited material (a “substance, occupying a part of the 
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space of books” [Image 156-57]), and “the Text,” which is abstract and ethereal, a 
“methodological field” that “is experienced only in an activity of production” (157). For 
Barthes, the work is static, but the Text (which he capitalises) comes to life through the play 
of the reader: “the reader plays twice over, playing the Text as one plays a game” (162). 
Wallace inverts Barthes’s model. For Wallace, the Work itself—Wallace notably capitalises 
the word that Barthes keeps uncapitalised—is what’s fun. If there was no “play” at this point 
in the process, if it was all about the play of the reader, then we would have nothing to read.49 
A consequence of this embodied metaphor is that the author’s consciousness, their 
‘I,’ plays a somewhat insignificant role in the creative process. The ‘I,’ we have seen, is a 
stranger to itself, filling a human form that has its own desires and processes. If someone 
creates something then, is it the ‘I’ or the ‘Me’ who made it? When we create children it is an 
entirely unconscious process, the work and play of ancient biological processes going on 
below our conscious awareness. Wallace allows with his metaphor in “The Nature of the Fun” 
that he is barely in control of his own literary children because they are produced by his body, 
unconsciously. As he puts it, creation is not abstract and conscious but instead “It’s usually a 
tummy thing: does this feel real? Does this make me want to puke?” (Conversations 146). The 
‘Author’ is still dead in this sense because the ‘I’ is not in charge of what the author makes. 
Wallace cannot be an authority on his own work, because consciousness itself is not 
authoritative. 
This problem is explored in Wallace’s story “The Suffering Channel,” a spiritual (or, 
rather, a bodily) sequel to “The Nature of the Fun.” Discussion of this story has tended to 
                                                          
49 We can see from Wallace’s archive that he would often annotate the introductions and forwards to books 
(such as Borges’s Labyrinths [1962] and Kafka’s The Complete Stories of Kafka, introduced by John Updike 
[1995]) more than the contents themselves. Wallace was clearly interested, as an author, in other authors 
and in how authors are perceived. Where Barthes’s essay famously ends with the birth of the reader being 
dependent upon the death of the author, both Gass’s essay and Wallace’s “The Nature of the Fun” end by 
stubbornly inverting this idea, telling their readers that readers are not as all-important as Barthes makes 
them out to be. With tongues in their cheeks, Gass shrugs off the ‘Reader’: “. . . readers . . . readers simply 
comprise the public” (288), while Wallace decides that compared to the fun of writing “the reward of 
strangers’ affection is as dust, lint” (Both Flesh 199).  
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revolve around its take on 9/11 and American life at the turn of the millennium.50 I suggest, 
however, that “The Nature of the Fun” and the embodied metaphors we have seen so far are 
absolutely central to this story about a man who shits art: “they come out that way. Already 
fully formed. Hence the term incredible” (Oblivion 239). Lucas Thompson has suggested that 
this story is a reflection on theories of appropriation and influence, because the artist’s art is, 
like Wallace’s own writing, the “literal product of what he ingests” (38). This is the poetics of 
embodiment at work. Not only are the artworks shaped by what is ingested, but they are also 
produced unconsciously, through a bodily process. This raises problems for the art’s critics. 
The “pieces” are said to be “arresting in their extraordinary realism and the detail of their 
craftsmanship,” but the story asks “whether a word like craftsmanship really applied in such 
a case” (Oblivion 254). The artworks are not made consciously. They are produced by the 
‘Me,’ not the ‘I’ (in Nørretranders’s terms), so the problem is how much credit you give the 
artist from whom they emerged. 
Characters have “queer twin” responses to the artworks, feeling that they “both 
[want] to bend and get them” and “run as fast as [they] could from the cubicle complex” 
(301). This mixed reaction recalls Wallace’s point in “The Nature of the Fun” that you both 
love and hate your work. But why are the characters so repulsed by embodied art? Much of 
the story revolves around various characters’ debates about their discomfort with the fact of 
their own bodies. Shit or the hideous baby are not repulsive while they are inside the artist, 
but “the minute it’s outside of [you] . . . it becomes gross” (307). To allow that we are 
embodied, and that our art, therefore, is also embodied and not wholly produced by careful, 
conscious craft, seems to violate the fantasy we have of ourselves as luminous conscious 
beings. As one character asks, if the artist does not work consciously,  
‘. . . it’s some kind of, what, a miracle? Idiot savantry? Divine intervention?’ 
                                                          
50 Olivia Banner notes that the story is “haunted by the foreknowledge that the events of September 11 will 
affect its characters by literally turning them into so much waste” (75), while Annie McClanahan argues that 
“Wallace’s story also shows that while it is wrong to call 9/11 constitutively unforeseeable, it is equally 
mistaken to view such events as easily, materially predictable” (59). Staes notes that the “references to the 
terrorist attacks in the novella are sparse,” but argues that Wallace uses 9/11 to interrogate the status of 
American art at the end of the century before and after the tragedy (“Only Artists” 475). 
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‘Or else some kind of extremely sick fraud.’ (Oblivion 320) 
Wallace’s statements about authorship suggest he thinks about his own creative process this 
way, though it seemed like he had made peace with the idea in his earlier essays. The act of 
writing in “The Suffering Channel” is still all tummy and gut, not abstract reason, but the 
metaphor has changed from “Fun” to “Suffering,” from reproduction and the birth of 
something alive (albeit deformed) to the fraudulent defecation of waste. Either way, the 
embodied artist has no control over what his body produces.  
This a different kind of death to the one that Barthes and Foucault describe, however. 
The author is ‘dead’ only insofar as our fantasy of the ‘I’ as the dominant force in a person is 
dead: it is the author’s whole person, the ‘I’ and the ‘Me,’ the self and the form they fill, that 
produces the work, not just the ‘I’ alone. Wallace’s contemporary George Saunders describes 
his perspective in a recent essay titled “What Writers Really Do” (2017). While Saunders 
accepts the postmodern position that it is not as easy as saying a writer “had something he 
‘wanted to express’. And then he just, you know . . . expressed it,” at the same time his 
consciousness, his ‘I,’ is there watching what the rest of him produces, and controls it with a 
reader in mind: “When I pull on this rope here, you lurch forward over there.” Though 
Saunders is well aware that, as far as the reader is concerned, “one of us is dead,” the fact 
that authors and readers are embodied alike means there is still some possibility of a “a living 
transaction between humans” (Wallace, Conversations 41): Saunders is able to maintain that 
“hopeful notion” because author’s and readers’ “minds are built on common architecture . . 
. whatever is present in me might also be present in you.” Restoring the author’s body 
revitalises the possibility that reader and author can be “unit[ed] . . . in the same feelings” 
(Tolstoy 40). Though Wallace and Saunders are both theoretically sophisticated enough to 
accept that they are not necessarily an authority on what they have produced, they do not 
kill themselves off completely. We may or may not value their intentions, but we cannot say 
that they were not there to have any.  
When Wallace introduces himself in his final novel as “Author here. Meaning the real 
author, the living human holding the pencil, not some abstract narrative persona” (68), we 
would have to ignore all his other writings on authorship to simply shrug this off as untrue. 
Indeed, we would have to ignore how the author appears throughout The Pale King itself. The 
Wallace-character explains in later “Author here” sections that he had “a severe 
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dermatological condition during this period” (269). Seeming to anticipate the criticism of his 
work, he notes that as a result, he “was more or less used to not being looked at or 
acknowledged” (269). Known by a roommate as “‘the young man carbuncular’” (288n. 40), 
the author is emphatically bodied, his living skin there to see, but no one wants to look. We 
try to erase Wallace’s body from our minds: “most people . . . looked . . . repelled, then could 
be seen struggling with themselves to superimpose on that expression another one that 
signified they either didn’t see the bad skin or weren’t especially bothered by it” (288). Of 
course, this is not to deny that the author does eventually disappear into the system, that 
Wallace’s “old Social Security number . . . simply disappeared, from an identification 
standpoint” (300) and he is confused with another persona: “his file had been deleted, or 
absorbed into, that of David F. Wallace” (413). But we cannot ignore that the body was there 
in the beginning. Authors exist in forms in the world, and the forms they make are shaped by 
that fact. To erase the body from our readings altogether is to erase that which brings the 
things we read into existence in the first place.  
I do not think those critics who have read the ‘forms’ epigraph as a statement about 
paper forms, genre forms, and the artist disappearing into his novel, are wrong. I would only 
add that to fill artistic forms is to fill a human form: for both Bidart and Wallace they are one 
and the same. Lucas Thompson has recently argued that we need new models of influence to 
understand Wallace’s relationship with other writers, because Harold Bloom’s famous 
“conception of influence . . . cannot properly account for the presence of multiple and 
overlapping artistic influences” that characterise Wallace’s writing (85). Thompson argues 
that the implicit model of influence in Wallace’s work is “based on a far more playful 
recontextualization of sources” than the Bloomian model of “writers’ relationships to 
previous specters of influences as combative” (85-86), and he suggests that  
The most apposite metaphor for Wallace’s practice is that of a software 
engineer. . . . In the same way that software innovations often arise from 
technical advances in neighboring fields, so Wallace’s texts are innovative in 
their amalgamation of diverse philosophical, cultural, and literary influences. 
(85) 
In the spirit of Thompson’s argument, I would add that this engineering takes place specifically 
inside the body and the bodied brain. To fill a human form is to live inside the hardware of 
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body and brain that have preferences, that absorb other works and stitch them together, 
unconsciously, into something new. As Jonathan Lethem writes,  
Neurological study has lately shown that memory, imagination, and 
consciousness itself is stitched, quilted, pastiched. If we cut-and-paste our 
selves, might we not forgive it of our artworks? (“The Ecstasy of Influence” 
68)51 
“We live inside bodies, after all,” writes Wallace (Pale King 291), and the artist who lives in 
and through the body is necessarily filling a form that has, throughout its life, been absorbing 
and engineering an endless array of ‘plagiarised’ sources from which the conscious mind can 
draw. Wallace’s various allusions to “appropriation art”—in the Erdedy chapter in Infinite Jest 
(23); in the endnotes, when one critic asks “‘Has James O. Incandenza Ever Even Once 
Produced One Genuinely Original or Unappropriated or Nonderivative Thing?’” (990n. 24); in 
“Westward” with the description of “‘art’ [as] nothing more than the closet of a klepto with 
really good taste” (Girl 293)—suggests this was much on Wallace’s mind. The conscious artist 
can choose to resist this fact, but ultimately, as Wallace wrote in Infinite Jest, “You are what 
you love. No?” (107).52 
                                                          
51 Lethem’s essay about replacing the “wearisome killing-the-father imperatives” with an “ecstasy of influence” 
is itself patchworked together with quotations from other writers. Lethem reveals his sources at the end 
(including a couple from Wallace himself), and notes that the phrase “ecstasy of influence” is “lifted from 
spoken remarks by Professor Richard Dienst of Rutgers” (68). Lethem uses similar language to Thompson 
when he explains that “Blues and jazz musicians have long been enabled by a kind of ‘open source’ culture” 
(60), and he asks his readers to “consider” some of history’s plagiarisms that are the product of such a 
culture: “Shakespeare's description of Cleopatra, copied nearly verbatim from Plutarch's life of Mark 
Antony and also later nicked by T. S. Eliot for The Waste Land. If these are examples of plagiarism, then we 
want more plagiarism” (61). Samuel Cohen refers to this essay in his discussion of Wallace’s own anxiety 
about his “postmodern inheritance” (76), and suggests that Wallace’s relationship with his influences is 
both anxious and ecstatic, despairing and hopeful (75-76). 
52 Another complementary model of literary influence that Thompson uses to describe Wallace’s work is that of 
the hologram, whereby a writer’s work does not “eras[e]” its influences, but is “overlaid onto” them, 
“superimposed images that rework the original material and find new thematic inflections” (112). To 
support his argument, Thompson quotes Wallace in conversation with Bryan Garner, explaining writing 
“Exercises as boneheaded as you take a book you really like, you read a page of it three, four times, put it 
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In her study of artistic inspiration, Touched with Fire: Manic Depressive Illness and the 
Artistic Temperament (1993), Kay Redfield Jamison notes that  
From virtually all perspectives—early Greek philosopher to twentieth-century 
specialist—there is agreement that artistic creativity and inspiration involve, 
indeed require, a dipping into pre-rational or irrational sources while 
maintaining ongoing contact with reality and ‘life at the surface.’ (104) 
In the postmodern period, language and Text replaced the gods and muses in the authorship 
equation (Burke xvii). Now, in the post-postmodern period, artists such as Wallace and Bidart 
re-embody the whole problem. They still understand, as the postmodernists did, that the ‘I’ 
has little authority, but this is not because it is absent. The ‘I’ is embodied in a body that is 
present every step of the way. In the following chapters I will not read Wallace’s works to try 
and discover things about the life of the man who wrote them, but it is important to recognise 
from the beginning that Wallace existed, that he read things and inevitably drew on them in 
his own writing, and that our readings of his work can be enriched if we allow that his works 
have origins. We should not chain ourselves to Wallace’s statements about what fiction is 
supposed to do, but neither should we demap Wallace entirely. As we will see in chapter 2, if 
we try, in spite of what we know about Wallace’s life and beliefs, to stubbornly fit his work 
into the narrow bounds of a specific theoretical framework that cannot account for those 
beliefs, we run the risk of ignoring hugely significant aspects of his fiction.  
                                                          
down, and then try to imitate it . . . so that you can feel your own muscles trying to achieve some of [its] 
effects” (qtd. in Thompson 113). Thompson’s “holographic metaphor” (113) still begins with Wallace’s 
body. This “boneheaded” exercise is all about the writer’s “muscles” mimicking the muscle movements of 
previous writers. The texts become holographic once they leave Wallace’s hands but until then they are in 
the firm grip of a writer’s muscle and bone. 
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Chapter 2 
“He’s a ghost haunting his own body”: Cartesian Dualism in 
Wallace’s Ghost Stories 
 
 . . . More than once you asked 
      that I breathe into your lungs like the soprano in the opera 
           I loved so my ghost might inhabit you and you ingest my belief 
 in your otherwise-only-probable soul. 
—Mary Karr, “Suicide’s Note: An Annual” (2012) 
Wallace the Posthumanist 
It is no coincidence that one of the first articles on Wallace’s work was written by N. Katherine 
Hayles, whose landmark study How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics (1999) is perhaps the most cited work on posthumanism. In 
Hayles’s article on Wallace’s Infinite Jest, notably published in the same year as her larger 
study, she characterised Wallace’s project as a posthuman one, and introduced the 
theoretical framework that has influenced the debate about Wallace ever since, notably in 
criticism by Elizabeth Freudenthal and Paul Giles. It remains an unchallenged truism in 
Wallace studies that Wallace was a posthuman writer. 
Like ‘humanism’ before it, ‘posthumanism’ means different things to different critics. 
Posthumanism is, loosely, a critique of humanism, and it dismantles in many different ways 
the traditional concept of ‘Man’ that we see in the work of philosophers such as René 
Descartes: that is, ‘Man’ as a uniquely spiritual being in possession of a temporary, mechanical 
body. Though Descartes’s dualist model of the self has since become synonymous with 
traditional humanism, and is often the primary point of reference for posthumanist studies, 
it is part of a very long philosophical tradition. Plato, for instance, thought of ‘Man’ as a 
rational, reasonable soul that exists inside a burdensome body: “if we are ever to have pure 
knowledge of anything,” he writes, “we must get rid of the body and contemplate things in 
isolation with the soul in isolation” (Last Days 127). Aristotle defined ‘Man’ as that which is 
elevated up the chain of being by its “intellect,” above the souls of animals (defined by 
“movement and . . . senses”) and even further above “the plant or vegetative soul” (defined 
by “the principle of growth and nutrition”). This understanding of ‘Man’ as something distinct 
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from the animal and plant kingdoms later influenced the thirteenth-century philosopher 
Thomas Aquinas, who read and annotated Aristotle’s theory (Aquinas 427-28). According to 
George Makari, Descartes did away with Artistotle’s view when he argued that all of the 
natural world, including ‘Man,’ was equally mechanical, and that only “man’s Cogito stood 
outside of” nature (29). In the eighteenth century, in Alexander Pope’s “An Essay on Man” 
(1734), ‘Man’ still has his place on the “great chain of being,” between the beasts (with which 
he shares an animal body) and the angels above (with which he shares a rational, divine, 
spirit):  
Now upward will he soar,  
And little less than angel, would be more;  
Now looking downwards, just as grieved appears  
To want the strength of bulls, the fur of bears. (277)  
This understanding of ‘Man’ as having a rarefied place in the natural order, 
distinguished from the crude animal kingdom by his divine soul, is what posthumanism, in its 
many forms, attempts to dismantle. Cybernetic posthumanism, for example, treats humans 
as patterns of information, reproducible in genetic or digital code. For posthuman theorists 
such as Donna Haraway, in her landmark essay “A Cyborg Manifesto” (1984), the boundaries 
between human, animal, and machine have been breached (Simians 151). Human beings are 
no longer distinguished from either animal or machine by a “spirit . . . self-moving” and 
“autonomous” (152). This has its literal counterpart in what Paul Sheehan calls “Technological 
posthumanism,” which has a utopian vision of humanity actually merging with technology, a 
“bio-mechanical hybridity of the techno-body” (251). Both Sheehan and Haraway share the 
view that ‘Man’ is not a stable category, but something that is, and should be, kept in flux. In 
Gender Trouble (1990), Judith Butler argues that “the essence or identity” that human beings 
“purport to express,” the idea that they have an “internal core or substance,” is a 
“fabricatio[n]” (Butler 173). The human body is not a “bounded corporeality endowed with 
an origin, interiority and depth” (Fraser and Greco 44), but a hollow text, endlessly 
rewriteable: the “posthuman body is a technology, a screen, a projected image” (Halberstam 
and Livingston 3) with no internal, stable self hidden beneath. Roland Barthes shares these 
views, arguing for a posthumanism that eradicates the idea of “The Great Family of Man” 
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(Mythologies 100), an end to the naïve notion that all human beings are fundamentally the 
same. For Barthes, “Nature is itself Historical” (101)—there is no “solid rock of a universal 
human nature” (101)—and ‘Man’ is just a fiction (with an ugly imperialist history) that should 
be dismantled and rewritten.  
Though scientists studying the brain would disagree with the view that different 
cultures are not built upon the same “solid rock” of biology, the sciences of mind are 
posthumanist in their own way because they, too, dismantle the idea that human beings have 
some internal, soulful essence. As David Lodge puts it, there is  
a certain affinity between the poststructuralist literary theory that maintains 
that the human subject is entirely constructed by the discourses in which it is 
situated, and the cognitive science view that regards human self-
consciousness as an epiphenomenon of brain activity. (89)  
This anti-essentialist account of selfhood is perhaps best expressed by Daniel C. Dennett, who 
writes that “the various phenomena that compose what we call consciousness . . . are all 
physical effects of the brain’s activities” (16): “there’s nobody home” (29).53 In each of these 
theoretical frameworks, ‘Man’ is an unstable category threatened by technology, scientific 
accounts of selfhood, and both cultural and physical mutation. There is no such thing as a 
rational soul or essence that distinguishes thinking man from animal. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
this view is typical of the postmodern fiction that was written in the same period in which 
posthuman theory flourished. In Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), for instance, Thomas Pynchon 
describes Slothrop’s family history, “his blood’s avalanche” (29), coming to an end when 
Slothrop is “broken down . . . and scattered” (875), no longer held “together, even as a 
concept” (878). One of Robert Coover’s characters is also literally dismantled. In The 
Adventures of Lucky Pierre (2002), Pierre receives a flatpack woman in the mail, and puts 
together her “scraps, spare parts” and sexual organs into what barely resembles a human 
                                                          
53 As Peter Carruthers notes, “Many have alleged that Dennett’s book,” Consciousness Explained, “should really 
have been entitled Consciousness Explained Away” (32). Not all scientists of mind share this view, of course. 
As we have seen, Antonio Damasio is quite comfortable “privileg[ing] the self” (Self Comes to Mind 8) and 
argues that “nothing is gained by dismissing it as an illusion” (24). Damasio would not argue, however, that 
the self is immaterial or somehow separate to the evolutionary process: only that it exists. 
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being (her vagina, for instance, is installed in her armpit), though she continues to function: 
“You’ll get useta me after a while, and we can have some pretty weird ol’ flops together!” 
(109; 111). ‘Man’ is no longer a stable concept. The human being is hollow, rewriteable, and 
not as special as we used to think.54 
Hayles situates Wallace’s work in this tradition. For Hayles, posthumanism is 
“characterised” by the assumption that consciousness is neither uniquely divine nor the “seat 
of human identity” (How We Became 2). It is, in other words, an anti-Cartesian position, which 
rejects the notion that the mind is the immaterial master of the body it possesses and 
controls. Hayles celebrates this anti-Cartesianism, and the deconstruction of the (white, male, 
imperial) liberal humanist subject that has been achieved by feminist, postcolonial, and many 
other theorists.55 Posthumanism as Hayles defines it does not mean “the end of humanity” 
but the “end of a certain conception of the human” (286); it is not an attempt to take ‘Man’ 
down from his pedestal, but rather the recognition that ‘Man’ never had a pedestal to begin 
with.  
As we saw in chapter 1, the posthuman model of mind as embodied, embrained, and 
out of conscious control is clearly central to Wallace’s work. Though I will argue in this chapter 
                                                          
54 Though posthuman theory has been particularly dominant in the postmodern period, Ulrika Maude notes that 
its roots grow deep. In the nineteenth century, for instance, we had learned that “consciousness differed 
rather drastically from the Cartesian dictum, ‘I think therefore I am’, which had seen the rational mind as 
the defining attribute, the sine qua non, of the human. Darwin’s work declared mental consciousness a 
mere by-product of the body and its various functions” (200). Though there is what we might call a 
posthumanist strand through all of Western philosophy—one which challenges the view that humans are 
unique, divine, or immaterial—twentieth-century posthumanism is distinguished from these earlier 
positions by its association with postmodern and poststructuralist theory (‘Man’ is a text to be rewritten); 
our modern understanding of DNA, genetics, and the biological codes that make us up; and the 
hybridisation of Man and technology that dissolves the clear-cut boundaries between the two.  
55 In How We Became Posthuman, Hayles’s argument is specifically with the cybernetics movement, from whom, 
she argues, we need to reclaim the term ‘posthuman.’ Because the cybernetics movement understands 
human beings as “information-processing entities who are essentially similar to intelligent machines” (7), 
Hayles argues that it falls, therefore, into precisely the same Cartesian trap as liberal humanism. Like the 
humanism it supposedly challenges, cybernetic posthumanism still privileges consciousness and the 
dominant “rational mind” which it views as “possess[ing] a body” rather than “being a body” (4).  
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that by miscategorising Wallace as a posthumanist we bind ourselves to a theoretical 
framework that neglects major aspects of his work, my aim is not to oversimply Wallace’s 
obviously complicated treatment of his characters. Throughout his career Wallace writes 
about posthuman beings, and is all too aware that we are driven by “the deep and involuntary 
stuff of man” (Supposedly 279). He describes the “limbic system[s]” of his editors (Consider 
158n.), the “individual neocortices” at work inside his characters (Oblivion 38), and describes 
puberty as “adolescent glands firing all over the place” (Infinite Jest 450), an emotionless, 
mechanical description that is divorced from the individual selves who are caught in the 
crossfire. Wallace’s early, uncollected short story, “Order and Flux in Northampton” (1991), 
is quintessentially posthuman in its description of the involuntary love that drives the 
character Barry Dingle:  
through the miraculous manipulations of primal human ontemes too primal 
and too human even to be contemplated, probably, it gives birth to life: from 
the clotted silt of the uninterestingness at the center of Barry Dingle there 
emerges the salamanderial zygote of a robust, animate thing, a life, Barry 
Dingle's immoderate homunculoid love, conceived out of the impossibly 
distant refracted epiphany of Myrnaloy Trask, demure in her now-not-fallen 
socks, a Myrnaloy who is as unaware as carbon itself that she has effected the 
manufacture of life through her role in the interplay of forces probably beyond 
the comprehension of everything and everyone involved. 
The characters hidden somewhere beneath this frustrating prose are as “unaware” and as out 
of conscious control “as carbon itself,” the material stuff of which they are made, stuff that is 
unconscious and bound to the laws of the natural world. The scientific jargon seeded through 
this passage—“zygote,” a “body of living protoplasm” (OED), and “ontemes,” which seems to 
be an invention of Wallace’s—turns what is a simple, classical moment—falling into love—
into a dense, expansive passage that ostensibly cannot contain all the chemical and 
involuntary movements that drive the people inside it.  
It is entirely appropriate, then, that Hayles would establish, in one of the first scholarly 
articles on Wallace’s work, the terms of the debate for a significant strand of Wallace studies. 
Her 1999 article “The Illusion of Autonomy and the Fact of Recursivity: Virtual Ecologies, 
Entertainment, and Infinite Jest” brings the ideas in her larger study, How We Became 
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Posthuman, to bear on Wallace’s novel. Infinite Jest is framed, Hayles argues, by two Bottoms: 
Hal’s “disastrous failure to communicate” and Gately’s “failing to intervene in Fackelman’s 
torture and death,” both of which “displa[y]” the disastrous “end results of believing in 
autonomy” (“Illusion” 695). According to Hayles, Wallace’s cast of characters suffer from the 
“presumption of autonomy” that is the “founding principle for the liberal humanist self” (693) 
and the founding philosophy of the United States. The only way out for these characters is to 
abandon their assumption that they are free to pursue happiness in all its forms (chemical or 
otherwise), and instead radically “restructure the autonomous liberal subject” (694). This 
restructuring is made possible by the novel’s Alcoholics Anonymous program, because it runs 
counter to the philosophy of the individual pursuit of happiness, teaching instead that 
“citizenship” only works when individuals are not solipsistic (i.e., focused on their individual 
pleasure) but “connected with everything else” (694). In Hayles’s reading, Infinite Jest 
portrays autonomous selfhood as a dangerous delusion that needs a “cure” (694). 
Hayles’s work on Wallace has been further developed in particular by Elizabeth 
Freudenthal (2010), who also reads Infinite Jest as dismantling the liberal humanist self. 
According to Freudenthal’s reading, which is rooted in Butlerian theory, characters such as 
Gately use their “own bod[ies]” as “instrument[s] of free-floating, originless well-being” (192). 
Wallace’s characters do not have a core essential self (they are “originless”), and they perform 
“rituals” of “‘anti-interiority’” to maintain an identity that is “divested from an essentialist 
notion of inner emotional, psychological, and spiritual life. . . . [A] subjectivity generated . . . 
not in the ideal realm of interiority,” but in a “continuous reestablishment of selfhood 
contingent on external material reality” (192). Like Hayles’s reading of the novel as a challenge 
to the “presumption of autonomy” (693), Freudenthal reads the novel as a challenge to neo-
Cartesian models of the self that separate the body and brain from the so-called “‘self’” (193). 
Drawing explicitly on Hayles (196), Freudenthal argues that “embodiment” is key to our 
understanding of Wallace’s “depiction of selfhood” (196), and she reads the body in the novel 
as connecting “exterior political-social structures and ostensibly interior subjective 
experiences” (196, my emphasis).  
Alexander Resar, Simon de Bourcier, Alexander Moran, Lucas Thompson, Mark 
Bresnan, Allard den Dulk, Wilson Kaiser, and Brian Douglas Jansen read Wallace along these 
lines. Where Resar argues that Infinite Jest “performs the production of the subject in 
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process/on trial, . . . structuring the production of subjectivity, while simultaneously 
annihilating the subject’s signification” (Resar 144), De Bourcier makes the same point that 
“the ‘self’” in Wallace’s work, “whether it be text, artificial consciousness, or the human 
subject—is always grounded on absence” (57). Moran argues that Meredith Rand, in The Pale 
King, is “shown to be a product of her environment,” rather than having a “‘substantive soul 
or ego’” (16). Lucas Thompson reads one of Wallace’s Kafka-inspired story sketches about a 
“cockroach . . . who perceives himself as a human does, as ‘the center’ of the world,” as a 
posthumanist story about how “evolutionary biology obviates the possibility of an individual 
perspective” (135). Both Bresnan and Dulk reiterate Hayles’s point, arguing that the novel’s 
Alcoholics Anonymous program requires that characters “relinquish any conception of 
[themselves] as . . . integrated and autonomous subject[s]” (Bresnan 66), and that in Wallace’s 
writing the self has “no ‘true core’ that . . . underlies selfhood” (Dulk 16). Though Kaiser’s 
reading of “recursive network[s]” in the novel differs from Hayles’s (58), he shares with her 
and Freudenthal the view that Wallace is writing against “sweeping claims about self and 
other” and “the ‘humanity of man’” (54-55). Finally, Jansen argues that Wallace’s fiction 
“celebrat[es] . . . the human subject who is turned outward . . . aware of our roles in a large, 
complex, interconnected system” (57). For Hayles, Freudenthal, and others, Wallace’s 
characters are emphatically posthuman: they are “without any inner essence” (Freudenthal 
205-06). 
 
Interiority in the Early Stories 
These posthuman readings misrepresent Wallace’s fiction. According to Freudenthal and 
Hayles, Wallace’s cast of characters in Infinite Jest suffer from the illusion that they possess 
an “inner essence” (Freudenthal 205-06) and “autonomy” (Hayles, “Illusion” 693), yet the 
entire project of the AA community in Wallace’s novel is one that, to quote it directly, 
“stresses the utter autonomy of the individual member” (356). Gately tells us that what AA 
teaches is precisely the opposite of what Hayles and Freudenthal suggest: “Newcomers come 
in so whacked out” they make the mistake of wanting “desperate[ly] to escape their own 
interior, to lay responsibility for themselves at the feet of something” outside themselves, 
such as the “Substance” to which they are addicted (863). The point of AA is not to be anti-
interior but to take personal, interior responsibility for your own actions.  
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One speaker at the AA meeting tells the horrifying story of her father’s incestuous 
sexual abuse, but the reason her story makes the others in the room uncomfortable is not 
because of its content but because it is riddled with blame and excuses that locate the cause 
of her drug problem outside of herself: “she’d had to become a stripper at sixteen because 
she’d had to run away from home because . . .” (370). The woman takes what we might call a 
posthuman view of her experience: she is, appropriately, a stripper, who bares her body to 
the AA audience, blaming it for everything that has happened to her. By arguing that 
“anybody with an operant limbic system” would be “force[d]” to run away (373), she pushes 
the blame away from her conscious mind and onto her unconscious form—her body and 
brain—that is posthumanly driven by chemicals, instinct, and mood. In doing so, she suggests 
that she had no part in it, because anyone with a body would have acted similarly. This 
creation of “cause[s]” is dangerous because it leads to “Self-Pity and Denial,” the opposite of 
what AA wants to instil. What AA emphasises is not anti-interiority and anti-autonomy but 
the exact opposite: the importance of the “In Here” instead of the “Out There” (374). Taking 
personal, conscious responsibility for your actions is what saves you. Autonomy is not the 
dangerous delusion that needs a “cure” (Hayles, “Illusion” 694). It is the desire to give one’s 
own autonomy up to a Substance that destroys you. 
Unlike Hayles and Freudenthal, I have the benefit of hindsight and more of Wallace’s 
work to draw on. Yet Wallace’s emphasis in Infinite Jest on the interior self inhabiting the 
body as the “soul” (218) inhabits its “vessel” (231), does not come out of nowhere. Wallace’s 
earlier fiction is filled with references to the interior self. In Broom, for instance, the Snapiard 
family undergo a ritual to “preserve individual identity and efficacy of will” (169). This is an 
apt description of Lenore’s arc through the novel, too, as she tries to remain an autonomous 
individual while two men, Vigorous and Lang, try to possess her.  
In the first story in Girl with Curious Hair, “Little Expressionless Animals,” the character 
Julie, a Jeopardy! savant, is haunted by an episode from her past that did violence to her sense 
of interiority. As a child, she was left by her mother and one of her mother’s many partners 
(“one after the other. . . . These blank silent men” [10]) by the road, where a dead-eyed, 
expressionless cow “watche[d]” her “the same way it watches anything” (40). This is such a 
haunting episode for Julie because she does not feel alive unless she is in the gaze of 
something with an expression that registers her own existence. She seems to come alive on 
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the Jeopardy! show because the “audience flicker[s]” (4) with whatever light hits them, and 
Julie “best likes . . . faces whose expressions change by the second” (10). Where Judith Butler 
denies the existence of an “internal core or substance” that can be “express[ed] or reveal[ed]” 
(173), Wallace takes a contrary view. Trying to explain herself to her lover Faye, Julie explains 
that  
Oceans are only oceans when they move. . . . Waves are what keep oceans 
from just being very big puddles. Oceans are just their waves. And every wave 
in the ocean is finally going to meet what it moves toward, and break. . . . Your 
own face, moving into expression. A wave, breaking on a rock, giving up its 
shape in a gesture that expresses that shape. See? (42) 
What Julie implies here is that humans only seem human (that is, conscious and having an 
interior, unlike the dead-eyed cow or her mother’s blank men) when they express: when there 
is some continuity between the emotional inner self and the outer expression of that self. 
This is not a Butlerian performance belying the absence beneath, but a metaphor that stresses 
the presence of something inside. Like the story’s other TV personality, Bob Eubanks, who is 
“inside of the set, and I’m on the outside” (30-31), so Wallace’s characters are inside their 
bodies, their expressions projected out onto their faces.  
This metaphor is not isolated to one collection, but appears throughout Wallace’s later 
work. In his AVN awards essay, for instance, Wallace describes the way pornographic actors 
“preserv[e] some sense of dignity and autonomy” by “lock[ing]” their “self . . . someplace far 
behind the eyes” (17n. 14). When that “hidden self appears,” it is the opposite of acting: 
“moans” change “from automatic to expressive” (17n. 14, my emphasis), and the interior self 
is expressed outward. In “Mister Squishy,” the facilitator of a taste-testing focus group has a 
“vision of [the participants] in the conference room as like icebergs and/or floes, only the 
sharp caps showing,” the rest of them buried deep beneath the surface (31), again stressing 
that there is much more going on beneath the surface, inside the person, than an outsider 
can see. In The Pale King, Cusk feels there is a “literal spotlight” on him in his anxiety-
nightmares, emphasising his discomfort with the idea that “his secret inner self” was 
“leak[ing] out” and becoming visible to others (101). For Wallace, there is always an infinitely 
complex “inner self” that can only be glimpsed by an outsider (under a wave; as a genuine 
moan; as the tip of iceberg; or through a leak). Dennett argues that the idea that we have a 
75 
 
“‘unity of consciousness’,” a Cartesian observer inside the head, “impresses on us the 
distinction between ‘in here’ and ‘out there’” (108). This “naïve boundary”—as Dennett puts 
it (108)—is a consistent metaphor that governs the whole of Wallace’s first story collection 
and the philosophy of Infinite Jest’s AA. Wallace does not advocate anti-interiority, but rather 
the importance of the “‘In Here’ that protects against a return to ‘Out There’” (374). 
Paul Giles is the only critic who acknowledges that though the world Wallace writes 
about might be undeniably posthuman, Wallace views this world as hostile. In his 2007 article, 
“Sentimental Posthumanism: David Foster Wallace,” Giles concurs with Hayles that Wallace’s 
writing “developed under the intellectual sign of posthumanism” (329), and that Wallace 
shares the posthumanists’ “intellectual scepticism about the efficacy of the liberal 
imagination and humanist centers of gravity” (329). Giles also allows, however, that despite 
his clear engagement with the posthuman condition there is “nostalgia” in Wallace’s work 
“for more traditional forms of identity” (335). Wallace is a posthumanist of course, but a 
“sentimental” one, “for whom the legacies of human spirit still carry a cathectic charge” 
despite their being outdated (341).56 Charles B. Harris makes a similar point when he suggests 
that Wallace’s “formidable task” was  
to develop a literary form that accepts human reality as defined by 
poststructuralist thought while moving away from the strain of antihumanism 
in such thought. That recuperates the priorities and beliefs of humanism 
without retreating to prestructuralist notions of essentialism and universalism. 
(116) 
Giles’s and Harris’s gestures in this direction are still couched in Hayles’s early framework. 
Though they recognise that Wallace’s work is nostalgic for “more traditional forms of 
identity,” Giles still sees no room in “Wallace’s texts [for] unfractured consciousness” 
(“Sentimental” 341), and Harris no room for “notions of essentialism” (116). Where 
                                                          
56 Kaiser rejects this view, arguing that “Wallace’s worlds do not secretly harken back to normative humanist 
models” (67). Conley Wouters, on the other hand, takes up a similar line to Giles. Wouters argues that The 
Pale King complexly portrays posthumanism as a threat to old-fashioned subjectivity, but a threat which 
cannot be avoided or denied. For Wouters, like Giles, Wallace “attempts to tell very human stories in a form 
we might assume to be hostile to such stories” (460).  
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Cartesianism exists in Wallace studies—the traditional humanist view that ‘Man’ has an 
essential, thinking soul that makes it human—it is as something that Wallace is continually 
rejecting. Yet none of these critics, who take as their foundation the view that Descartes was 
wrong about the nature of the human mind, account for the recurring idea in Wallace’s work 
that his characters have a core essential self that is the origin of what they are able to express, 
nor, indeed, for the many ghosts that literally walk and talk through Wallace’s stories.57 
It is remarkable that there has not been a single significant mention of souls or ghosts 
in any of these articles, despite these symbols of the essential, Cartesian self being an 
absolutely central thread through all of Wallace’s writing, especially Infinite Jest (which is the 
focus of most critics). Freudenthal mentions the “soul” once in a brief discussion of the 
character Ortho Stice when she argues that he does not have one: Stice apparently embodies 
the novel’s “anti-interior agenda” because there is “no soul or mind separate from and 
superior to his cog-and-gear-filled head” (204). Both Freudenthal and Conley Wouters briefly 
mention that ghosts appear in Infinite Jest and The Pale King, though Freudenthal reads the 
ghost as an affirmation of materiality (“If [James’s ghost] is moving them, he trusts these 
objects to speak for themselves and for him . . . materiality insists on itself” [204]), and 
                                                          
57 Nicoline Timmer is one of the few critics to acknowledge that the “self, experiencing real feelings, is not absent 
at all” in Wallace’s work, as it was in the postmodern fiction that preceded it (44). While I share Timmer’s 
view that post-postmodern fiction can be characterised by its “incentive to move beyond” the “postmodern 
perspective on subjectivity” (13), I disagree with her conclusion that Wallace’s fiction “does not signal a 
return to some form of ‘universal’ humanism” (117) and that the “self in these texts feels empty inside” 
(331). Samuel Cohen’s description of Hal as “a soul trapped inside a body” (67) seems closer to how Wallace 
actually wrote him, but Cohen does not linger on these dualistic terms, nor on what they might mean for 
Wallace’s take on character or humanism. Casey Michael Henry and Emily J. Hogg both note that Infinite 
Jest and The Pale King, respectively, contain “a new sort of three-dimensional postmodern figure” who 
suffers “piercing bouts of interiority” (Henry 485-96), and “inner worlds [that] are expressed through, but 
also darkly undermine, political commitment and public service” (Hogg 69), but they do not explain this 
interiority in the context of Wallace’s other works or in terms of humanism and characterisation. Edmund 
Waldstein argues that Wallace “makes faltering steps toward recovering” human characters that have some 
“soul-body unity” (209), but does not explain what this means or how Wallace goes about it. Traditional 
humanist models of the self are literally at the core of Wallace’s characters, and while there are some small 
gestures in this direction, they have to be more rigorously accounted for when we discuss the self in 
Wallace’s work.  
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Wouters as representing the IRS’s dehumanising (posthuman) effects. Giles at least refers to 
Wallace’s nostalgia for “the legacies of human spirit” (“Sentimental” 341), though the term 
“spirit” is not defined. I will show that Wallace’s work is far more Cartesian than his critics 
allow.  
“People are often surprised,” said Wallace, that he’s a “fairly traditional, conservative 
kind of writer. I tend to think of fiction as being mainly about characters and human beings 
and inner experience” (“Interview by Karmodi,” my emphasis).58 Perhaps this surprise arises 
because, as Lisa Ruddick has argued, in the academy today  
those who think little of interiority can reject this concept outright, with 
decades of theoretical opinion behind them. They can say, for example, 
without spending time defending their views, that ‘the truth of inner life’ is a 
construct of ‘enlightenment thinking about selfhood’ and an extension of 
‘humanist’ and ‘Christian’ ideology. (“When Nothing is Cool”) 
It is undeniable that disembodiment, essentialism, and the human soul are key ideas that run 
throughout Wallace’s writing. The word “soul” appears no less than forty times in Infinite Jest, 
and “spirit” or “spiritually” no less than sixty (the word “brain” is used around one hundred 
times). This is not to mention the two ghosts who appear in the novel: Lucien, briefly, and one 
of the main characters, James Incandenza, for a considerable length of time. There is another 
ghost in Wallace’s later story “Incarnations of Burned Children” that leaves its body to escape 
terrible pain. The word “incarnations” from the title literally means a “body, person, or form 
in which a soul, spirit, or deity is incarnated” (OED), yet those who have discussed this story—
                                                          
58 Increasingly, critics have noted that Wallace held rather more conservative views than had been previously 
assumed. Maria Bustillos, for instance, suggests that the lack of attention paid to the religious qualities of 
Wallace’s writing is a problem with “the ingrained secularist character of modern literary analysis” that has 
“skewed readings of Wallace; there’s almost a deliberate refusal to see what is right before us” (134). 
Recently, Michael J. O’Connell and Martin Brick have begun to situate Wallace’s work in a Christian context, 
though both articles are limited by their authors’ attempts to prove that Wallace himself was a particular 
kind of Christian. Neither critic engages with the theoretical category of humanism or posthumanism. While 
James Santel argues that Wallace was quite conservative, he argues that Wallace’s conservativism is 
“trag[ic]” (632) because Wallace’s desire to “plac[e] his faith . . . in other human beings” (627) was always 
“severely curbed by his bedrock belief that true empathy is impossible” (626).  
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Paul Giles (“All Swallowed Up” 16), Iannis Goerlandt (“Still Steaming”), and Jaroslav Kušnír—
make no mention at all of Wallace’s description of the child’s “self’s soul” like “so much vapor 
aloft,” “leav[ing] himself [to] watch the whole rest unfold from a point overhead . . . the child’s 
body . . . liv[ing] its life untenanted” (Oblivion 116). That Infinite Jest’s Gately is also said to 
“fal[l] back and up inside himself, like vapor up a chimney” (895) suggests that this image was 
significant for Wallace and worth exploring. Finally, there are two ghosts in Wallace’s final 
novel, The Pale King, who haunt the IRS office. 
Though Infinite Jest definitely marks a shift (there are no ghosts in Broom or Girl), in 
1992, one year after the publication of the very posthuman “Order and Flux,” Wallace 
published a short story in Harper’s titled “Rabbit Resurrected,” which features another ghost. 
In this imagined sequel to John Updike’s Rabbit at Rest (1990), Wallace describes the 
eponymous character rising out of his body at death—“He is not his body” (39)—to arrive at 
a kind of heaven, “a solipsist’s haven” [41], filled with the “pale wisps of images,” the “ghosts” 
of those he had brought to life by “minutely describ[ing]” them while he was alive (41). Ghosts 
are clearly a rich image for Wallace, given their number and various forms across his career. 
In his review of John Updike’s Toward the End of Time (1997), Wallace famously named 
Updike one of the “Great Male Narcissists who’ve dominated postwar American fiction” 
(Consider 51), and it is notable—and perhaps unsurprising to readers of Wallace’s work—that 
all of Wallace’s ghosts, including the ghost of Rabbit/Updike, are men.59 A generous 
interpretation of this fact is that Wallace was engaging directly with the traditional concept 
of ‘Man’ as it appears throughout Western philosophy, and his ghosts are a way to think about 
not gender or masculinity necessarily but humanity’s “Cartesian nightmare” (Both Flesh 93). 
Though there are far fewer female characters in Wallace’s work than male, we will see in 
chapter 3 that they clearly suffer the same nightmare, become addicted to the same 
substances, and have the same kind of interiority as Wallace’s men. For now we will focus on 
the ghosts as a direct engagement with Cartesian models of mind.  
                                                          
59 Lenore Sr. is central to Broom’s plot but never actually appears, and is in this sense ghostlike (a “presence-in-
absence,” as Wallace put it in his film treatment of the novel [qtd. in Thompson 114]). It would be 
disingenuous to suggest, however, that the ghosts who appear in Wallace’s fiction are not uniformly men. 
79 
 
The only critic to draw attention to the continuum in Wallace’s fiction between 
embodiment at the one end and the ghost (a symbol of “pure mind”) at the other is Stephen 
J. Burn (“Webs” 73). In this chapter I will expand Burn’s discussion of Infinite Jest across 
Wallace’s fiction. I will also argue that what Burn sees as a symptom of “schizophrenia” (73)—
the way in which the novel’s characters feel that their minds are separate from their bodies—
is not necessarily a symptom of mental illness in Wallace’s worlds but true of all human life 
as he portrays it.60 Ultimately, I will begin to uncover in this chapter what Wallace really 
means when he says that “Fiction’s about what it is to be a fucking human being” 
(Conversations 26). What does Wallace mean by “human being”? What does he mean when 
he refers, as he so often does, to the self and the soul? We will see that though Wallace is in 
many ways a posthumanist who draws upon the embodied model of mind, Descartes’s 
outdated model is the foundation upon which all of Wallace’s characters are built.  
 
“I am soul” 
The embodied model of mind that Wallace draws upon across his fiction emerges out of an 
argument with what Antonio Damasio calls, in his book’s title, Descartes’ Error. Descartes’s 
error is to assume that the mind is separate to the body, that it is an immaterial, reasonable, 
autonomous entity inhabiting a material form.61 Descartes’s model rests upon the 
foundational fact of cogito ergo sum: that though the body may be an illusion, a trick played 
upon the soul, the soul cannot be an illusion: Descartes knows at least that “I am, therefore, 
precisely only a thinking thing, that is, a mind, soul, intellect or reason” (Meditations 25). 
According to Russell Shorto, it was Descartes who, with the publication of the Meditations on 
First Philosophy in 1641, “reorientat[ed] . . . knowledge so that it was no longer based on 
collective authority . . . but on a newly empowered self—the individual mind and its ‘good 
                                                          
60 Burn draws on R. D. Laing’s description of schizophrenia in The Divided Self (1960), a book that Wallace had 
read in considerable detail, which describes how a patient “experiences himself . . . as a mind more or less 
tenuously linked to a body” (qtd. in Burn, “Webs” 73). 
61 Wallace himself used the phrase “Descartes’ error” in a chatroom conversation with Word, to describe the 
problem with one of the room’s participants “deducing Agent from Event.” Descartes’s error is assuming 
the existence of an Agent. 
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sense’” (xviii). Because the soul is not made of matter, it distinguishes human beings from 
“the beast[s]” with which they share their clockwork bodies.  
We do not have to be interested in Wallace’s portrayal of ghosts and souls to recognise 
that Descartes is a hugely formative figure for Wallace, and it is remarkable that the 
relationship between the two writers has received so little attention. Other than in Stephen 
J. Burn’s work (Reader’s Guide 72-74), Wallace’s relationship with Descartes’s writings is 
absent from Wallace studies, except in the implicit assumption that Descartes’s model was 
wrong.62 Yet Descartes is named in Wallace’s very first published story, “The Planet Trillaphon 
As it Stands in Relation to the Bad Thing,” as a source for the narrator who is trying to describe 
his experience of depression and of the world falling out from beneath his feet: “Imagine how 
you’d feel at that exact moment, like Descartes at the start of his second thing” (10). 
Descartes’s description of being “tossed about, as if I had fallen suddenly into a deep 
whirlpool, that I can neither put my foot on the bottom nor swim to the surface” (Meditations 
23) is not a philosophical abstraction for Wallace, but something he seemed to feel at a very 
personal level.63  
                                                          
62 In his unpublished thesis, Jonathan Baskin is one of the few critics to discuss Wallace’s significant relationship 
with Descartes’s work. Baskin’s focus is not on the mind-body problem, however, but on the failure of 
Descartes’s way of thinking, and he argues that Wallace makes a “case against dualism” as an “ineffective 
framework for addressing the kinds of problems by which his characters tend to be afflicted” (35). Baskin 
does not account for the Cartesian ghosts in Wallace’s fiction, nor the Cartesian metaphors that, as we shall 
see, govern all of Wallace’s characters independently of how they conceive of themselves. 
63 Wallace expresses this sentiment in his most undisguisedly philosophical piece, “The Empty Plenum: David 
Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress,” where he describes himself as one of “the impotent unlucky sort 
whose beliefs inform his stomach’s daily state” (Both Flesh 79). Wallace tackles Descartes head on in this 
review, and it fits what we have seen so far across Wallace’s fiction. Though Wallace is aware of the debates 
around the logical problems with Descartes’s Cogito—“the truth of ‘I think’ entails only the existence of 
thinking,” not existence itself (84)—Wallace shares with Descartes a deeply felt doubt about what we can 
know is true “outside the sixteen-inch diameter of bone that both births & imprisons” us and our thoughts 
(82). In a roundabout way, and perhaps with a little more doubt, Wallace comes to a version of Descartes’s 
conclusion: “‘I EXIST’ is the signal that throbs under most voluntary writing” (83). Whether the “Empty 
Plenum” in Wallace’s title refers to the emptiness of the world outside the self, or the hollowness of the 
skull, is unclear, but given the essay’s content the former interpretation seems more appropriate.  
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Descartes is also an important source for Wallace’s first novel, The Broom of the 
System, in which the central plot device is a baby food that can “significantly speed up 
development of powers of speech and comprehension” (149). This baby food is made with 
“pineal gland” extract, which is the name of the place, “suspended” in “the innermost part of 
the brain,” where Descartes located the connection between body and soul (Passions 230). 
According to George Makari, even by the 1670s, theories about the pineal gland as the house 
of the soul “provoked only ridicule and disgust” (96), yet it plays a significant role here. The 
pineal gland, Wallace writes, is where “Descartes thought [. . .] mind met body, [. . .] where 
the body’s hydraulics were adjusted and operated according to the . . . ?” (148). The 
conspicuous ellipsis in this sentence, when Stonecipher has to name the essence that 
operates the “body’s hydraulics,” suggests that he feels uncomfortable introducing 
metaphysics into his monologue about more grounded topics such as “revenue-loss” and the 
“market year” (152).64 The reader has to fill in the word for themselves, in spite of 
Stonecipher. Interestingly, this reader-input has to take place over the course of the chapter 
as a whole, because Stonecipher is talking at Lenore and we have to infer her presence too 
because he never gives her room to speak: “Meaning as use. Excuse me? You’re asking me 
why? Lenore, please. What do you talk about all the time, then, ‘why’?” (150).  
The explicit Descartes reference in Infinite Jest is similarly put into the mouth of 
another dominant male figure who spends his scene monologuing and leaving no room for 
the person to whom he is talking. Harking back to Stonecipher, Wallace uses the same 
narrative method in the chapter with James Incandenza and his father in Infinite Jest, where 
the father monologues to his son about the importance of being a body, a “machine” (158-
59), and of being the “helmsman at your own vessel’s tiller. A machine in the ghost, to quote 
a phrase” (160). James Sr’s phrase alludes to Gilbert Ryle’s argument that the Cartesian model 
of mind, which Ryle derides as “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine,” is “entirely false . . 
. in principle” (17). Both of these father-figures, then, are anti-Cartesians and thoroughly 
posthuman: the first is only interested in the pineal gland as a means to interfere in the 
“mental development” of children (149), the second is a makeshift sports scientist who wants 
                                                          
64 The same ellipsis happens in “Trillaphon,” suggesting that Wallace was more uncomfortable with the word 
‘soul’ in his early career. For a more detailed discussion of this and the “Trillaphon” story, see chapter 3. 
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to mould his son into the shape of a tennis player. As Burn puts it, James Sr.’s method “leaves 
little space for traditional conceptions of selfhood” (Reader’s Guide 49).  
It is significant that these allusions to Descartes are put into the mouths of characters 
who have no interest in the interior lives of the people to whom they are talking. The interior 
lives of their addressees are absent as far as they are concerned—their interiority has to be 
inferred by the reader—just as Descartes’s interior self is absent from their philosophy. Since 
the two addressees are major characters in the two novels, and the reader presumably does 
care about their interior lives, the speakers’ anti-Cartesianism is, I suggest, designed to 
frustrate the reader.  
Perhaps Wallace repeats the narrative technique (one senior figure talking over the 
younger protagonist) across two novels to suggest that he is the inheritor of an anti-Cartesian 
legacy. We have seen that Wallace “developed under the intellectual sign of posthumanism” 
(Giles, “Sentimental” 329), and with regard to Wallace’s literary inheritance, Burn has argued 
that  
Outside his own body of work, [Don] DeLillo's pioneering incorporation of 
emerging neuroscientific research may have influenced younger writers. David 
Foster Wallace, for example, seems to have patterned his massive 
encyclopaedic novel, Infinite Jest, on Great Jones Street. (“Don DeLillo’s” 362).  
Yet where DeLillo refers to the dominance of the brain (“Four ounces on the meat scale. That’s 
all I’m told I weigh” [Great Jones 231]) and souls as a dead waste product, akin to pollution in 
the air (“They get emitted from jet aircraft along with the well-known noxious chemicals” 
[53]), Wallace seems to challenge this with a more overt concern with soulful interiority. The 
two father-figures in Wallace’s novels scoff at the soul and signal the dominance of scientific 
and theoretical models which run roughshod over old-fashioned Cartesianism, but 
throughout the rest of the novel Wallace challenges this paradigm. 
For a clear example of how Wallace’s larger project runs counter to these two scenes, 
we can look at Wallace’s allusions to two of the more significant nails in the coffin of the 
Cartesian model: the case of Phineas P. Gage, and the philosopher Gilbert Ryle who coined 
the phrase ‘the ghost in the machine’ in The Concept of Mind (1949). Gage was a nineteenth-
century railroad worker whose brain was impaled by a yard-long spike, and whose story is 
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now a common example in books popularising cognitive science. As Steven Pinker explains, 
Gage survived with his “perception, memory, language, and motor functions intact,” but  
‘Gage was no longer Gage.’ A piece of iron had literally turned him into a 
different person, from courteous, responsible, and ambitious to rude, 
unreliable, and shiftless. It did this by impaling his ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, the region of the brain above the eyes now known to be involved in 
reasoning about other people. (The Blank Slate 42) 
Damasio also opens his study with this story, and explains that “it was difficult to accept the 
view that something as close to the human soul as ethical judgement, or as culture-bound as 
social conduct, might depend significantly on a specific region of the brain” (Descartes’ Error 
21). To try to cling on to the Cartesian model in the face of this evidence, however, is to arrive 
at the absurd notion that “Gage’s body may [have been] alive and well, but there [was] a new 
spirit animating it” (7). Wallace was aware of Gage and this problem. Burn notes that Infinite 
Jest contains a reference to the story (“Webs” 77) when one of the Antitoi brothers is killed 
by the wheelchair assassins who shove a “railroad spike [through] his eye” (Wallace, Infinite 
Jest 485). Wallace also wrote an entire story that seems to be based on Gage: “John Billy,” 
collected in Girl with Curious Hair. In this story, Chuck Nunn Junior, a “handsome and semi-
divine” figure living in “Minogue Oklahoma” (Girl 121), is injured in a car crash so badly his 
head is described as being “minus a jaw, consciousness, and two healthy eyes” (129). Like 
Gage, who was “pronounced cured in less than two months” (Damasio, Descartes’ Error 7), 
Chuck heals in “just weeks, . . . a sharper shot, . . . and nearer to handsome than before,” but 
only afterwards is it discovered that the injury to his “consciousness” (129) was long-lasting: 
the “major impact and damage from the accident had turned out to be to Nunn’s head, mind, 
and sensibility” (130). Though Chuck’s external “handsome[ness]” is intact, “something 
interior” had gone “askew” (131). Like Gage, Chuck is now prone to fits of what the narrator 
can only call “evil” (130): he develops a “scary” temper, a “state of nameless and potential 
eternal rage and evil ever time he but stub his toe or some such shit” (132). Given the story’s 
mythic register, the fact that Chuck’s eyes were knocked out of his head during the accident 
and now “rattl[e] in the sockets, insecure” (134), seems to symbolically stand in for the 
unsettling of his soul. The eyes are no longer the window onto the person the other characters 
once knew.  
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Wallace’s allusions to Gage demonstrate his knowledge of the posthuman 
understanding of life (the narrator of “John Billy” declares that this story ends with 
“meadowphysics”: a metaphysics rooted in material, the “dirt . . . and soil” [143] and the 
body), yet Wallace also dismantles that view in the same scenes. “John Billy” ends bizarrely 
with all the characters “levitat[ing],” looking down onto “the tops of trees of meat” (145) and 
having visions of the “webs and dust and creak” (144) of the land and the spiritual cycle of 
the people who live on it. The story lives up to the initial promise of Chuck Nunn Junior being 
“more God than not” (123); though there is a central tension between embodiment and the 
soul, the last moments suggest he is more soul than body. Similarly, the Gage allusion in 
Infinite Jest—the death of Bertraund which proves the gruesome finality of brain injury—also 
precedes a moment of out-and-out essentialism, in this case the unambiguous soul-flight of 
Bertraund’s brother Lucien. With a broom handle stabbed down his throat and through his 
body, Lucien, after a while, “finally dies” and  
sheds his body’s suit, . . . find[ing] his gut and throat again and newly whole, 
clean and unimpeded, and is free, catapulted home . . . at desperate speeds, 
soaring north, sounding a bell-clear and nearly maternal alarmed call-to-arms 
in all the world’s well-known tongues. (488-89) 
Just as Wallace puts Descartes into the mouths of those who have little patience with his 
theories, so allusions to Gage are set up by Wallace only to be countered by moments of clear-
cut essentialism. This moment has more in common with Plato’s definition of the soul as that 
which “is a long-lived thing, whereas body is relatively feeble and short-lived” (Last Days 159), 
or Donne’s description of the “soul . . . tak[ing] flight, / And earth-born body, in the earth shall 
dwell” (71), than it does with any neuroscientific or posthuman account of human nature. 
Wallace takes what Dennett calls the “fundamentally antiscientific stance of dualism” (37) 
and describes Lucien’s soul as free at last. Clare Hayes-Brady suggests that the unbounded 
self in Wallace’s work is just as scary as the solipsistic self (Unspeakable 111-12), yet Lucien’s 
soul-flight is perhaps the freest moment in the whole novel.65 Lucien is killed, in part, because 
                                                          
65 Peter Sloane notes, incorrectly, that the “key feature of all of Wallace’s ghosts . . . is that they are the result 
of death by suicide” (213), and reads the ghosts as presenting a “nightmarish scenario” wherein characters 
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he cannot understand his assailants’ French. He lacks his brothers “brains” (480) and is “mute” 
(481), failing to find “Words that are not and can never be words” (487) to save himself. When 
he dies, Lucien’s soul is released from the limitations of his own brain: he casts off his fleshy 
suit, and finds he has access to “all the world’s well-known tongues” (489) as he flies home.  
This is not to say that Wallace’s moments of posthumanism are red herrings and that 
moments of essentialism mark the true Wallace, only that a rigid posthuman view fails to 
account for half of what is going on in his fiction. We see this problem again with Wallace’s 
allusions to Ryle, and Ryle’s argument that Descartes made a “category-mistake” (17). For 
Ryle, Descartes incorrectly states that “Minds are things, but different sorts of things from 
bodies; mental processes are causes and effects, but different sorts of causes and effects from 
bodily movements” (20). Ryle argues that the ghost in the machine has been an “escape-
route” for philosophers from Descartes onwards who “could not accept . . . that human nature 
differs only in degree of complexity from clockwork. [That] [t]he mental could not be just a 
variety of the mechanical” (20). Burn, again, has noted that Wallace explicitly points to Ryle 
in Infinite Jest (Reader’s Guide 71-75): he is the source of Hal’s grandfather’s understanding 
of the self (“a machine in the ghost” [160]), and he also gives the name to “Ryle’s Inman 
Square Club of Jazz” (775), where Marathe and Kate discuss being “chained in a cage of the 
self” (777). Again, however, this Ryle allusion is set up in tension with the Cartesian 
containment that seems to be encoded in the scene. Marathe (read ‘Ma-’ or ‘My-Wraith’) is 
“Inman” while he and Kate talk of cages: his wraith is contained inman, or inside the form of 
a man. “Inman Square” is also, significantly, the next place we visit right after James Sr.’s 
materialist monologue (169), which suggests that there might be something inside ‘Man’’s 
material body after all. Indeed, the tennis academy that James Sr.’s son establishes seems to 
fly in the face of James Sr.’s philosophy that “head is still just body” (159). The students are 
told they have to “occur, playing,” to live inside the “Different world inside” (459), to “Be here 
in total. . . . You are not arms. . . . Not engine” (461), but an occurring, present self inside the 
“second world inside” the “head” (459; 461). We might even suggest that James Sr.’s 
inaccurate version of the phrase—machine in the ghost, not ghost in the machine—is itself a 
                                                          
cannot choose the moment of their death. Sloane does not explain how these dualist moments fit with his 
larger argument about embodiment. 
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joke at the expense of James Sr., and a nod to Descartes. That the machine is inside the ghost 
suggests that the body (the machine) only exists for certain inside the mind (the ghost) that 
can think about it.  
The fact that Ma-wraith is an amputee and feels, on rare occasions, “phantom pains” 
(530) also gestures to the mind-body debate. The phenomenon of phantom limbs lead 
Descartes to conclude that, because the mind stays “whole” when the body is severed, “the 
mind is completely different from the body” (Meditations 67-68). Recently, phantom limbs 
have become a staple example in contemporary neuroscientific studies to demonstrate that, 
on the contrary, the mind’s map of the body is not “limitlessly plastic” and culturally 
malleable: rather, the stubbornly material brain has built into it a map of the whole body to 
which it is so fundamentally connected, a map which culture and upbringing (i.e. amputation) 
cannot alter (Pinker, The Blank Slate 98). Amputees often feature in Wallace’s work. Lenore’s 
brother has an artificial leg (Broom 219), and one of Wallace’s early unpublished stories was 
titled “Quoth the Amputee,” and featured “an amputee from the right shoulder down” (HRC 
38.7). Other than Lenore’s brother, Marathe and the wheelchair assassins are the most 
fleshed out amputee characters. Described as “one of the rare types who did not examine the 
hankie after he blew” (426), Marathe, like the other assassins, is seemingly uninterested in 
his own body. The assassins literally have their bodies cut in half, in contrast to the poorly 
disguised American Steeply who is doubled in size by his enormous fake breasts. Where the 
Americans are solipsistic and obsessed with their pursuit of self-pleasure, the assassins are all 
about self-transcendence and self-sacrifice in service of some larger political goal. The fact 
that Marathe is said to have a “part” of him that “floated off and hovered somewhere just 
above him, crossing its legs, nibbling at his consciousness as does a spectator at corn” (418), 
suggests that Marathe is perhaps more Cartesian wraith than embodied mind. The Cartesian 
language here works to emphasise their political positions: either they privilege bodily 
pleasure or the ethereal will. Where Wallace turns the Gage story into one of mythical 
proportions, he layers his allusions to Ryle with Cartesian double-meanings and metaphor. 
Even “Order and Flux,” Wallace’s most obviously posthuman story, is governed by a Cartesian 
metaphor. The character Dingle is literally driven around by the “homunculoid” love which 
sits inside him. Though Dingle is ruled in this case by his unconscious passion and not by his 
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own will, Wallace is still flirting with the idea that we have some internal, Cartesian driver: 
especially if we read the humunculoid love as the real protagonist of the story. 
The most significant advocate for Cartesianism in Infinite Jest is James Incandenza 
himself, who—despite his father’s materialist, Rylean philosophy—appears late in the novel 
as a “ghostly figure . . . a plain old wraith” (829). The wraith is not a material entity. Like Lucien, 
he has been released from its body and, consequently, the restrictive laws of the physical 
universe. The wraith can “whiz around at the invisible speed of quanta” (831), faster than 
Gately’s still-bodied mind can process, so its movements look “segmented” to him (829). This 
quantum speed would become the subject of Wallace’s later story, “Good Old Neon” (2001), 
in which Wallace describes the moment of death: 
many of the most important impressions and thoughts in a person’s life are 
ones that flash through your head so fast that fast isn’t even the right word, 
they seem totally different from or outside of the regular sequential clock time 
we all live by, and they have so little relation to the sort of linear, one-word-
after-another-word English we all communicate with each other with that it 
could easily take a whole lifetime just to spell out the contents of one split-
second’s flash of thoughts and connections, etc. 
. . . 
The internal head-speed or whatever of these ideas, memories, realizations, 
emotions and so on is even faster, by the way—exponentially faster, 
unimaginably faster—when you’re dying, meaning during that vanishingly tiny 
nanosecond between when you technically die and when the next thing 
happens. (Oblivion 150-51) 
The thinking thing thinks so quickly that it seems to be “totally different from or outside of” 
time as we experience it when we are inside bodies in the physical world. Mind is faster than 
the limitations of matter, and what goes on inside the head is so much faster than what goes 
on outside it. James himself is what Burn calls “pure mind” (“Webs” 73): he is the speed of 
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thought, freed from the shackles of the body, and a literal manifestation of Descartes’s model 
of mind.66 
For Wallace’s posthuman critics, Infinite Jest is full of hollow skulls. Fabienne Collignon 
argues, for instance, that the MIT building in Infinite Jest—that “cerebral cortex of reinforced 
concrete” (Wallace, Infinite Jest 184)—is “lobotomized,” a symbol of “subjectivity as vacuity, 
essentially aligning the interiority” of the characters with “‘empty space’” (Collignon 105). 
While James is proof that this is not true for the novel as a whole, the pattern of ghostly 
consciousnesses haunting their physical forms is not limited to the novel’s two ghost figures. 
We have seen, for instance, how this applies to AA’s philosophy of the ‘In Here,’ and it is 
significant that the second paragraph of the whole novel is: “I am in here” (3). The MIT 
building itself, a symbol for Collignon of the novel’s hollow self, is described as “ghostly-clean” 
(182), suggesting that the inanimate form of the building is haunted, not hollow at all but 
                                                          
66 James has not been discussed by any posthuman critic except Freudenthal, who sees him as proof that 
“materiality insists on itself” (204). This is a remarkable omission from Wallace studies. Where he has been 
discussed he has been interpreted solely as a stand-in for the author of the novel. Marshall Boswell and 
Christopher Bartlett argue that James is a “spokesman for Wallace himself” (Boswell, Understanding 170; 
Bartlett 376). Staes suggests that though it would be “unwise to conflate Incandenza with the real author 
of Infinite Jest . . . these pages do function as a self-conscious reminder that the words in the novel are 
ultimately the writer’s own” (“Work in Process” 81). Brian McHale and Lucas Thompson suggest that 
Wallace’s ghosts are symbols of his literary influences (“Pale King” 207; 114). Jorge Araya reads Wallace’s 
ghosts as a reflection of the author’s whiteness and The Pale King’s “racial monotony” (247). Vincent 
Haddad reads the ghosts as a “conceptual metaphor for how Wallace conceives of each novel as a relational 
mode between the author figure and his readership” (2), a relationship that Haddad argues is especially 
“intimate . . . bodily, and even potentially erotic, (male) author/(male) reader relationship” (4). David Hering 
also argues that Wallace’s ghosts “foregroun[d] the ‘writer’s consciousness’” (15). Hering fits Wallace’s 
ghosts into his larger argument about Wallace’s struggle between monologism and dialogism. He argues 
that the monologic tendencies of Wallace’s earlier work—in which Wallace is an “absent possessor” of 
other literary styles (32)—are replaced by “companion ghost[s]” (32) such as Neal in “Good Old Neon,” 
signalling Wallace’s turn to dialogism. In her book on Afterlife and Narrative in Contemporary Fiction (2012), 
Alice Bennett focuses only on the “evidence for the wraith . . . as the dead narrator of Wallace’s novel” 
(139). Despite Nicoline Timmer’s focus on subjectivity and interiority in Wallace’s work, she too suggests 
that James’s ghost “does not seem to fit in this novel” except as “a manifestation of the narrator voice” 
(169; 170). None of these critics discuss Wallace’s ghosts as characters, nor what these ghosts might tell us 
about Wallace’s understanding of human beings other than himself.  
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inhabited by James’s muse, Joelle, who sits there to do her radio show. Collignon does not 
mention Joelle’s presence—she is, after all, “hidden from all view” (Infinite Jest 183)—but she 
is there, visible as a “silhouette” (183) and a “shadow” (185) with a “halo” of light above her 
head (187). Though the skull might look empty, it is inhabited by a shadowy consciousness 
that has the qualities of something divine, whose “monologues seem both free-associative 
and intricately structured, not unlike nightmares” (185) and not unlike consciousness itself.67 
Infinite Jest was a turning point in Wallace’s career for a number of reasons. According 
to Steven Moore, the novel was written at a time when Wallace, “the son of atheists, got 
religion” (“First Draft”). Jest also seems to mark the moment when Wallace began to radically 
break away from the theory that he had read and engaged with in his earlier writing. Wallace 
described his first novel, Broom, as being “essentially a dialogue between Hegel and 
Wittgenstein on one hand and Heidegger and a contemporary French thinker-duo named Paul 
DeMan [sic] and Jacques Derrida on the other” (qtd. in Max, Every Love Story 69). In the same 
year that Broom was published, Wallace defended theory in a letter he wrote to the New York 
Times. In response to Jacques Barzun’s essay “A Little Matter of Sense,” Wallace defends 
literary criticism and theory from the charge that they are “trying to erect walls of 
impenetrability around the very stuff they’re trying to penetrate” (“Matters of Sense and 
Opacity”). Though Wallace allows that some criticism and theory puts “demands on readers’ 
patience and dictionaries . . . out of all proportion to reward,” he concludes that “There’s 
babies in that bathwater, dude.” This defence continued one year later in Wallace’s essay, 
“Fictional Futures and the Conspicuously Young” (1988), in which he argued that “the 
contemporary artist can simply no longer afford to regard the work of critics or theorists or 
philosophers—no matter how stratospheric—as divorced from his own concerns” (50). D. T. 
Max notes Wallace’s reverence as a student for theorists such as Derrida (Every Love Story 
38), and Wallace’s view during his MFA that “theory was what separated the serious novelist 
from the others” (74). Max also charts Wallace’s turn from theory later in life, however: his 
development into the kind of teacher he had previously “found so irksome” (188), one who 
                                                          
67 Madame Psychosis does disappear later, but this unsettles her listeners, who much preferred the “Silence of 
[her] presence” to the “silence of absence” (625). The point being that she was emphatically “presen[t]” in 
there, a conscious voice inside the head. When Joelle leaves the building, she does not leave the novel 
altogether: in fact we see even more of her. 
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is not interested in intellectual, theory-heavy stories by “budding literary theorists” (270) but 
in stories that “connect reader and writer” emotionally (188). Thompson quotes a note 
Wallace made when writing his Dostoevsky review (published in 1996) about the way 
theorists eviscerate art: “One shudders to think what a Terry Eagleton or Gayatri Spivak would 
make a Dost[oevsky] text into—probably they wouldn’t talk about the text at all” (qtd. in 
Thompson 33). If we approach Wallace’s work expecting it to support our own theoretical 
assumptions then we are set up to miss whatever that theory cannot account for. 
Just after the publication of Infinite Jest, Wallace worked on what would eventually 
become his final, never completed, novel, The Pale King. What Wallace wrote at this time is 
even more explicitly built upon the same Cartesian foundation as Infinite Jest, and continues 
to challenge posthuman assumptions. One of the novel’s original titles was Sir John Feelgood 
or, The Genesis of a Great Lover, and it was originally about a porn star who is “unnaturally 
pale” and “unusually easy to erase from shot,” which allowed the viewer to experience what 
is happening on screen in the place of the invisible actor (HRC 37.4). There are fragments of 
this early version in documents dated between 1997 and 1999 in Wallace’s archive. One of 
these fragments is a short three-paragraph introduction to a story with the above title, 
narrated by “FNE’S SOUL/‘GHOST’,” and reads as follows:  
If you are angry and yet are somehow able objectively to be aware of the fact 
that you are angry, have you stopped to ask what part this is? . . . 
Your mind and capacity for thought are the enemy of your ghost. Your ghost is 
essentially you. . . . You are not your possessions, or your body, or the parts of 
your body, nor your neural net, nor your brain. Nor your mind. . . . I don’t want 
to go on and on about this. I am soul. The mind is the Enemy. . . . It is your 
identification with your think/feel/mind that keeps you from knowing soul.” 
(HRC 40.6). 
What does Wallace mean by the “ghost” and the “soul” here? He describes it as being 
“essentially you” (my emphasis); that is, the essence of a person. It is nothing physical, not 
the “body” or “parts of the body” or the “neural net” or the “brain.” Nor is it even the “mind,” 
because most of the mind, as we know from chapter 1, is below the level of “aware[ness].” 
What the “soul/ghost” is, then, is that which can be “aware,” that which is self-reflective. 
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Where Descartes thought of the soul as the whole “mind . . . intellect or reason” (Meditations 
25) we now understand that most of our mind’s activity is unconscious and fundamentally 
tied up with the material body, brain, and senses that Descartes thought so unreliable. 
Wallace’s ghost is the “enemy” of the “mind,” therefore, because the ghost is immaterial 
while the mind is not. The mind, as Wallace knew, is itself embodied, and therefore not part 
of the soul, the self, the conscious I that we think of as ourselves. By framing the conscious ‘I’ 
as a “SOUL/GHOST,” Wallace elevates the very small part of the mind that is conscious out of 
the body altogether. Though this is a Cartesian metaphor that prioritises conscious 
experience, the metaphor is still rooted in the posthuman understanding of the body and the 
mind, because the “soul” here does not refer to the mind in its entirety but rather to the small 
part of the mind’s activities that are conscious. Because we now understand that most of 
what the brain does is unconscious, the Cartesian soul is much smaller than it used to be. But, 
for Wallace, it is still in there.68  
The metaphor that Wallace is setting up here is that of a ghost inside a machine. 
Though this is Ryle’s phrase, used to discredit Descartes’s model of mind, Wallace takes it at 
face value in his fiction. The pre-existing form, the machine, the unconscious body and brain, 
is haunted by a ghost that is separate to that body. Another fragment from this early version 
of the story reads: “He’s a ghost haunting his own fucking body” (HRC 41.6). A third, which 
appears above the three-paragraph intro (HRC 40.6) and in the novel’s “very rough outline” 
(HRC 37.4), and was published in both Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (209) and The Pale 
King (314), is “Every love story is a ghost story.” Max, who uses this phrase as his biography’s 
title, has tried to trace its “ghostly” origins, but does not reflect on its meaning in Wallace’s 
                                                          
68 To be fair to Descartes, his position on the mind-body problem was much more complex than his critics allow. 
Descartes recognised, for example, that, the body operates “without any contribution from our will – as 
often happens when we breathe, walk, eat and, indeed, when we perform any action which is common to 
us and the beasts” (Passions 225), and that it often acts upon the soul: “the principal effect of all the human 
passions is that they move and dispose the soul to want the things for which they prepare the body” (233). 
Descartes’s position is effectively a prototype of the modern model of the small consciousness inside a 
complex, bodied system. As Dennett explains, Descartes held the view that “Human bodies, and even 
human brains, were also just machines. . . . This was actually a subtle view, most of which would be readily 
defended by zoologists today” (43). Where Descartes differs from the zoologists is in his insistence that the 
soul is some different sort of thing to the matter it inhabits.  
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larger body of work.69 I suggest that we might read this phrase as one which encapsulates the 
nature of human beings as Wallace wrote about them. Any love story in Wallace’s work is 
literally a ghost story, because human beings are ghosts haunting their bodies: small, 
powerless, ethereal consciousnesses trapped inside unconscious machines.   
Though this metaphor is most clearly articulated in the seeds of The Pale King, it 
encapsulates how Wallace wrote about human beings across all of his fiction. Infinite Jest is 
itself a ghost story, which significantly takes its title and central ghost character from Hamlet 
(c.1600). An under-discussed source for Infinite Jest, and all the more significant for being 
Western literature’s most famous story about the mind-body problem, Hamlet is shaped by 
a central tension between materialism and essentialism.70 Interestingly, Shakespeare uses the 
same language that Descartes would come to use to describe the body’s “configuration of . . 
. wheels” (Passions 225). Hamlet writes in his letter to Ophelia, “Thine evermore, most dear 
lady, whilst this machine to him” (246), devoting his soul to Ophelia but his lesser, machine-
body elsewhere. Significantly, Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor note that this phrase is 
“Shakespeare’s only use of the word machine (and OED’s first use of the word in a 
metaphorical sense)” (246n. 121). The extended metaphor throughout Infinite Jest of the 
ghost in the machine seems to take some of its energy from Shakespeare’s play. Hamlet’s 
anxiety about his body—“this quintessence of dust” (257)—is shared by Hal, who feels like 
“an odd forked stalk of stuff and blood” (902) and contemplates the size of the rooms that 
could contain all the food he would consume in his life, and “the rising mass of the excrement 
I’d produce” (897). The centrality of consciousness in Hamlet is also absolutely present in 
Wallace’s novel. The chapter in which Joelle is ready to commit suicide begins with what reads 
                                                          
69 Max notes that Wallace’s crediting the phrase to Virginia Woolf is probably incorrect (“Tracing”), and suggests 
it may come from Christina Stead instead, author of The Man Who Loved Children (1940), “a favourite, as 
it happens, of Wallace’s friend Jonathan Franzen.” The trail meets a dead end, however, at just how Wallace 
would have found it in a letter Stead wrote in the 1970s. 
70 Where Burn discusses Jest and Hamlet, it is primarily around the association with the “skull that’s been 
separated from a body” in both, and Jest’s “continuum of embodiment” (“Webs” 73). In the Reader’s Guide, 
Burn argues that “Hal finds little support in Cartesian foundations,” and suggests that Hal’s “ontological 
doubt” “finds its boundaries in a reading of Hamlet,” which concludes that “‘the rest is silence’” (73-74). 
My reading of Hamlet as a source for Jest concerns mind more than matter. 
93 
 
like a version of Hamlet’s famous soliloquy: “You can be at certain parties and not really be 
there” (219). Later in the novel, this phrasing is echoed when Gately fights to defend Joelle 
and the other members of Ennet House from three Canadians. When Gately is spurred to 
violence the “situation becomes even more automatic and Gately feels adrenaline’s warmth 
spread through him as his subdural hardware clicks deeper into a worn familiar long-past 
track” (612). Like experiencing a drug-high, Gately becomes unconscious, machine-like, and, 
as Wallace writes in a carefully arranged sentence: he “is part of this whether he wants to be 
or not” (612). Hamlet’s “To be, or not to be” (Shakespeare 284), his hesitant, conscious 
ideation, shuts down in Gately when he operates like a machine, just a body and nothing else. 
The model of selfhood, here and throughout the novel, is that of a “mind . . . in possession of 
your body” (464), of a ghostly Cartesian consciousness inhabiting its machine.71 
 
“Forever Overhead” 
Wallace’s posthuman critics do not account for the significance of this metaphor in his fiction, 
and I suggest that Wallace’s work can be more productively understood as part of a 
conservative tradition that sees posthumanism as a threat to some basic, essential humanity. 
As Neil Badmington explains, posthumanism in this sense is at home not in the academy, but 
in popular science fiction film and literature (8). Wallace showed a considerable interest in 
the genre. In his reviews of James Cameron’s Terminator 2 and of two maths novels, Wallace 
makes references across a century of science fiction, from Fritz Lang to Stanley Kubrick and 
Paul Verhoeven (Both Flesh 179-80), and from Isaac Asimov to Larry Niven, Robert A. Heinlein, 
and William Gibson (222-24; 211). In Wallace’s reviews of J. G. Ballard’s War Fever (1990) and 
David Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress (1988), Wallace classifies the former as “Psy-Fi” and 
the latter as “a kind of philosophical sci-fi” (Both Flesh 85), demonstrating that science fiction 
was clearly a point of reference for Wallace’s thinking about art.72 This interest is not just 
                                                          
71 For Marshall Boswell, this inner self is not a ghost but a “deformed, stillborn infant,” a gooey emotional core 
that the characters “smothe[r]” with “hip irony” and “narcotics” (Understanding 158). My interpretation 
complements Boswell’s, because I suggest the characters’ ghosts cannot get in touch with their gooey, 
bodily emotions if they are narcotised or detached from them. 
72 For a more in-depth discussion of Ballard and what Wallace calls “Psy-Fi,” see chapter 3. 
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limited to Wallace’s reading, as science fiction elements appear in his writing as well, from 
the “vague genetic engineering enterprises” in Broom (47) and the alternate future America 
in Infinite Jest, to smaller examples such as Wallace’s short story “DATUM CENTURI0,” which 
is ostensibly made up of extracts from a dictionary published in 2096 (Brief Interviews 106). 
Simon de Bourcier is the only critic to situate Wallace’s work in a science fiction context, 
though it is to argue that the characters in The Pale King, like Philip K. Dick’s androids, are all 
machine, “ensembles of surface phenomena with ‘nowhere’ or ‘nothing’ inside” (56). We 
have seen that this reading does not fit with Wallace’s actual treatment of his characters. The 
metaphor of the ghost in the machine has an important history in science fiction, and 
Wallace’s use of it shares significant affinities with what has been called post-cyberpunk 
literature in particular. 
In “Towards a Poetics of Cyberpunk,” Brian McHale describes the symbiotic 
relationship between postmodern and cyberpunk fiction. Cyberpunk, he argues, “tends to 
‘literalize’ or ‘actualize’ what in postmodernist fiction occurs as metaphor” (6). Cyberpunk’s 
off-planet worlds and cultures literalize postmodern fiction’s ontological concerns (7); its 
warzones and urban sprawls literalize postmodernism’s fragmented, chaotic spaces (9), and 
its portrayal of cyberspace literalizes what postmodernists understood to be the simulated 
nature of reality (12).73 Both postmodern and cyberpunk fiction treat the self as dissolute, 
malleable, and merged with information and machine to such an extent that it is no longer 
possible to tell where the ‘human’ begins or ends. McHale points, for example, to characters 
in Walter Jon Williams’s Hardwired (1986) and Pat Cadigan’s Synners (1991) who, in different 
ways, “abando[n] [their] ravaged bod[ies]” to become “diffused” and “spread” across 
information systems (16). Though cyberpunk fiction shares with postmodern fiction an 
anxiety about the fragile, divisible self, it still maintains a nostalgic Cartesian view that 
consciousness is all-important, that it can somehow transcend the “meat” (16) of the body to 
become pure information.  
                                                          
73 See McHale’s “POSTcyberMODERNpunkISM” for a map of the complicated routes of influence between 
postmodern and late-twentieth-century science fiction, where he argues that science fiction motifs 
eventually come back to science fiction through a postmodern intermediary.  
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Richard Morgan’s futuristic noir Altered Carbon (2002) is to the post-cyberpunks what 
William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984) was to the cyberpunks, and it radically updates the 
cyberpunk model of mind. In his article “The Return of the Human in Richard K. Morgan’s 
Takeshi Kovacs Trilogy,” Pawel Frelik argues that Morgan updates cyberpunk’s “vision of near-
future (post)humanity,” which was based upon the cybernetic notion of the “digitization of 
human consciousness” (173), by reinstating the central importance of the body. As Morgan 
writes, a “digitised mind is only a snapshot. You don’t capture individual thoughts any more 
than a satellite image captures an individual life” (Altered Carbon 153). Central to Morgan’s 
trilogy is the “cortical stack,” a  
small chip implanted in the upper spine at birth, which contains an accreting 
sum of personality, memories, and experience. As a container of everything 
that is permanent about individual subjectivity and that can be carried 
between subsequent sleeves, the stack becomes the metaphor of the subject 
and effectively the subject itself. (Frelik 174)  
Though this is a kind of Cartesianism that separates mind and body, Frelik argues that Morgan 
complicates the dualism “to the point where the body is reinstated as equally essential as the 
mind” (185). The characters are only really alive when they are placed inside a body or 
“sleeve” (Morgan, Altered Carbon 135), and they are slaves to these sleeves that can “carry 
over [the] physical habits or acquired traits of [their] previous owner[s]” (Frelik 186). In 
Morgan’s universe people can be stored digitally, but they have no existence outside of 
embodied existence. Though they can be interacted with (i.e. tortured) in a virtual reality, 
they have to be given a virtual body there as well. Morgan is writing post-Hayles and updates, 
as she does, cybernetic posthumanism to acknowledge the importance of the body in the 
formation of identity and the self. Where Morgan differs from Hayles’s position on 
embodiment is in his preservation of the ‘I,’ the singular, continuous consciousness of his 
characters that is maintained across sleeves. Morgan is posthumanist in the sense that he 
recognises that “Conscious thought doesn’t have much to do with this stuff. Doesn’t have 
much to do with the way we live our lives, full stop, if you believe the psychologists” (Altered 
Carbon 314), but he is humanist insofar as he elevates that small consciousness above all else. 
In Nørretranders’s terms, the conscious ‘I’ in Morgan’s work becomes synonymous with the 
soul (the stacks of soldiers are sold at the “Soul Market” [Broken Angels 98]), and with it 
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Morgan preserves some essential identity that exists separate to the material mind, brain, 
and body—the sleeve, the ‘Me,’ the form, or the machine—that it lives through. 
This is, in other words, a science fiction version of the model we have seen at work in 
Wallace’s fiction. Where Hayles’s critical posthumanism celebrates the deconstruction of the 
liberal humanist self, this popular posthumanism decries it. As Badmington puts it, “whereas 
the intellectuals were celebrating the demise [of Man], popular culture was committed to a 
defence of humanism (the aliens were always defeated, frequently by a uniquely ‘human’ 
quality)” (8). Badmington is, like Hayles, an academic, and he takes the position that popular 
culture is merely taking “refuge in denial” from its “anxiety about the loss of human 
sovereignty,” betraying its awareness that “[h]umanism” is in fact “in trouble” (8). We have 
seen that Wallace dramatizes ‘Man’’s lack of sovereignty and the diminished role of 
consciousness, yet his fiction is far more complicated and nuanced than critics allow when 
they argue that he just rehearses the critical posthumanist worldview. By talking about 
consciousness as a ghost and a soul, Wallace elevates that consciousness—however small it 
might be—above the meat of the body. Like Morgan’s stacks and sleeves, Wallace’s metaphor 
of the ghost in the machine emphasises that though his characters have posthuman bodies, 
there is still something like a soul that haunts them.  
Though we cannot know if Wallace read Altered Carbon, he certainly read its 
predecessor, Neuromancer (Both Flesh 211), and he was enamoured with another seminal 
post-cyberpunk work: the Wachowski siblings’ The Matrix (1999).74 In correspondence with 
Don DeLillo, Wallace sang the praises of The Matrix, calling it “the single best movie I’ve seen 
in the last year.” While Wallace ostensibly “cringe[s] to admit” this to DeLillo (because DeLillo 
“feed[s]” Wallace more sophisticated “tips on serious subtitled art movies”), and though he 
is aware that the film is “commercial postmodernism with a capital C, and yes has Keanu 
Reeves, . . . and yes uses archetypal names and Campbell-grade mythopoeia in ways that are 
                                                          
74 We know Wallace was interested in the genre, since as well as reading Neuromancer he read Neal 
Stephenson’s Snow Crash (1992), published ten years before Morgan’s novel but also hailed as a key post-
cyberpunk text (“Letter to Avoledo”). He had also seen Johnny Mnemonic (1995), a cyberpunk film starring 
Keanu Reeves (Lipsky 134) that is based on one of Gibson’s early short stories about a man who had “spent 
most of [his] life as a blind receptacle to be filled with other people’s knowledge” (Burning Chrome 32).  
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about as subtle as a croquet mallet,” he nevertheless writes that the film is “an incredible 
evocation of what’s creepy and powerful in Descartes’ first two Meditations on First 
Philosophy (no kidding) and Hilary Putnam’s ‘Brains in a Vat’” (“Letter to DeLillo”).75  
It is difficult to guess what Wallace found “creepy and powerful” about these three 
very different texts. What they seem to share is the philosophical position that it is impossible 
to have access to an objective reality outside of our conception of that reality. Descartes 
concluded from this that the only thing that is certain is that the mind exists. Putnam’s 
conclusion is more complicated. In his thought experiment he makes the point that were the 
“science fiction” (4) to come true that we could remove a brain from its body and “plac[e] [it] 
in a vat of nutrients which kee[p] the brain alive,” and manipulate the nerve endings so the 
brain experiences a reality filled with other “people, objects, the sky, etc.; but really all the 
[brain] is experiencing is the result of electronic impulses” (6), the brain could never, as a 
result, refer to the real world, only “produc[e] the illusion of reference, meaning, intelligence” 
(11). Putnam argues, therefore, that it is not possible that we are disembodied brains in a vat 
because to be able to refer to the fact that we are brains in a vat is a self-refuting statement, 
like Descartes’s “‘I do not exist’” (Putnam 8). Even if those brains were to think “we are brains 
in a vat,” it cannot mean what it would mean if those outside the vat were to think the same 
thing. Putnam concludes that, contrary to the “doctrine that has been with us since the 
                                                          
75 Despite his defensiveness, there is evidence that Wallace’s interest in the film was long-lasting. In his essay on 
tennis player Roger Federer—with the significantly Cartesian title of “Federer Both Flesh and Not” (2006)—
Wallace refers to one of Federer’s winners as being “impossible. It was like something out of The Matrix” 
(Both Flesh 6). Molly Schwartzburg, in her “Observations on the Archive at the Harry Ransom Center,” 
recounts Jackqueline Muñoz’s discovery: “one of her favourite items was a book whose annotations 
seemed to reveal more about Wallace the person than any specific project: it contained quotes from the 
film The Matrix (including, she recalled, [Mouse’s] line ‘His neurokinetics are way about normal’). These 
annotations seemed to have nothing to do with the book they were in” (253-54). Lastly, in early drafts of 
the commencement speech that was later published as This is Water, Wallace originally opened by saying 
“the temptation has been overwhelming to get up, say simply ‘There is no spoon,’ and sit back down” (HRC 
28.10-11), a reference to an iconic scene in the film when Neo starts to use his conscious mind to bend the 
illusory reality in which he finds himself. Notably, each of these three references to the film share an interest 
in the relationship between mind and body: how can Federer be at one with his body? How do the mind 
and body interact (neurokinetically)? What choices can we consciously make about what to believe? 
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seventeenth century, meanings just aren’t in the head” (19). Putnam’s essay tells us that while 
we still cannot have access to any objective truth, we know at least that we are not just a 
mind: the mind and its meanings cannot exist independently from the world. Both Descartes 
and Putnam arrive at a view of consciousness as being the lonely place in which we are all 
isolated. For Descartes, in the seventeenth century, we know at least that we are a 
consciousness, a divine entity separate from a body that need not necessarily exist. For 
Putnam, in the twentieth, we know at least that we are isolated inside bodies in the world.  
What, then, does this tell us about what The Matrix meant to Wallace? I suggest that 
The Matrix dramatizes Putnam’s argument. Though the characters in The Matrix cannot trust 
what their own minds tell them about the world, we know at least that in order to think at 
all, they have to have a body somewhere in the world with which to do the thinking. Most of 
the human race in the film are born and live out their lives as brains (or, more accurately, 
bodies) in vats, while their minds operate in the virtual cyberspace of the matrix. For all but 
the messianic Neo, death in the matrix (the death of the mind) equals the death of the body, 
because mind and body are fundamentally interconnected: as Morpheus explains, “the mind 
has trouble letting go” of the body (41:30), just as “the body cannot live without the mind” 
(52:40). What The Matrix portrays, then, is a ‘creepy’ world in which all the mind can know 
for certain is that it is trapped inside the prison of the body. Where cyberpunk literature was 
cybernetic and, in a roundabout way, Cartesian, assuming as Descartes did that the mind 
could exist separately from the body, Altered Carbon and The Matrix are post-cyberpunk 
because they recognise that human beings are fundamentally embodied. All three texts seem 
to be “creepy and powerful” for Wallace because they evoke what it is like to be a thinking 
thing, absolutely present but, in one way or another, isolated and encaged. 
The Matrix is an interesting source for Wallace because, like Altered Carbon, it 
preserves some essential humanity despite its posthuman premise. In a significant parallel 
with Wallace studies, criticism of The Matrix tends to take it as read that the film presents a 
postmodern, posthuman view of human identity and the world, both of which are thought to 
be unstable, simulated, and emptied of origin. These posthuman critics struggle, therefore, 
with the fact that the films are actually very conservative in their portrayal of humanity. In 
the collection of essays on The Matrix and its sequels, The Matrix Trilogy: Cyberpunk Reloaded 
(2005), for example, Baudrillard and his argument about the simulated, mediated world in 
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which we live features in no less than five of the essays (Shail 24; Gillis 81; Pamela Church 
Gibson 116; Nakamura 131; Constable 151). Only Catherine Constable argues that the film is 
in knowing conversation with Baudrillard, however, allowing that the Wachowskis arrive at a 
different—more hopeful—conclusion than Baudrillard’s view that “change or revolution is 
utterly impossible within a pre-programmed system” (160). More common is the 
condescending view, such as that of Pamela Church Gibson, that the Wachowskis’ differences 
with Baudrillard show they have “misuse[d], or misinterpret[ed]” him. Gibson, for example, 
struggles to reconcile the fact that Baudrillard was an influence on the Wachowskis with the 
film’s incorrect suggestion “that there is, in fact, a ‘real’ world” (116) outside of the Matrix’s 
simulated one. Anne Cranny-Francis takes a similarly rigid posthuman view, noting that the 
film—which presents the human protagonists in a battle with artificial machines—fails to 
“problematise the notion that humanity is inherently superior to all other life-forms” (109). 
Instead the film naively represents the machines as “the forces of evil” (109), which is why, 
according to Cranny-Francis, “the story seems dated” (110). 
The Wachowskis’ film has obvious roots in postmodern and cyberpunk culture, and 
the directors have pointed to a number of influences that bear this out, such as William 
Gibson’s Neuromancer and Ghost in the Shell (1995), the film (aptly titled with an allusion to 
Descartes and Ryle) based on the manga by Masamune Shirow.76 I suggest, however, that The 
Matrix is best understood as a post-cyberpunk film that both privileges the body and the 
human essence trapped inside that body. On the one hand, The Matrix follows the map set 
out by theorists such as Hayles and Putnam towards the sort of posthumanism which rejects 
the view that humans are not bodies but just information. Unlike William Gibson’s 
Neuromancer, which ends with a construct of the protagonist and his dead girlfriend 
immortally preserved in “the nonspace of the matrix” (81), transcendent disembodiment is 
                                                          
76 The Wachowskis note that Ghost in the Shell is one of the anime that inspired them the most and that they’re 
“big fans of William Gibson’s work” (“Interview”). Again, we cannot be sure if Wallace ever read or saw 
Ghost in the Shell. Wallace did show some interest in Japanese fiction—he had a copy of Yukio Mishima’s 
The Sailor Who Fell from Grace with the Sea (1963)—and descriptions from the manga resonate with 
Wallace’s writing: “What you witness here is my will. As a self-aware life-form—a ghost—I formally request 
political asylum” (Shirow 248). The metaphor of “ghosts,” here, for the souls that exist inside the “shells” 
of people, cyborgs, and robots, is similar to Wallace’s first fragments of Sir John Feelgood. 
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not an option in the Wachowskis’ world because the body and the mind are fundamentally 
co-dependent. On the other hand, like Altered Carbon, The Matrix films present a posthuman 
world that is an unambiguously terrible threat to some essential human spirit. The film’s 
antagonistic machines—who live a life without cosy human qualities such as love—are the 
enemy of the protagonists’ human spirit. Humans are an elevated lifeform in the film, 
distinguished by their soulful self, their free will, and their ability to make conscious choices.77 
Like Altered Carbon, The Matrix is ultimately posthuman and Cartesian: though it allows that 
most of the human being is embodied, unconscious, and posthuman, it takes what little role 
consciousness and the human spirit play in that model and elevate them above all else. 
By recognising that Wallace’s work might belong in such unfamiliar, less theoretically 
sophisticated company, we can better appreciate the Cartesian model that governs Wallace’s 
construction of character. It gives us a useful way in to “Forever Overhead,” for example, 
though this earlier story has no science fiction elements at all. This story is written in the 
second person, addressing a boy on his thirteenth birthday who is paralysed by anxiety at the 
top of a diving board. At the cusp of puberty and adult life, the boy’s body is beginning to alter 
around him and he is discovering “an inside deeper than you knew you had” (4). His voice 
deepens, and he begins to notice girls in a new way, girls who are also in a state of transition 
that Wallace matches at the sentence level: “And girl-women, women” (Brief Interviews 6). 
Against this backdrop of bodily change, Wallace describes the boy’s ascent up a diving board. 
Like the loaded phrases dotted throughout the story that refer both to a changing body and 
to personal character—“you are not without spine,” for instance (6)—the physical ascent up 
to the board takes on metaphorical significance. Those before him move up to the ladder, 
controlled not by their will but by their bodies: their movement is “spaced by the beat of 
hearts,” and “their legs take them to the end” where the board “throw[s] them up and out” 
                                                          
77 When Morpheus asks Neo if he believes in fate, Neo responds: “No. . . . I don’t like the idea that I’m not in 
control of my life” (23:38). It is true that in The Matrix Reloaded (2003) we learn that the prophecy of Neo-
as-saviour is in fact just another way in which the machines control their human slaves, undermining the 
notion that Neo has free will. Yet by the end of the film Neo chooses (and talks often about the importance 
of choice, an irrational human feature with which the machines struggle to cope) to save the single human 
he loves, apparently dooming the entire human race to extinction in the process. In the final film, The Matrix 
Revolutions (2003), humanity is saved by Neo’s final choice to sacrifice himself for the greater good. 
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(7). In this vein, the “big” woman in front of him is comfortably adult, “part of a rhythm that 
excludes thinking. . . . Like a machine” (10). That the woman’s “suit is full of her” (9) has an 
interesting double meaning. It refers to her swimming suit, but also to her body, the suit that 
her self inhabits, the “machine that moves only forward” (11).  
The boy, on the other hand, is all mind, separate from the strangeness of his own 
machine. About to enter a grown up world, the boy has “decided being scared is caused 
mostly by thinking” (7). To be “overhead” and above the “ground [that] wants you back” (9) 
is to be, in other words, all-too-conscious, a mind that operates over and above the meaty 
machine-stuff of the head and brain. Like the wraith in Infinite Jest, an entity for whom 
disembodiment and “death was just everything outside you getting really slow” (883), or the 
ghost of Neal in “Good Old Neon,” who explains that at the moment of death one realises 
that life is not a “sequential thing” (Oblivion 151), when the boy is “overhead,” “No time is 
passing outside you at all” (Brief Interviews 12). While the body is an ever present threat in 
this story, it is always separate to the second-person “You” that controls the narrative. “You” 
are trapped in there, and separate to the strange processes that operate below your 
awareness. If we recognise that the metaphor of the ghost and the machine governs this story 
then the title “Forever Overhead” seems to suggest—contrary to the views held by Clare 
Hayes-Brady and Marshall Boswell that this story is about the emergence of a more balanced 
self (Unspeakable 184) that is “safe from the self-consciousness that would displace it” 
(Understanding 203)—that the boy’s ghost, his conscious self, is and always will be at odds 
with the machine in which he finds himself. Like the child in “Incarnations of Burned Children,” 
whose “self’s soul” floats “overhead” (Oblivion 116), or the child in “The Soul is Not a Smithy” 
who fears an adult life spent “gazing down” onto forms “as if [he] were at some terrible 
height” (108), Wallace’s characters are ghosts, stuck in their own thinking, hovering forever 
over the bone heads of their bodies.78  
                                                          
78 This metaphor, where the ghost or soul represents consciousness, and the machine represents the 
unconscious brain and body, is consistent across Wallace’s writing. The only reference that does not fit is 
in Wallace’s “Remarks on Kafka’s Funniness,” a speech he made at a PEN event where he says that 
“‘unconscious’”—not conscious—is “just a fancy word for soul” (Consider 64). As Lucas Thompson notes, 
“Wallace stresses that he wanted all ‘[i]diosyncracies [sic] of ital, punctuation, and syntax’ left unchanged” 
in order to “‘preserve an oralish, out-loud feel to the remarks so as to protect me from people’s ire at stuff 
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Dualism in The Pale King 
Given that the subject of Wallace’s final novel was (relatively) normal American citizens in a 
1980s IRS office, it perhaps seems odd to associate him with fantastical science fiction that 
literally disembodies its characters and sets them against killing machines. Yet the metaphor 
of the ghost in the machine—a model of the essential self chained to a meaty body that is 
central to works such as Altered Carbon and The Matrix—cuts across Wallace’s entire corpus, 
and forms the thematic backbone of The Pale King.  
One of the novel’s major plot threads (insofar as they exist at all in this unfinished 
work) is the “enormous internal struggle and soul-searching” of the IRS (72) as it decided 
whether or not to “put automation in place” (15). According to the novel, there was a push in 
the 1980s to change the IRS from a system primarily powered by human beings doing 
incredibly boring rote work to an “increasingly automated, computerised tax system” (84): an 
IRS with a soul, and an IRS without. Should it struggle to keep its “intuiti[ve]” (346) human 
component, or should it kill that human part and become an unconscious, automated system 
designed simply to process “millions and millions of bits” (Nørretranders 125)? This question 
translates down the scales to the novel’s “soul-searching” (72) characters. Chris Fogle, for 
instance, describes the moment he matured from “being an unmotivated lump” (223)—just 
inanimate flesh—to being more like “a machine that suddenly realized it was a human being 
and didn’t have to just go through the motions it was programmed to perform over and over” 
(184). Turning the IRS into an automated system is a seductive option, at least in terms of 
productivity and the mitigation of human boredom, but it implies a discomfiting solution to 
the characters’ own struggles. By paralleling their struggle with that of the IRS, the novel 
implies that they could be free of pain too, if only they could remove the soul and “proceed 
                                                          
that isn’t expanded on more’” (226). Perhaps with expansion, Wallace’s break with the pattern of the soul 
being the conscious, rather than unconscious, would be clearer. What this does tell us, though, is that 
Wallace affected far more interest in writing about the soul than about the “fancy” names that philosophers 
and neuroscientists have come up with for what is basically the same thing. As Tiny Ewell puts it in Infinite 
Jest: “‘My wife’s personal term for soul is personality. As in “There’s something incorrigibly dark in your 
personality, Eldred Ewell”’” (810). The word “soul” just means more. 
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on autopilot” (193). The part of them that makes them more than just a “lump” of meat needs 
to be taken out of the equation. 
Conley Wouters has argued that The Pale King depicts human characters who are 
basically “machines,” whose “lives and constructed subjectivities are merely data” (460). For 
Wouters, the IRS employees are turned into posthumanist subjects by their work in a 
bureaucratic system that is “hostil[e] toward coherent, intelligible selfhood” (455). Though 
the IRS certainly has a dehumanising effect on the novel’s characters, Wouters’s reading is 
complicated by the explicit presence of “ghosts” in the novel—suggesting that intelligible 
selfhood is still quite possible—not to mention that The Pale King grew from those early seeds 
about Sir John Feelgood and the ghost haunting its body. Though the wraith in Infinite Jest is, 
arguably, a figment of Gately’s fevered imagination (though there are plenty of moving 
objects in the novel to suggest that the wraith does exist), Wallace very explicitly distinguishes 
The Pale King’s ghosts from the “hallucinations” that examiners also experience. The 
hallucinations are known as “phantom[s],” a term which, like ‘phantom limbs,’ connects them 
to the brain of the beholder. “Not so true ghosts,” Wallace explains: “The truth is that there 
are two actual, non-hallucinatory ghosts haunting Post 047’s wiggle room” (317). One of these 
ghosts is Blumquist, who “is a very bland, dull, efficient rote examiner who died at his desk” 
but was not noticed for “four days” given his incredible work ethic (317; 29). The other is 
Garrity, who in the “mid-twentieth century” had the job of examining “each one of a certain 
model of decorative mirror that came off the final production line, for flaws” (317). After 
doing this every day for eighteen years, Garrity hanged himself. It is significant that these two 
men, whose jobs involved paying very careful conscious attention to boring things—of being 
mindful, in other words—turn into ghosts, a symbol, as we saw with James Incandenza, of 
pure, Cartesian mind. Indeed, for Blumquist the difference between being mindful inside his 
alive body and mindful outside his dead one is so negligible that no one notices a difference. 
These two ghosts are the tip of an iceberg of metaphors relating to the ghost and the 
machine that inform the whole novel. While I agree with Wouters that Wallace “attempts to 
tell very human stories in a form we might assume to be hostile to such stories,” the metaphor 
of the ghost in the machine throughout the novel suggests, contrary to Wouters’s argument, 
that Wallace does not represent human subjectivity “a[s] merely data, too” (460). Wallace’s 
language is rather more traditional and Cartesian. For example, Wallace describes work at the 
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IRS as “soul-murdering” (383). Characters reflect that in this line of work “Something goes out 
of you” (118), and as the soul is slowly murdered the characters become hollow, pale “shells 
of men” with eyes with that “milky spooky anybody-home quality” (370). When Lane Dean is 
“unmanned” by the boring work (380), the description suggests that he is both perturbed, 
and that some fundamental essence of ‘Man’ is threatened by the work. In Wallace’s story 
“The Soul is Not a Smithy,” which began as a chapter for The Pale King (Pietsch 1:02:50-
1:04:00), the narrator describes his father suffering the same “soul-level boredom of his job” 
(Oblivion 105), coming home looking “dispirited” (77), his “eyes . . . lightless and dead, empty 
of everything we associated with his real persona” (103-04). Wallace describes this death of 
the soul, this un-Manning and de-spiriting, as a consequence of the increasingly 
bureaucratised nature of American institutions in the twentieth century. One of his characters 
has a haunting dream of “regiment[ed]” school life, with clocks ticking away time on the walls 
as the children perform rote “memorization and regurgitation” (Pale King 257). The 
“idealism” of the teacher, appropriately named “Mr. Goodnature,” is “no match for the 
petrified bureaucracy of the Columbus School System or the listless passivity of children [he]’d 
dreamed of inspiring” (257). In a bureaucratic system, the adventurous spirit of the ‘first’ 
Americans—such as “Columbus,” after whom the school is named—is turned to stone. The 
teacher’s desire to “inspire,” to—in the Biblical sense of the word—“breathe (life, a soul, etc.) 
in or into” (OED) the children, is negated by a system that petrifies them, literally emptying 
them of spirit and turning them into inanimate lumps of matter. In the Bible, “the Lord God 
formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and 
man became a living soul” (Genesis 2:7). The Pale King portrays a world that destroys the soul, 
that “precludes everything vital and human”: a world in which one has to “breathe, so to 
speak,” without “air” or inspiration (440). It is not the case that these characters are “merely 
data, too” (Wouters 460). They are emphatically soulful, full of some essential humanist spirit 
that separates them from mere machine. If they had no soul, then nothing would be under 
threat. A posthuman framework that sees no difference between man, machine, and animal, 
cannot account for the way that Wallace actually writes about his characters. 
The metaphor of the ghost in the machine not only animates Chris Fogle’s arc from 
lump to consciousness, or Lane Dean’s unmanning, but the other central characters in The 
Pale King as well. The metaphor provides a useful way, for instance, to think about the 
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differences between David Cusk and Shane Drinion. David Cusk suffers from an anxiety 
disorder which both causes, and is triggered by, prodigious sweating. When he becomes 
anxious about getting overly warm, the “heat of the fear of the heat spread[s] through him” 
(96), thus making him warmer, which thus makes him more anxious. Discovering this process 
within himself, Cusk learns the “terrible” consequences of what you consciously “pay 
attention to” (93). He finds himself “imagin[ing] what his sweating might look like” to others 
(94), and he can feel his temperature rising as he does so, “unwilled, even against his will” 
(94), as he becomes fixated on the smallest changes inside his body but outside his control. 
His body and unconscious mind (the ‘form’ or ‘machine’ he fills) betray his conscious “will” 
(his ‘I,’ his soul, his ghost) by doing what they evolved to do: operate very efficiently outside 
of Cusk’s conscious control. Cusk’s machine detects his anxiety and sets off an automatic, 
fight-or-flight response (sweating cools the body in preparation to flee) that, of course, only 
makes the conscious Cusk more anxious. His body’s most basic animal instinct is put on a 
torturous, infinite loop by the brilliant, complexly self-reflective consciousness that fills it.  
Again, Wallace’s construction of this character is at odds with Wouters’s posthuman 
argument that “we might begin to see [Cusk’s disorder] not as some psychological or 
physiological impairment, but rather a mechanical malfunction, something that cannot be 
understood in terms of human breakdown” (179). Wouters suggests, somewhat offensively, 
that Cusk’s anxiety disorder “is not directly or logically influenced by either [his thoughts or 
emotions],” that it is an “inhuman” condition, a sign that Cusk, like the novel’s other 
characters, is not human in the traditional sense (Wouters 179; 180) but, as De Bourcier puts 
it, “comically” empty “inside” (De Bourcier 56). Though I agree that Cusk might be seen as 
suffering from a “malfunction” in his unconscious, “mechanical” body, Cusk’s condition is, as 
we have seen, directly influenced by his conscious thoughts. Wallace explains that Cusk does 
“not truly begin to suffer” until he learns that the “fear of it could bring it on” (95): like the 
boy in “Forever Overhead,” Cusk learns that “being scared is caused mostly by thinking” (Brief 
Interviews 7). The real source of dread for Cusk is that he understands that he is, however 
unwillingly, the cause of his own suffering. Once triggered, his anxiety grows with a precise 
and relentless logic that is both utterly inexorable and yet (Cusk knows all too well) completely 
avoidable. The problem would vanish if he could just stop imagining it.  
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Cusk’s experience as Wallace portrays it emphatically complicates the notion that his 
characters are merely posthuman. When Cusk feels that he “would have traded his very soul 
not to have” others around him become aware of his sweating (97), it is not mere hyperbole. 
The human “soul” is the problem, and it is not fragile but all too present. Like Bidart’s anorexic 
subject Ellen West, who feels “force[d]” by her own “mind . . . always to think of eating” (In 
the Western Night 113), Cusk’s soul fills an antiquated, pre-existing animal form (with useful 
drives to eat, sweat, and survive), but by filling it changes it into “an endless funhouse hall of 
mirrors of fear” (Pale King 98). If Cusk could rid himself of his soul—if, in other words, the 
conscious self could be “traded” away—his animal form would no longer house the prime 
mover of the anxious, automatic responses that torture him. The tragic irony for Cusk, of 
course, is that the soul cannot be separated from the machine except in death. Cusk’s soul is 
forever overhead, but it is still chained to an animal body. And what could be more humanist 
than the idea that ‘Man’ has his place on the “great chain of being” (Pope 277), a tragic, 
“exquisite hybrid,” as Wallace puts it, “of animal and angel” (Consider 143)?79 
The polar opposite of Cusk is Shane Drinion, who, during his long conversation with 
Meredith Rand, is able to focus so intently on others that he fails to notice he is levitating. 
Unlike Cusk and most of the novel’s other characters, Drinion is unused to considering his 
own “inward reaction[s]”: when he is asked to consider his own emotional state, for instance, 
he has the strange mechanical look of an “optical reader scanning a stack of cards very fast 
and efficiently” (455). His focus is intent in whatever direction it is pointed, to the occlusion 
of all else. I would not argue, however, that Drinion is particularly posthuman either. He is not 
a machine without a conscious self or soul. If anything, his conscious self is not absent but 
extremely present. Drinion is similar to what Wallace calls, in his essay on athletes and the 
tennis player Michael Joyce, “our culture’s holy men: they give themselves over to a pursuit . 
. . and enjoy a relationship to perfection that we admire and reward . . . even though we have 
                                                          
79 Aengus Woods is the only critic to suggest that “Cusk is in the throes of the anxiety induced by abstract 
thought” (282). As part of a larger argument that anxiety and abstraction are central to Wallace’s work, 
Woods suggests that “We can always alleviate the anxiety of abstraction by not thinking, but then, without 
thought, what is truly left to us?” (283). Peter Sloane suggests that “Cusk’s realising that he [is] ‘an object, 
a body among other bodies’ is traumatic” (199), but the opposite is true. The problem begins, for Cusk, not 
with the body, but with the thinking thing inside that body.  
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no inclination to walk that road ourselves” (Supposedly 237n. 42). It is significant that the 
levitating Drinion is very similar to the guru Lyle in Infinite Jest, who also “hovers cross-legged 
just a couple mm. above the top of the towel dispenser” (700) at the tennis academy. From 
this elevated position, Lyle is able to “completely engag[e]” (395) with the students’ many 
troubles because “Everything he sees hits him and sinks without bubbles” (128). The 
“bubbles” imply that, because Lyle can pay the utmost attention to the students’ words, their 
problems do not cause distracting, self-conscious ripples when they enter him, but sink 
straight to the core. Drinion also echoes the holiest of characters in Infinite Jest, Mario 
Incandenza, who has the same “Data-Search Face” (764). Paying total conscious attention to 
unentertaining things is made strange in Wallace’s work, an achievement on the level of 
mysticism.  
The boy in The Pale King’s §36, who is moved to “press his lips to every square inch of 
his own body,” is one striking example of this (396). Significantly linked to historical Saints and 
mystics and their rituals of religious purification—such as “The Umbrian St. Veronica Giuliani,” 
who “permitted pilgrims to insert special keys in her hands’ wounds” (401), the boy, like 
Giuliani, is literally in touch with himself. Contrary to Hering’s and Staes’s view that this 
section is not compatible with the rest of the novel’s plot (137; “Work in Process” 82), the 
boy’s short narrative arc is governed by exactly the same Cartesian metaphor that governs 
the lives of the other characters. He is distinct from them only because, unlike most of the 
rest of the novel’s cast, all of whom want desperately to escape the forms which contain 
them, the boy’s self is at ease with its own embodiment. He has the extraordinary ability to 
dutifully focus on and perform the painful, monotonous stretches required to complete his 
project. This makes him appear very “‘calm’” and, in a particularly significant phrase, “‘self-
containing’” (402): he does not want to escape his form but get in touch with it. Chris Fogle 
has his own moment of self-containment when he discovers that he has “the ability to choose 
what I paid attention to, and to be aware of that choice” (189). Learning to be calmly “aware 
of [his] awareness,” conscious of the fact that he is a conscious self in a body in a room (185), 
makes Fogle feel like he “actually owned [him]self. Instead of renting or whatever” (188). In 
these moments of focused consciousness, Drinion, Fogle, and the boy are not strangers to 
themselves, merely renting space, but rather—like holy men—they feel unified with, and in 
full possession of, their own bodies.  
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As far as Wallace’s cast of characters goes, this is a rare gift. Drinion’s own levitation 
is prefigured by the malfunctioning air hockey table in the bar, which has air that “blow[s] too 
hard,” making it “next to impossible to keep [the puck] from flying off the table altogether” 
(460). The implication of this is that Drinion, who keeps “flying off” his chair, has an anomalous 
design, one which makes him too full of air (i.e., of spirit, or consciousness). The controlling 
metaphor of containment and soulfulness through all these scenes suggests that Wallace is 
bringing a critical posthuman model of human life constantly into dialogue with a much more 
classical humanism. In The Pale King, Wallace is drawing on Nørretranders and a very specific 
model of mind, but uses that model to articulate a traditional view of human beings. His 
characters are literally souls filling their forms, ghosts filling their machines, and these 
metaphors inform, in a very significant way, the novel’s central themes of attention and 
boredom. A solely posthuman reading of the novel cannot account for the fact that its 
characters’ souls matter. 
 
“I desire to believe” 
Wallace’s dualist metaphors for his characters are not unique to him but seem to be a defining 
characteristic of the work of his contemporaries. Sven Birkerts, whom Wallace knew (Max, 
Every Love Story 190-91), tries to define what he means by the soul in The Gutenberg Elegies 
(1994): 
Soul—a vast, elusive word [. . .]. What do I mean by it? Although I don’t want 
to rule out its religious sense, I am not using it, as believers have for centuries, 
to designate the part of ourselves that is held to be immortal. My use of soul 
is secular. I mean it to stand for inwardness, for that awareness we carry of 
ourselves as mysterious creatures at large in the universe. The soul is the part 
of us that smelts meaning [. . .]. It is the I that speaks when we say, ‘I’ve always 
believed . . .’ as opposed to the I we refer to when we say ‘I went to get the car 
fixed this morning.’ (212) 
There is no heaven in Wallace’s work, no God, and no sense of a heaven or afterlife that exists, 
except where some ghosts linger on earth. In a draft of This is Water (2009), Wallace wrote 
that “wisdom . . . can be supplied only by the spirit” (qtd. in Brick 68), and Martin Brick reads 
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this as an explicit reference to “the Holy Spirit” (68), but I disagree. When Wallace uses the 
word “spirit” it is always rooted to humanity, and to human minds: “as far as [Infinite Jest’s] 
Schacht can see,” “spiritual” and “mental” are “the same thing” (269).80 Wallace’s ‘soul’ 
seems to be “secular” like Birkerts’s, a word that “stand[s] for inwardness,” for the “I that 
speaks,” for the “stuff that,” as Wallace puts it, “doesn’t have a price” (Conversations 27). 
Wallace’s short story title “The Soul is Not a Smithy” suggests, however, that he might 
disagree with Birkerts’s view that the “soul is the part of us that smelts meaning” (212). The 
soul is present, for Wallace, but it is not in charge, not the master of its destiny nor “the forge” 
for “the uncreated conscience of my race,” as James Joyce—the source of the phrase—
suggests (Portrait 276). As Wallace knew from his reading of the contemporary sciences of 
mind, consciousness is a very small part of the whole mind-body system. What art he forged 
was as much a product of his unconscious mind as it was his conscious. This does not mean 
that the soul does not matter, however. Though Wallace, according to Mary Karr’s poem 
“Suicide’s Note: An Annual” (2012), could not believe in the “only-probable soul,” his entire 
body of work is haunted by the idea. Though he may not have believed in an immortal soul, 
it seems to be very clear that he shares with David Lodge the view that “the words ‘soul’ and 
‘spirit’ [are] useful, if not indispensable, to signify some uniquely valuable quality in human 
life and human awareness” (5). 
Wallace is not alone as a fiction writer in his insistence that there is, still, some basic 
human spirit worth defending.81 George Saunders’s science-fiction story “Escape from 
Spiderhead” (2010) portrays a posthuman, dystopian research facility, in which human 
                                                          
80 Though Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly’s interpretation of Wallace as someone who champions the 
incredible power of the human mind to “treat melancholy as happiness, boredom as bliss” (51) is simplistic 
and problematically dependent on This is Water, they are right that “the sacred in Wallace . . . is something 
we impose upon experience; there is nothing given about it at all” (47). 
81 My focus here is on contemporary novelists, but there is obviously some historical precedent for the kind of 
fiction that is written in response to the advance of scientific materialism. In The Evolutionary Self (1982), 
for instance, Roger Ebbatson notes that writers such as Thomas Hardy, E. M. Forster, and D. H. Lawrence 
were “imaginatively quickened by scientific rationalism whilst simultaneously refuting the literalism which 
that tradition posits.” Lawrence’s “entire imaginative strategy,” for example, “may be read as an endeavour 
to redeem and preserve the mysteries of human character from the causation of science” (xiv-xv). 
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emotions—from the blackest depression to the truest love—are mere chemical reactions, 
induced in the subjects during the facility’s materialist experiments. Yet the story ends with 
the narrator committing suicide and, like Wallace’s Lucien, “sail[ing] right out through the 
roof,” escaping the material confines of his body and “brain chemistry” (Tenth of December 
79-80). David Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas (2004), which also crosses genres into science fiction, 
rides the line between materialism on the one hand (“it voyages through the host’s blood-
vessels to the brain’s cerebellum anterior" [36]) and essentialism on the other. Indeed, the 
novel’s title refers to the nature of “Souls” that “cross the skies o’ time . . . like clouds crossin’ 
skies o’the world” (318). Mitchell has said in interviews that he “desire[s] to believe in the 
continuity of the soul” (“Interview” 26:40, my emphasis), and one of his most recent 
publications is ostensibly an autobiographical short story under the title “A Possibly True 
Ghost Story from David Mitchell” (2015). He writes: “that night is the closest I have to a real-
life ghost story, and turned a ghost-disbeliever into a ghost-agnostic, at least.”82 Chris Adrian, 
the novelist and paediatrician whose work draws on ‘genre writers’ such as H. P. Lovecraft 
and Ursula Le Guin, negotiates this dualism in his novel Gob’s Grief (2001), which is haunted 
throughout its pages by ghosts who long to have bodies, those “perfect machine[s],” again 
(165). Richard Powers’s The Gold Bug Variations (1991), whose characters work to crack the 
genetic code, ends with the character Ressler’s ghost playing a last musical message over an 
ATM, a song with “something of divinity in it” (631). The narrator in Jennifer Egan’s gothic 
novel The Keep (2006) is haunted by the man he killed, and has to tell his victim’s story. When 
in prison, the narrator is aided by a radio made out of dust and an old cardboard box that, its 
owner claims, picks up the “voices of the dead”: “All that love, all that pain, all the stuff people 
feel. . . . It can’t disappear,” for it is “too . . . permanent” (98).  
Egan’s device is knowingly ridiculous, but isn’t the disembodied soul also ridiculous? 
All these writers seem to share a general understanding and interest in the science of the 
brain that has become increasingly a part of popular consciousness. Yet they all also write 
against the posthuman view that the soul, or any basic human interiority, does not exist. 
Stephen J. Burn has suggested that Wallace and Saunders write “ghost-haunted texts” 
                                                          
82 Mitchell’s novel Cloud Atlas was turned into a film in 2012 directed by Tom Tykwer and The Wachowskis, who 
presumably saw some affinity between this rather traditionally humanist work and The Matrix. The 
producer of The Matrix, Joel Silver, also, significantly, bought the rights to Morgan’s Altered Carbon. 
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because they share a “metaphysical ache for some kind of meaningful knowledge that lies 
beyond mortal beings” (Reader’s Guide 9). I suggest that the ghost, specifically, has become 
such a significant symbol in the post-postmodern novel because post-postmodern writers, in 
the aftermath of posthuman theories of all sorts, understand that the soul is a dead idea (as 
Gately puts it: “like a ghost, as in dead?” [Infinite Jest 833]). To keep investing in some basic 
human essence requires, therefore, a leap of faith, to believe in the ghost of that which has 
been killed. By taking Ryle’s criticism of Descartes—the ghost in the machine—at face value, 
Wallace at once acknowledges that the soul is not scientifically viable and carries on 
regardless.83 
In Infinite Jest, Hal’s problem is that he is a posthumanist who knows too much to be 
able to do this. As he says, “It’s always seemed a little preposterous that Hamlet, for all his 
paralyzing doubt about everything, never once doubts the reality of the ghost” (900). Hal 
recognises that ghosts are not real, just as he recognises that he, like everyone else, has 
nothing so significant as a soul: he is “hydrochloric acid and bilirubin and glucose and glycogen 
and gloconol produced and absorbed” (897). Gately, on the other hand, “doesn’t want to 
know his body even fucking has something with six syllables in it” (921). Gately survives 
because he is humanist: he learns to be “In Here” instead of “Out There” (374), to take 
personal responsibility for his machine’s unconscious actions. Hal’s posthuman reality, the 
idea that he “just never quite occurred,” or existed, inside himself, “chills [him] to the root” 
(686). Yet like the rest of the E.T.A. students, Hal treats the “annual celebration of 
Interdependence Day”—significantly shortened in the novel to “I.Day”—“ironic[ally]” (380). 
The students are too clever to take their own selves seriously.84 It is not, as Hayles suggests, 
                                                          
83 My argument sits inside a larger, ongoing discussion about contemporary fiction and the afterlife. For Peter 
Boxall, “posthumousness is, I think, a characteristic of the contemporary novel more broadly” (31), while 
Alice Bennett suggests that “contemporary existence can be characterised by its post-consciousness – its 
consciousness of its status as after. Every reminder of post-modernity, of the post-historical, the post-
human . . . is a reminder of the presence, already, now, of our own afterlives” (3). 
84 As Pemulis says to Hal, “that shit’s not going to work for you because you’re too sharp to ever buy the God-
Squad shit” (1066n. 321). It is worth noting that in Wallace’s next book, it is the “hideous men” who ironize 
the word “‘souls’” with quotation marks (Brief Interviews 19), and they who treat women as coercible 
automatons whose “natura[l] programm[ing]” the hideous men can use to their advantage (195). 
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a veneration of the self that dooms Wallace’s characters; what dooms them is the very “irony 
and contempt for selves” (530) that characterises posthuman theory. Hal’s lack of respect for 
ghosts has terrible consequences for his own.  
We have seen in chapter 1 that Wallace was coming from a posthumanist, materialist 
perspective, writing fiction that is grounded in an understanding of the embodied mind. Why, 
then, is the soul such an important metaphor for Wallace, and was it ever more than just a 
metaphor for the conscious ‘I’? We have seen that traditional humanism is at the very centre 
of Wallace’s work, but how can Wallace reconcile this with his posthumanism and his critique 
of solipsism (the narcissistic belief that there is nothing but the self)? In chapter 3 we will 
focus on mental illness and the relationship between patient and therapist in Wallace’s work, 
which will reveal what is at stake in Wallace’s representation of his characters as ghosts 
trapped inside their machines, and why it matters that they are not just matter after all. 
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Chapter 3 
“The heat just past the glass doors”: Therapy,  
Madness, and Metaphor 
 
 Think of it this way. Two people are screaming in pain.  
—David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest (696) 
“A very glib guy”? 
The idea that consciousness is, as Wallace writes in one of his late stories, “nature’s 
nightmare” (Oblivion 282), is such a central thread throughout all of his writing that most 
studies of his work have, if not explicitly, implicitly acknowledged it. There has been 
surprisingly little attention paid, however, to the actual nature of this nightmare, and the 
means by which the nightmare is treated, despite the central role that mental illness and 
therapy plays across Wallace’s fiction. Indeed, there are therapist characters who play 
significant roles in each of Wallace’s three novels; therapists, or characters who refer to their 
history of therapy, in no less than nine short stories across all three of his collections; and as 
many different kinds of therapy in his work as there are characters to practice them and 
sicknesses to treat.85 Wallace’s representation of illness and the therapeutic structures 
                                                          
85 The Broom of the System features a dramatic family therapy session called “family theater” (160) and the 
“drooling” Dr. Curtis Jay, who has a “membrane” theory about “Self and Other” (136). Infinite Jest revolves 
around numerous support groups and therapeutic philosophies, though the central therapist character is 
Dr. Dolores Rusk, a Freudian who teaches at the tennis academy and is obsessed with “the Oedipal phase’s 
desire to . . . ‘win’ the mother” (550). In The Pale King there are different kinds of “psychotherapy” (256), a 
mental health hospital with psychiatrists like “computer[s]” so “you can’t proceed until you give the 
properly formatted answer” (471), and Meredith Rand’s husband, who works as an attendant at the 
hospital and is a “natural therapist” (482). There are many more examples outside of the novels. In “The 
Planet Trillaphon as It Stands in Relation to the Bad Thing,” a doctor prescribes anti-depressant medication 
to the narrator (5). Alex Trebek talks about his dreams with a “psychiatrist” in the story “Little 
Expressionless Animals” (Girl 19), Bruce tries “fiction therapy” in “Here and There” (153), and Mark writes 
a story about a “psychologist” who treats phobias in “Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way” (278). 
“The Depressed Person” analyses her “therapist” in Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (37), while “Church 
Not Made with Hands” in the same collection features a kind of therapy “through artistic acts” (170). Finally, 
Schmidt has had “several years of psychotherapy” in “Mister Squishy” (Oblivion 25), Neal thinks he is 
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designed to help the ill is clearly one of the major threads that ties together all of his fiction. 
I will not try to encompass this enormous range of therapies and illnesses but focus in on what 
they all share: the moment of interaction between patient and therapist, which raises 
important questions about how we understand, describe, and treat human beings. Exploring 
Wallace’s approach to these problems will give us an insight into both how he understood the 
relationship between materialist and essentialist accounts of the self, and why interiority is 
ultimately so important in his fiction.  
Those studies that have considered Wallace’s treatment of illness and therapy in some 
detail tend to take a very narrow view of Wallace as the writer of just Infinite Jest and “The 
Depressed Person” (1999).86 The approach to these two texts has been divided. On the one 
hand, critics such as Kiki Benzon (2007) and Eric A. Thomas (2013) focus primarily on Wallace’s 
representation of illness. They do not focus on Wallace’s therapists or his literary context, but 
elucidate the pathology of the characters (and the author) within. On the other hand, critics 
such as Alan Bleakley, Margaretta Jolly (2012), and Catherine Toal (2003) pay little attention 
to Wallace’s representation of illness, instead taking these two texts as proof that Wallace’s 
work—like Jonathan Franzen’s The Corrections (2001), Rick Moody’s The Black Veil (2002), 
and Bret Easton Ellis’s Lunar Park (2005)—is yet another contemptuous, “drawling satir[e]” 
of “‘therapeutic culture’” (Bleakley and Jolly 783; Toal 312). It is significant that Bleakley, Jolly, 
and Toal identify this literary trend as being distinctly male in character. Bleakley and Jolly set 
up these works in opposition to the “very different handbook for women’s health and 
sexuality Our Bodies, Ourselves” which, though similarly critical, has more “humane 
                                                          
cleverer than his “psychoanalys[t]” in “Good Old Neon” (143), and Randall thinks his “counsellor” is not 
“thoughtfu[l]” in “Oblivion” (209). 
86 Marshall Boswell broadens the field a little by identifying a central “trilogy of pieces” in Wallace’s work—“The 
Depressed Person” from Brief Interviews, “Good Old Neon” from Oblivion, and the Chris Fogle chapter from 
The Pale King (“Constant Monologue” 156)–each of which presents a dominant monologue from a 
narcissistic, depressive, deeply self-conscious character. Boswell notes several significant links between 
them, including the fact that in the first two the therapist character “die[s] mid story” (156). Though Boswell 
is unique in Wallace studies in looking at the treatment of therapy in any of Wallace’s fiction published after 
“The Depressed Person,” this is quite a specifically defined trilogy. Wallace’s treatment of the relationship 
between therapist and patient is by no means limited to these three stories. 
115 
 
intention[s]” (788). Similarly, Catherine Toal argues that Franzen, Moody, and Wallace use 
the term ‘depression’—which Toal defines as a “commodified subjectivity” popularised by 
bestselling memoirs—to pathologize a “crisis in masculinity” (305-06). The prevailing view of 
Wallace, particularly when it comes to his writing about therapy, is that of a male writer 
among other male writers who extend and champion the (predominantly male) postmodern, 
anti-psychiatric tradition that had prominence in the 1960s.87  
In this chapter I will considerably broaden and enrich our understanding of how 
Wallace approaches illness and therapy by recognising that his approach to them is neither 
divided nor narrow: illness and medicine, in Wallace’s fiction, are vital halves of the same 
picture, and Wallace is indebted to a wide range of literary sources when he writes about 
them across his whole career. This becomes especially clear as soon as we expand our 
selection of his works beyond Infinite Jest and “The Depressed Person.” Indeed, Wallace’s first 
story “The Planet Trillaphon as It Stands in Relation to the Bad Thing” (1984) is about precisely 
this problem, and it gives us an early map of Wallace’s approach to illness and the inherent 
problems with illness-writing. In the story an unnamed narrator describes his experiences on 
                                                          
87 Appignanesi explains that in the 1960s, when “many asylums were little better than prisons,” the “anti-
psychiatry movement was launched from a variety of sites” (Mad, Bad and Sad 396). Michel Foucault 
described the “language of psychiatry” as a “monologue of reason about madness” (x-xi), a singular, 
dominating voice designed to silence dissenting views and perspectives. In the United States, Thomas Szasz 
famously decried what he called The Myth of Mental Illness (1961), arguing that “psychiatric diagnoses are 
stigmatizing labels” and “involuntary psychiatric therapy is not treatment but torture” (12). In the United 
Kingdom, R. D. Laing—the “‘psychedelic psychiatrist’ who thought of schizophrenia as a kind of epiphany” 
and “became a prophet of [the] counterculture” (Appignanesi, Mad, Bad and Sad 410)—wrote that a 
“‘normal’ ‘adjusted’ state is too often the abdication of ecstasy, the betrayal of our true potentialities” 
(Laing 18). Wallace was aware of this critical tradition, especially in the form of the anti-psychiatric novel. 
He lists Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1962) among other examples of great hypocrisy-
puncturing postmodernist works—“Kesey’s black parody of asylums suggested that our arbiters of sanity 
were often crazier than their patients” (Supposedly 66)—and he also read and annotated Doris Lessing’s 
Briefing for a Descent into Hell (1971), which similarly exemplifies the view that the authoritative medical 
establishment subjugates the so-called insane. Much of Lessing’s novel comprises lengthy prose passages 
describing her patient-protagonist’s visionary experiences, intercut with the terse dialogue of two feckless 
doctors. As one of the doctors explains, “I believe you could snap out of this any time you want” (28), or, at 
least, “Try Tofronil? Marplan? Tryptazol? Either that or shock” (17). 
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the planet Trillaphon, the alternate world in which he finds himself when he takes anti-
depressant medication (specifically, “Tofranil,” which the narrator thinks of as “Trillaphon” 
because “it just sounds more like what it’s like to be there” [18]). The narrator is given the 
medication to escape what he calls the “Bad Thing,” which his doctor, “Dr. Kablumbus,” 
explains to him is “‘severe clinical depression’” (9). The narrator feels uncomfortable with the 
doctor’s language because it fails to denote his experience; he had always “thought that 
depression was just sort of really intense sadness” (9-10). As Andrew Solomon explains, 
It’s a strange poverty of the English language, and indeed of many other 
languages, that we use the same word ‘depression’ to describe how a kid feels 
when it rains on his birthday and to describe how somebody feels the minute 
before they commit suicide. (“Depression” 24:17-24:33) 
Wallace’s narrator discovers the poverty of not only the medical term for his “so-called 
‘depression’” (Infinite Jest 692), but of the ability of any writer to put their experience of 
mental illness into words.  
In a long paragraph he tests a number of descriptions of his condition, beginning with 
a “very glib guy on the television [who] said some people liken it to being underwater” 
(“Planet Trillaphon” 10). In parenthesis the narrator quietly writes in the margins of this 
description, explaining which part of it most aptly describes the Bad Thing to him:  
(I don’t know how apt it is to say it’s like being underwater, but maybe imagine 
the moment in which you realize, at which it hits you that there is no surface 
for you, . . .; imagine how you’d feel at that exact moment, like Descartes at 
the start of his second thing, then imagine that feeling in all its really delightful 
choking intensity spread out over hours, days, months . . . that would maybe 
be more apt.) (10) 
One particular part of the glib guy’s description feels apt (not being underwater exactly but 
the moment you discover there is no surface), and this part leads the narrator to another 
writer, Descartes, who at the start of his “second thing” was unsettled by his understanding 
that the world outside him might not exist. Descartes writes that he feels “tossed about” by 
this assumption, “as if I had fallen suddenly into a deep whirlpool, that I can neither put my 
foot on the bottom nor swim to the surface” (Meditations 23). We move from one annotation 
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to the next, and the narrator reframes the water metaphor through Descartes as a model not 
just of directionlessness but of profound ontological uncertainty.  
From Descartes’s Meditations the narrator moves to Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar (1963): 
A really lovely poet named Sylvia Plath, who unfortunately isn’t living anymore, 
said that it’s like having a jar covering you and having all the air pumped out of 
the jar, so you can’t breathe any good air (and imagine the moment when your 
movement is invisibly stopped by the glass and you realize you’re under 
glass…). (10) 
The surface of the water becomes here the surface of the bell jar’s glass. The sentence 
structure mimics what came above with the glib guy and Descartes, with the narrator again 
annotating someone else’s metaphor to pull out the part that is most apt for him. In this one 
paragraph we can see, in microcosm, an early example of Wallace’s method when it comes 
to writing about both mental illness and the therapeutic structures surrounding the illness. 
Through someone on television, to a philosopher, to a poet, the narrator moves from one 
metaphor to the next, stitching together the insight of different works into a “kind of” 
accurate description of what depression, and subsequently his anti-depressant medication, 
feels like (11). The narrator adds his own definition—like “every single cell in your body is . . . 
sick” (10)—but makes a point of recognising that this is what the Bad Thing feels like “to me” 
(10), not to everyone. The formal structure of this paragraph, its long sentences intercut with 
the narrator’s parenthesis, enacts the fact that the narrator can only skirt around the edges 
of the Bad Thing. “It can be described only in metaphor and allegory” (Solomon, Noonday 16), 
but no one metaphor can ever really communicate what it is like, especially to someone who 
has not felt it for themselves.  
Taking Wallace’s early map of his method in “Trillaphon” as a starting point, my aim is 
to trace how Wallace consciously writes in the margins of a number of different literary 
traditions when he writes about illness and therapy.88 One of my central claims is that 
                                                          
88 Though I will be drawing on Wallace’s working library and some of his private notes, my literary approach in 
this chapter is grounded in a rejection of Thomas’s argument that Wallace’s characters “deman[d] to be 
read” (283) as “mouthpiece[s]” (277) for Wallace himself.  
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Wallace’s therapists are not “caricatures” (Thomas 288), and that therapy is not something 
Wallace merely shrugs off as a nuisance in the lives of the ill. Across his fiction, like 
“Trillaphon”’s long paragraph on a larger scale, Wallace pieces together two central, 
sustained, complementary metaphors for illness and therapy: a metaphor of hellfire within 
the ill person, and a metaphor of the glass wall between therapist and patient which means 
that fire cannot be directly accessed. As I will make clear, these metaphors work together 
because illness and therapy are part of the same picture for Wallace.  
“Trillaphon” is also a useful starting point because, in one paragraph, it poses a 
number of significant challenges to our currently narrow understanding of Wallace’s work. 
Firstly, the fact that Plath is the only author Wallace names in the story other than Descartes 
(whose significant influence on Wallace’s work we have seen in chapter 2) challenges 
Bleakley, Jolly, and Toal’s argument that Wallace is writing in a solely male, anti-psychiatric 
tradition. By exploring Wallace’s sustained allusions to Plath throughout his work, we will see 
that Wallace’s treatment of therapy was far more nuanced than has been suggested. 
Likewise, the reference to Descartes himself demonstrates that Wallace is explicitly engaged 
with writing much older than that of his contemporaries Franzen, Moody, and Ellis, who, 
despite all being born in the space of five years, are the only writers that Wallace’s critics use 
to contextualise his therapy fictions.  
 
“Looking at stuff under glass” 
This is not to say that postmodern, anti-psychiatric writers have not been a significant 
influence on Wallace’s therapy fictions. It is not difficult to see, especially if we look no further 
than a couple of scenes in Infinite Jest, why critics view therapy in Wallace’s fiction as a useless 
endeavour and his therapists as “caricatures” (Thomas 288). In terms of literary allusion and 
form, Wallace does seem to have some of his most playful moments when it comes to Infinite 
Jest’s therapists. Half way through the novel, for example, we read of a Lolita (1955)-inspired 
episode involving “coach R. Bill (‘Touchy’) Phiely,” who took a “thirteen-year-old” player “into 
the Humboldt County” (an allusion to Humbert Humbert, the name of Lolita’s narrator), after 
which the academy employs “Dr. Dolores Rusk” (“Dolores” being Lolita’s real name [Nabokov 
9]) to protect the other “potential diddlees” (510-11). Naming your child-therapist after 
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literature’s most well-known victim of paedophilia makes a black joke of how effective Rusk’s 
services are likely to be. The playful literary allusion, not to mention the comic moniker 
“Touchy Phiely,” distracts entirely from the seriousness of the man’s crime and the traumatic 
experience of his “diddlee.”  
Dr. Rusk appears in another scene when she has a session with Ortho Stice. Here her 
voice dominates the proceedings as she theorises about Stice’s “counterphobia . . . the 
delusion of some special agency or control to compensate for some repressed wounded inner 
trauma,” ultimately suggesting—seemingly out of nowhere—that this might manifest itself in 
lust for “the Barbie . . . the most obviously reductive and phallocentric reduction of the 
mother to an archetype of sexual function and availability” (550). Stice’s objection that he 
does not “want to X no Goddamn Barbiedoll” (550) is again an allusion, this time to A. M. 
Homes’s story “A Real Doll” (1990), which Wallace taught at Illinois State University 
(Conversations 63), and in which a boy has a sexual affair with a (seemingly sentient) Barbie 
doll: “I imagined a million Barbies and having to have them all. I pictured fucking one, 
discarding it, immediately grabbing a fresh one . . . I saw myself becoming a slave to Barbie” 
(The Safety of Objects 163). Again, Wallace’s literary playfulness and the dense, redundant 
psycho-jargon (Rusk’s phrase “obviously reductive and phallocentric reduction” ironically says 
very little) make any serious point in the scene hard to see.  
Wallace’s first novel, The Broom of the System, also seems to support the view that 
Wallace only caricatures his therapists. One chapter is made up entirely of an “EXCERPT FROM 
DUTY LOG OF DR. DANIEL JOY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR EMERGENCY SERVICES, CHICAGO 
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH” (197). This excerpt details the arrival, at 10:40am, of 
Lenore’s brother, his delusion that he is a contestant on a television show (199), his inevitable 
“screams” (200), his sedation, and, fifty short minutes after arrival, his departure from the 
medical centre at 11:30am (200). The novel’s psychiatrist Dr. Curtis Jay keeps his 
appointments similarly (as his name suggests) curt: his paying customers sit on impersonal 
“mechanical chair[s] on [a] track” (61) and are moved into his room one after the other. 
Broom is closest in tone and style to Wallace’s postmodernist predecessors, particularly 
Thomas Pynchon, and Dr. Curtis Jay clearly echoes the paranoid (and parodically named) “Dr 
Hilarius” from Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 (1965). Both characters, from their names 
onwards, are caricatures of unethical therapists. Where Dr. Curtis Jay does not hesitate to tell 
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Rick Vigorous everything that Lenore tells him in confidence, Dr. Hilarius has armed and 
barricaded himself in his office, and it is said that if you “‘Start telling him your troubles . . . 
he’ll probably shoot you’” (92). It is significant that Wallace characterises Pynchon as one of 
the “post-Nabokovians,” the name he gives to the “black-humourists who came along in the 
1960s” (“Interview by Charlie Rose” 21:40-21:50): to write about therapy, for Wallace, is to 
write in the margins of Nabokov and Pynchon’s irreverent tradition. 
If we expand our selection of Wallace’s writing and reading, however, the picture 
becomes more complicated. Early in his career, Wallace drew on a number of influences from 
beyond the boundaries of the North American novel. Especially in terms of narrative structure 
and formal technique, the influence of the British writer J. G. Ballard—whose collection of 
stories, War Fever (1990), Wallace reviewed in 1991—and the Argentinian writer Manuel 
Puig—to whom, in 1987, Wallace said he felt “indebted” (Conversations 10)—is present in the 
background of all his therapy fictions yet remains unexplored.89  
Puig’s novel Kiss of the Spider Woman (1979) is made up of the dialogue between two 
men in a prison cell, Molina and Valentin, who briefly become lovers.90 On eight occasions 
throughout the novel, extensive academic footnotes intrude upon the narrative to define 
                                                          
89 Stephen J. Burn was the first to suggest that Wallace “owes much” of his “treatment of dialogue” to Puig, 
particularly the way Wallace represents a moment of silence in conversation with “…” (Reader’s Guide 30). 
Lucas Thompson discusses Puig’s influence on Wallace in considerable detail, arguing that Wallace drew 
five stylistic tropes from Puig (60-65). Thompson does not discuss Puig’s use of the footnote, however, 
which will be my focus here. While Thompson briefly refers to Ballard and Wallace’s War Fever review (72), 
and Fabienne Collignon to Ballardian “geometries of buildings and geographies of apocalypse” in Infinite 
Jest (116), Mary K. Holland’s statement that “Ballard’s influence on Wallace has yet to receive critical 
attention” (“Mediated” 128n. 5) effectively still stands. Holland herself very briefly suggests that the 
structure of Wallace’s short story collection Brief Interviews with Hideous Men “seems akin to that of 
Ballard’s The Atrocity Exhibition, which resists readerly attempts to connect and order its pieces” (109), but 
Wallace’s interest in Ballard remains unexplored.  
90 Puig’s novel is likely the inspiration for Cage II, a film in James Incandenza’s filmography in the endnotes to 
Infinite Jest, suggesting that Wallace’s debt to Puig was longstanding. Cage II is also about two men who 
are imprisoned, in more ways than one: “Sadistic penal authorities place a blind convict (Watt) and a deaf-
mute convict (Leith) together in ‘solitary confinement,’ and the two men attempt to devise ways of 
communication with each other” (Infinite Jest 987n. 24). 
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homosexuality, treating it at best as an academic curiosity and at worst as a threat to the 
running of a state: “While those societies in which freedom of sexual relations is tolerated . . 
. remain in an almost animal state of underdevelopment” (168n.). These footnotes are visually 
juxtaposed against the main narrative and literally undercut its emotional content. Indeed, 
on three occasions, the footnotes override the narrative completely when they require a final 
page to accommodate them and thereby conclude the chapter (132; 154; 196). They are also 
juxtaposed against the main narrative in terms of their language, an abstract psycho-jargon 
that clashes with the emotional intimacy of the text’s body. Each of the footnotes opens in 
the following manner: “After having classified the various theories on the physical origins of 
homosexuality . . .” (97n.); “Anna Freud, in The Psychoanalysis of the Child . . .” (129n.); “As a 
variation on the concept of repression . . .” (163n.). The academic study of the characters’ 
‘condition’ reads like a black satire of a disturbing, ridiculous state that subjugates its 
prisoners by categorising them as sexual deviants.  
Though Benzon’s argument that the “footnote, as a paratextual device, is particularly 
apt for the rendering of affective disorders” (“Darkness Legible” 191) could apply convincingly 
to other works of fiction that employ footnotes, it neglects the fact that Wallace’s foot- and 
end-notes are most often used in the manner of Puig to give voice to the analyst, not the 
patient.91 In The Pale King’s §13, for example, Wallace uses footnotes in the style of Puig not 
to render Cusk’s anxiety disorder but the scholarly, emotionless discussion of it. While the 
main narrative describes Cusk’s experience in terms of his “terror and frustration and inner 
suffering” (96)—the body of the text contains, in other words, how the experience feels—the 
academic footnotes are abstracted from Cusk’s emotions as they discuss anxiety disorders 
with precisely the same disinterest that characterised Puig’s footnotes: Wallace writes, for 
example, that “Pyschodynamically, he was, as a subject . . .” (94n. 1); “In clinical terms, he 
was fighting to re-repress . . .” (95n. 2); “Under any reputable Depth-based interpretation . . 
.” (101n. 5). The footnotes are marked apart from the narrative in both their visual 
arrangement on the page and the obscure, jargonistic mode in which they are written. The 
                                                          
91 In her article “Consider the Footnote,” Ira B. Nadel similarly focuses on the footnotes as a means by which 
Wallace represents his own “fractured consciousness” (218). Though I think this is true of Wallace’s style 
as a whole, it does not account for how Wallace’s footnotes inform individual scenes. Wallace’s therapy 
fictions, specifically, seem to be fractured in a careful, meaningful way. 
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last footnote in the chapter is attached to the story’s last line, a moving description of Cusk 
looking at himself in the mirror and seeing that “none of all this was visible to him in the 
bathroom’s glass, whose reflection seemed oblivious to all that he felt as he searched it” 
(101). If Cusk himself cannot see in his own image the torment that is “felt” inside him, even 
when he knows it is there, how could the voice in the footnote—which can only ever be as 
close as the reflection in the glass—offer any better understanding?  
Detached, academic footnotes also feature prominently in Ballard’s story “Notes 
Towards a Mental Breakdown,” which Wallace drew particular attention to in his review of 
War Fever. In the review Wallace categorises Ballard as a “Psy-Fi” writer, someone who “seeks 
to explore the psychopathology of post-atomic life.” Wallace characterises the genre as 
“postmodern to the quick, [it] seems to demand this flat, scholarly narrative voice, an air of 
lab technicians looking at stuff under glass.” Where in Puig’s novel there is a clear distinction 
between those under the glass and those above it, in Ballard’s story “Notes Towards a Mental 
Breakdown,” in which each word in a one-sentence-long fragment about a man’s breakdown 
is footnoted by an academic discussing the case, the distinction between one side of the glass 
and the other completely breaks down. We discover, ultimately, that the story’s apparently 
cogent analyst is actually just another of the patient’s “complex annotations” in “medical 
textbook[s],” a “complete fictio[n]” that exists in an “endlessly unravelling web of imaginary 
research work.” We discover that the story’s title “Notes Towards a Mental Breakdown” is to 
be taken literally: with each additional note, the ‘doctor’ moves further towards the 
unravelling of his “maze of lies” and the revelation that he is in fact the broken man about 
whom he is writing. The patient’s reasoned, above-glass analysis of his own condition is itself 
proof that he is mad.  
In Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography (1999), Ann Hunsaker Hawkins 
provides useful terms with which to think about the relationship between the footnote and 
the body of the text in both Ballard’s story and Wallace’s fiction. Hawkins makes a distinction 
between two kinds of texts about illness: the scientific “case report,” the subject of which is 
a “particular biomedical condition . . . the disease in the body in the bed” (12), and the 
“pathography,” which she defines as “a form of autobiography or biography that describes 
personal experience of illness” (1). As David B. Morris explains, “Contemporary medical 
textbooks define disease as an objectively verified disorder of bodily functions or systems. . . 
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. Illness, by contrast, is used inside medicine to indicate the patient’s subjective experience” 
(37). Hawkins suggests that one way to explain the sudden popularity of the pathography in 
the last half-century “is to see it as a reaction to our contemporary medical model, one so 
dominated by a biophysical understanding of illness that its experiential aspects are virtually 
ignored” (11). Wallace’s term “Psy-Fi” for Ballard’s work clearly plays on the homonymous 
“Sci-Fi,” suggesting that Ballard can be understood as portraying a kind of fictionalised reality 
shaped not by sci-fi technology but by the “contemporary medical model” that Hawkins 
describes. As we saw in chapter 2, Wallace similarly characterises David Markson’s 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress (1988) as a “kind of philosophical sci-fi” (Both Flesh 85). Where 
Markson creates an “imaginative portrait of what it would be like actually to live in the sort 
of world the logic and metaphysics of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus posit” (86), Ballard’s 
imaginative portrait is of a medicalised world that is equally cold and disturbing. Ballard’s 
fictional worlds are characterised not by travel to outer space but, as Wallace’s review-title 
puts it, into an “Inner Space” that has been abstracted through the lens of an emotionless, 
scholarly industry of psycho-pathologisation that redefines how the post-atomic subject 
thinks about themselves. So much so, indeed, that the patient in Ballard’s story has no way 
to articulate his own pathography: he is pathology only, and can only talk about himself in the 
mode of the case report. The “lab technicians”’ glass (Wallace, “Exploring Inner Space”) 
becomes the lens through which Ballard’s characters necessarily see the world and 
themselves, and it is all-distorting.  
Ballard’s detached, scholarly tone is most closely resembled in Wallace’s story “The 
Depressed Person,” and his influence poses a significant challenge to Benzon’s claim that the 
footnotes in this story “formally enac[t]” the experience of depression (“A Dark Web” 154n. 
4). Firstly, it is important to stress that the depressed person, known originally in Wallace’s 
early drafts as “The Devil” (HRC 27.6), does not suffer from depression. She is a narcissist and 
a hideous woman who sits comfortably alongside the cast of hideous men who give the 
collection, Brief Interviews with Hideous Men, its title.92 Though the footnotes in this story, 
                                                          
92 Marshall Boswell explains that when the story was published in Harper’s it was “greeted with a flood of letters 
from readers, many of them expressing anger at what some regarded as Wallace’s vicious portrait of the 
woman’s psychological affliction” (Understanding 205). Both Boswell and Holland note, however, that if 
the story is read with Wallace’s larger body of work in mind, it is unlikely one would come to this conclusion: 
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unlike Cusk’s chapter, are closely focalised through the depressed person, they nevertheless 
maintain the stilted, jargonistic language of the analyst which she has imbibed in order to 
think about, and emphasise, her ‘pain.’ It is not insignificant that the first footnote in the story 
is attached to the word “therapist” (Brief Interviews 37), signalling that, as in Ballard’s story, 
the usual operation of the medical footnote, whereby an academic annotates a patient’s case 
report, has been reversed. The depressed person thinks of herself as ‘the depressed person’ 
and we never learn her name because the only thing she is interested in—as a disinterested 
case reporter would be—is her ‘condition.’ Indeed, her narration reads like a case report 
precisely because she has no pathography; she has no real, felt experience of the 
“indescribable hell” she describes at length (34) because it is as much an abstraction to her as 
it would be to a medical observer. From pp.44-50, the footnotes dominate most of each page, 
but unlike the Cusk story in which the footnotes embody the split between experience and 
the case report, in “The Depressed Person” they show that the hideous woman is firmly on 
the academic side of the glass. Wallace’s footnotes do not intimately render the experience 
of mental disorders but rather the detachment that people who are not ill have—either 
willingly or not—from the reality of others’ conditions. Ballard’s “Psy-Fi” mode, with which he 
describes a world where people see themselves and others as if through glass, is realised in 
“The Depressed Person” in particular, but articulates a central, cynical fact that is apparent in 
all Wallace’s therapy stories: for those looking at mental illness from the outside, there is no 
way through that glass wall.93 
“The Depressed Person” was not written in isolation, and we see a similar technique 
in the “structure of lies” (158) that is Wallace’s early therapy story in Girl with Curious Hair, 
                                                          
the woman “is a victim of her own reliance on quick fixes for her narcissism, which she has mistakenly, and 
self-aggrandizingly, diagnosed as depression” (Boswell 206); “more accurately the woman is suffering 
narcissism” (Holland, “Mediated” 116).  
93 Stephen J. Burn notes that Descartes once defined madness as feeling one “ha[d] a body of glass” (qtd. in 
Burn, Reader’s Guide 73). Burn links this to the title of one of Hal’s essays “that adopts Descartes’ metaphor 
. . .: ‘A Man Who Began to Suspect He Was Made of Glass’” (74), and suggests this gives us some clue as to 
Hal’s own mental state. The essay title also suggests, perhaps, that Hal is the ultimate Ballardian subject, 
so much a product of a posthuman, medicalised culture, and so out of touch with his own emotions, that 
he feels himself to be transparent, nothing more than what science might observe. 
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“Here and There.” Much of this story comprises a conversation between a therapist (whose 
speech is denoted by “” marks) and the two halves of a separated couple (denoted by ‘’ 
marks). Boswell argues that the “fiction therapy” (Girl 153) the therapist encourages in the 
story is a way for Wallace to point to the fact that his own story is a fiction: an “apprentice 
fiction” at that, about a “banal” college breakup, but one which is run through the mill of 
Wallace’s self-conscious innovation (Boswell, Understanding 90). For Clare Hayes-Brady and 
Boswell, the story “unfolds during a therapy session in which the breakdown of the couple’s 
relationship is discussed by both parties,” with an “offstage therapist who, near the end, 
begins breaking into the story and offering her own observations” (Unspeakable 181; 
Understanding 91). I suggest that we might read the story’s “fiction therapy” not as a 
metafiction about therapy but as a therapy session filled with fictions. The story is a “structure 
of lies” (158) because Bruce voices both parts of the couple’s story. Bruce has pared down the 
emotional content of their relationship into a “well-formed formul[a]” (152) and has no 
trouble, therefore, playing his partner’s part in the ‘dialogue’: he is both “Here and There.” 
This interpretation makes the story especially unsettling when Bruce takes her early 
statements about him (“It felt right to be with him” [159]) and we read them from his mouth. 
The therapy session is a joke. There is a wall of glass between Bruce and both his partner and 
his therapist, and he learns nothing from the ‘dialogue’ with his partner because it is really a 
monologue: an unemotional case report of the relationship in which he coolly records both 
parts.  
 
Wallace’s Treatment of Doctors  
It is clear that to write about therapy, for Wallace, is to write in the margins of the irreverent, 
postmodern, male literary tradition with which he is most often associated. In Wallace’s work 
there is a glass barrier between patient and therapist that is seemingly insurmountable. Those 
studies that have focused on Wallace’s representation of illness and medicine tend to be 
limited to a couple of his texts and go no further than this conclusion. Though it is certainly 
the case that Wallace’s therapy fictions do poke some fun at their therapists, in the rest of 
this chapter I will broaden and challenge the narrow view that this is all that Wallace is doing. 
We will see that Wallace’s therapists emerge as part of his critique of postmodernism because 
the glass wall in his fiction has two sides. 
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To write about mental illness, for Wallace, is also to write through other works. It is 
remarkable that Sylvia Plath’s influence on Wallace, for example, has never been discussed, 
despite his clear engagement with her work and Plath’s obviousness as a reference point in 
any discussion of American fiction and depression.94 To be the only author named in Wallace’s 
first story other than Descartes (who is an enormous figure in the background of Wallace’s 
work) suggests that Plath is of considerable importance, and Wallace’s sustained line of 
allusions to her work throughout his own bears this out: Plath informs not just “Trillaphon”’s 
project but Wallace’s career-long effort to articulate his characters’ experience of illnesses 
such as the Bad Thing. Though her work has not been discussed in relation to Wallace’s, after 
Wallace’s death in 2008 their suicides are morbidly linked all the time, of course. In his review 
article in the Journal of American Studies, for instance, James Annesley suggests that “just as 
it is hard to read Sylvia Plath or Virginia Woolf without thinking about the way they ended 
their lives, so too is it difficult not to look for . . . evidence in Wallace's work” (133). Wallace 
himself was aware of the cult of personality around Plath—one of the characters in “The 
Suffering Channel” has a complicated self-harm ritual involving a “special numerical key code 
that was totally unbreakable unless you knew exactly which page of The Bell Jar the code’s 
numbers were keyed to” (Oblivion 319)—and it is ironic that the same thing has happened to 
Wallace. Jeff Jarot argues, for example, that stories such as “The Depressed Person” are 
expressions of Wallace’s own “personal struggles” (108) and a means for Wallace to find a 
“Support System” in the form of his readers: a system with “an unlimited supply of potential 
members” (110).95  
                                                          
94 Philip Coleman briefly notes a reference to Plath in Infinite Jest (11), and Jeffrey Severs sees a link between 
James Incandenza’s death—“How much must a person want out, to put his head in a microwave oven? 
(Infinite Jest 230)—and Plath’s own suicide (Severs 270n. 33). 
95 Andrew Solomon reflects on this problematic approach in a New York Times blog titled “The Lure of a 
Birthright: Why the Plath Legacy Lives.” Solomon writes about Plath’s “literary suicide”—a “sorry chain” of 
loss in which “David Foster Wallace is the latest link”—and notes that, “For a long time, all of Plath’s work 
(as Virginia Woolf’s) was read through the lens of her suicide.” I will proceed with Solomon’s conclusion in 
mind: “[Plath] is in fact a remarkable poet, whose writing would warrant our attention even if she had lived 
her days out happily.” 
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Wallace was aware of Plath and The Bell Jar at least as early as 1984, with the 
publication of “Trillaphon,” and some of his allusions to Plath’s novel do seem as irreverent 
as the Pynchonesque characters in his early work. In The Bell Jar, for example, Plath’s narrator 
Esther dreams of a useful therapist who would “lean back in his chair and match the tips of 
his fingers together in a little steeple and tell me why I couldn’t sleep and why I couldn’t read 
and why I couldn’t eat” (136). Wallace seems to nod to this description in a number of his 
therapy scenes. In the earliest example, in the story “Little Expressionless Animals,” Alex 
Trebek’s therapist matches it exactly, “mak[ing] a church steeple with his fingers and 
contemplat[ing] the steeple” (Girl 19). In Infinite Jest, according to the students at the tennis 
academy, all Dolores Rusk does when they come to her “with an Issue” is  
make a cage of her hands and look abstractly over the cage at you and take the 
last dependent clause of whatever you say and repeat it back to you with an 
interrogative lilt — ‘Possible homosexual attraction to your doubles partner?’ 
. . . ‘Drives you bats when people just parrot you instead of responding?’ (437)  
Similarly, in “The Depressed Person,” the depressed person is often distracted by the encaging 
shapes that her therapist makes with her hands. This is a “habit” that 
consists of placing the tips of all her fingers together in her lap as she listened 
attentively to the depressed person and manipulating the fingers idly so that 
her mated hands formed various enclosing shapes — e.g., cube, sphere, 
pyramid, right cylinder — and then appearing to study or contemplate them. 
(Brief Interviews 36) 
Since Esther’s all-clarifying therapist is just a fantasy, Wallace’s pattern of allusions is arguably 
in keeping with the black jokes discussed in the beginning of this chapter; Wallace updates 
Plath’s image as if to suggest that even when the fantasy of the steeple-fingered therapist 
does come true, the steeple-making is encaging, not a sign of sagacity.  
There are other allusions to Plath and The Bell Jar in Wallace’s work that complicate 
this picture, however. Wallace explicitly alludes to Plath’s novel a couple of times in Infinite 
Jest. When the academic Molly Notkin is interrogated she describes the “bell-jar” of Joelle’s 
mother’s “denial” (794), while the less well-read Don Gately notices that “Kate G.” is “reading 
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somebody called Sylvia Plate” (593).96 The link between Plath and Kate is not a throwaway 
one but a guide to understanding Kate’s character. When Kate is first introduced as a suicidal 
patient, for example, her relationship with the doctor in the scene is governed by further 
allusions to The Bell Jar. Kate tries to explain to the doctor her “feeling . . . like every sound 
you hear all of a sudden has teeth” (73). She describes it more like “horror” than “sadness,” 
and says “Lurid is the word. Doctor Garton said lurid, one time” (73). “Lurid” is an unusual 
word, but one that appears a significant number of times in both The Bell Jar (22; 43; 68) and 
Plath’s poetry (Collected Poems 115; 179), suggesting that this may have been the source of 
the word for Wallace. Interestingly, “Doctor Garton,” who gives the word to Kate, is only a 
couple of letters away from The Bell Jar’s “Doctor Gordon” (135), and the characters are 
similar. Just as Esther “hate[s]” Doctor Gordon because instead of steepling his fingers wisely 
he spends their time “tapp[ing] his pencil” on his pad (135), Kates “face writhe[s]” while her 
doctor spends too much time “writing” (73). For Wallace to allude so closely to Plath’s 
character suggests that he was giving some credit where it was due: just as Doctor Garton is 
the source of the word “lurid” for Kate, so Doctor Gordon (and Plath) were important sources 
for Wallace in this scene. 
The most significant allusion to The Bell Jar is in the description of Kate’s doctor. 
Throughout the scene Wallace avoids focalising through Kate; for the most part we are close 
to the mind of the doctor as he tries to record her status, and we are therefore as abstracted 
from her experience as he is. Appropriately, then, his eyes are said to look 
severely magnified behind his attractive but thick glasses. . . . Patients on other 
floors during other rotations had sometimes complained that they sometimes 
felt like something in a jar he was studying intently through all that thick glass. 
(72) 
The title for The Bell Jar comes from Esther’s description of depression: “To the person in the 
bell jar, blank and stopped as a dead baby, the world itself is the bad dream” (250). It is a 
                                                          
96 Later, Joelle sees “a copy of some yellow paperback called Feeling Good” on Kate’s bed, a reference to David 
D. Burns’s Feeling Good: The New Mood Therapy (1980), the book that popularised cognitive behavioural 
therapy. Given Kate’s fate, this is, perhaps, Wallace’s subtle jab at the unhelpfulness of certain therapeutic 
techniques. 
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metaphor that captures the suffocating, distorting quality of mental illness, and the fear that 
comes with knowing the bell jar can always “descend again” (254) over its victim. Wallace 
adopts this metaphor and changes it to suggest not only that Kate is depressed, but that the 
“thick glass” around her is a total, ever-present barrier between her and her doctor, a 
distorting lens that isolates anyone looking for help behind a transparent wall. This is not the 
fault of the doctor, necessarily; indeed, the glass metaphor stresses that the barrier is see-
through, that the doctor wants to (and, to a greater extent than Ballard’s or Puig’s characters, 
can) see his patient, and yet despite this cannot really feel or understand her pain. Seeing and 
hearing her description is not enough, because the pain cannot be described. For Kate, lost 
on the wrong side of the glass wall, the situation feels all the lonelier with a doctor on the 
other side trying earnestly to peer through. 
Though The Bell Jar was published in 1963, Baker et al. do not associate it with this 
period but see it as a forerunner of the “newer wave” of fiction in the 2000s that features 
“psychiatrists who provide a listening ear, rather than physical control” (Baker 78; 84-85). As 
Lisa Appignanesi puts it, The Bell Jar is a rare example of a novel from the 1960s in which the 
“fictional psychiatrist, Dr Nolan” is “something of a guardian angel amid the horror of asylum 
life” (“All”). It is significant that the word “psychiatrist” in The Bell Jar (ignoring one other 
minor instance when Esther has an unvoiced thought about someone else’s career [75]) is 
first used to end a chapter at the exact half way point through the novel (133). Though that 
first psychiatrist is not much help, the word marks a literal turning point in a narrative that 
ends in Esther’s ultimate freedom (255). The institution is still a place of parody and paranoia 
in Plath’s novel—a place where the “lawn is white with doctors” (189) who ask clichéd 
Freudian questions about “toilet training” (215), and where you cannot say anything without 
a doctor standing “at [your] elbow taking notes on a tiny, almost invisible pad” (190)—but the 
effect of The Bell Jar is profoundly different to other parodic, paranoid, anti-psychiatric works 
that were published around the same time. There is little sense in Plath’s novel of the 
countercultural notion that madness and mental illness are socially constructed, “an ideology 
designed to control and punish social dissidents” (Beilke 33). Unlike Doris Lessing’s Briefing 
for a Descent Into Hell (1971)—to take an example that Wallace had also read—in which a 
visionary patient has to remind his doctors that he is “not depressed, Doctor. I am not” (241), 
there is no doubt that Esther has lost her hold on her sanity and desperately wants help. 
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Though the institution itself could do with reformation, Esther is sick and ultimately rescued 
by her relationship with a medical professional.97 
The Bell Jar’s rather more sympathetic treatment of therapy does not fit into our 
current understanding of Wallace’s influences. This is not to say that by alluding to Plath’s 
novel Wallace necessarily adopts its argument, but his sustained allusions to Plath seem to 
continually point to her sympathetic position. Though Wallace read anti-psychiatric works 
such as Laing’s The Divided Self (1960) in detail, and drew heavily on Laing’s definition of 
schizophrenia in Infinite Jest (Burn 73), there is not any sense in Wallace’s work that madness 
is liberating or epiphanic.98 Wallace’s use of the bell jar metaphor in Kate Gompert’s 
introductory scene, for instance, seems all the more important when we recognise that other 
allusions to countercultural texts in the same scene are turned on their head. Kate refers to 
Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, but she disagrees with its conclusion. Referring 
to the film based on Kesey’s novel—“That old cartridge, Nichols and the big Indian” (78)—
Kate reveals that she does not interpret the infamous “LOBOTOMY” scene (Kesey 277) at the 
end as “that bad,” because she would “go willingly,” just as she would gladly have “ECT again” 
(74). ECT is not a source of horror for Kate but a means of escaping from horror.99 Plath is a 
more vital source for this scene because, like Esther, Kate needs help, and the doctors are 
                                                          
97 Mark McGurl suggests that the “institution in Wallace is not a place of gothic entrapment and abuse, as it had 
been in” Cuckoo’s or The Bell Jar, with “their harrowing tales of shock therapy ‘punishment’” (37). While I 
agree that Wallace’s institution is not gothic like Kesey’s, this is a narrow reading of The Bell Jar. As Gavin 
Francis points out, in his discussion of the changing reputation of ECT, the procedure in The Bell Jar is 
“alternately terrifying and transcendental – terrifying when administered by an uncaring doctor, and 
transcendental when delivered by someone more compassionate” (26). 
98 Though Bleakley and Jolly argue that Wallace only parodies therapy (785), they recognise that Wallace does 
“not romanticise mental instability as an alternative to prescribed drugs” (783).  
99 In her memoir about depression, Elizabeth Wurtzel writes about her argument with her doctor: “‘I want shock 
therapy,’ I say, ‘I’ve read about it recently, and apparently it works quite well on people who are beyond 
hope’” (267). Though D. T. Max’s suggestion that “The Depressed Person” is a revenge fiction against 
Wurtzel is illuminating (Every Love Story 241), Wurtzel’s self-portrait was perhaps not entirely at odds with 
Wallace’s own understanding of how depression affects people.  
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trying to offer it. Wallace’s characters are not countercultural prisoners of an evil system or a 
Nurse Ratched, but the victims of their own sickness. 
Though The Pale King’s Meredith Rand takes a different view of the “horror-movie 
stuff . . . electroshock treatments like in that one movie” (Pale King 473), it is significant that 
Wallace’s treatment of therapy in his final novel is also put into the mouth of its most central 
female character. I suggest that Meredith Rand, who cut herself as a 17 year old and 
consequently spent three and a half weeks in a “psych hospital” (470), is another character 
who is shaped by Plath’s influence. Her chapter notably begins with an obscure reference to 
“The Bell Shaped Men” (446), and Rand marries (though no longer loves) a dying man called 
“Ed” (full name: Edward) who suffers from “cardiomyopathy” (489; 468), echoing Plath’s own 
husband, the poet Ted Hughes (full name: Edward Hughes), who eventually died of a 
myocardial infarction.100  
Rand’s portrait of the mental health institution is similar to Plath’s in many ways. She 
loathes what she calls the “nut ward” she is sent to (470), as Esther hates “the house . . . 
chock-full of crazy people” (Bell Jar 148). The phrase “mental health system” is itself a 
contradiction for Rand (504), because doctors in a system treat patients like “piece[s] of 
machinery” instead of as “human being[s]” (473). Wallace adopted and altered Plath’s jar 
metaphor in the scenes with Kate, and it evolves again here: Rand thinks the doctors see 
                                                          
100 It may not be coincidental that Meredith Rand and Sylvia Plath share the same three-syllable forename (Mer-
e-dith and Syl-vi-a) and the same monosyllabic surname (with the “a” sound in the middle). Rand has a 
friend who takes her to the bar called “Beth Rath,” who perhaps picked up the remaining “ath” sound from 
Plath’s surname (462). That Rand is also defined by her status as a “fox” (474; 485), meaning someone very 
beautiful, gestures towards Ted Hughes’s “most famous poem” (Heather L. Clark 102), “The Thought-Fox.” 
The poem is, significantly, about hunting down literary inspiration, about having ideas “ente[r] the dark 
hole of the head” (1811), so it likely appealed to Wallace who was interested in the problems of influence. 
Given his interest in Plath, he was surely familiar with the complicated literary marriage between Plath and 
Hughes, and perhaps too with Plath’s “Burning the Letters,” a poem that she wrote “on the other side of 
the page upon which she had typed Hughes's” poem (Clark 102), and which responds to “The Thought-Fox” 
quite explicitly: “the dogs are tearing a fox” (Plath, Collected Poems 205). In Birthday Letters (1998)—the 
collection that Susan R. Van Dyne calls Hughes’s “anguished memoir of their marriage” (4)—Hughes writes, 
in what could be an epitaph for Meredith’s own ailing marriage, “If I had grasped that whatever comes with 
a fox / Is what tests a marriage . . . / I would not have failed the test. . . . / But I failed.” (115). 
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“everybody through this professional lens that was about half an inch across—whatever 
didn’t fit in the lens they either didn’t see or twisted it or squished it in so it fit” (477). Yet 
Rand also recognises, as Plath does, that it was “not the doctor’s fault or that they were 
stupid”: this is just the way that institutions, unfortunately, work (491).  
Plath’s significant influence does not override the influences that have already been 
discussed, but casts them in a different light. Wallace’s specific engagement with the 
metaphor of the bell jar demonstrates that his adoption of Puig’s and Ballard’s style and his 
references to glass are not atomistic but part of a sustained vision, one which does not 
support the argument that Wallace’s therapists are one-dimensional caricatures. Though 
“Good Old Neon” is not indebted to Plath in the same way, it is perhaps the clearest instance 
in which Wallace is generous to a therapist character. In the beginning, it seems considerably 
anti-psychiatric: a forty page long monologue by a narcissistic man who spends all his time 
with his “pliable and credulous” therapist Dr. Gustafson (154) “fencing” with him rather than 
honestly opening up (143). Wallace writes at the end of the story, however, that inside you is  
the whole universe at one time or another and yet the only parts that get out 
have to somehow squeeze out through one of those tiny keyholes you see 
under the knob in older doors. As if we are all trying to see each other through 
these tiny keyholes. (Oblivion 178)101 
Here we are told the reason that therapy and the therapeutic cliché of ‘opening up’ is so 
difficult: the “soul” is trapped inside the body, and you can neither see “another soul” nor 
“show” your soul to others because “English” and language is too slow and inaccurate. The 
infinite “universes inside you” can only be glimpsed in “tiny fraction[s]” through the keyhole 
(179). It is from this metaphor that “Good Old Neon” takes its title. We learn on the 
penultimate page about the “neon aura” around Neal, an aura that the ‘character’ David 
Wallace sees in a yearbook photo, and which is really the faint glow of the soul inside each 
individual that everyone struggles to project outwards (180). Implicit here, of course, is the 
fact that Dr. Gustafson has a soul too. As Neal says, “Dr. Gustafson and I both had a good 
laugh over this one after we’d both died and were outside linear time” (163). The problem, 
                                                          
101 Perhaps this is a nod to Esther’s description of “see[ing], as if through the keyhole of a door I couldn’t open, 
[a memory of] myself and my younger brother” (Bell Jar 145). 
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for therapy, is embodiment and the walls that exist during life. Wallace’s therapists, though 
they may be on the wrong side of the glass or the locked door, are like everyone else literally 
infinite in size, and far more interesting than their seemingly one-dimensional surface, if we 
care to imagine what we might find behind it.102 
Wallace’s work seems to align with Bracken and P. Thomas’s view that though the 
anti-psychiatry movement was important in its day, the criticism of the 60s has, as Wallace 
said of postmodern fiction, “to a large extent run its course” (“Interview by Charlie Rose” 
22:05-22:12). As Bracken and P. Thomas put it: 
we are also unhappy with the anti-psychiatry response in so far as it simply 
understands psychiatry as some sort of repressive force. This . . . fails to do 
justice to the complex reality of contemporary mental health care. (90)  
Siri Hustvedt suggests that the same can be said of fiction about therapy. She argues that 
earlier novels such as Nabokov’s Lolita, J. D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye (1951), and Philip 
Roth’s Portnoy’s Complaint (1969) all misrepresent therapeutic practice:  
These books are essentially bracketed monologues. There is no back-and-
forth, no dialogue, no world made between therapist and patient. They are not 
fictional versions of therapeutic practice but narratives that employ 
psychoanalysis as a literary device to unleash an uncensored first-person 
confession. (Living, Thinking, Looking 156-57) 
Though it is true that there is no constructive “back-and-forth” between therapist and patient 
in any of Wallace’s monologic therapy fictions, his therapists are present in his fiction and 
trying to make some connection through the walls around them and their patients.  
                                                          
102 In an article in the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Woods Nash gestures towards the two-sided 
nature of medicine in his discussion of Wallace’s early story “Luckily the Account Representative Knew 
CPR.” Nash argues that medical practice (in this case, the act of giving CPR) is as important to the person 
who delivers it as the person who receives it (103). Nash uses Wallace’s story as a means to address the 
current model of medical ethics that privileges “impersona[l]” delivery of care (97), arguing that, for 
Wallace, the Account Representative’s act is a “personal” one that “builds a bridge of continuity with his 
past, an act through which he might revive the more affectionate and spontaneous person he once was” 
(103). 
134 
 
From the glimpses we get of the therapist in “The Depressed Person,” for example, 
we learn that she is perceptive and presumably quite earnest: she notes, for example, that 
the depressed person’s use of the word ‘pathetic’ “felt to her like a defence-mechanism the 
depressed person used to protect herself” (Brief Interviews 41), which is surely true. The other 
therapist-figure in the story, the “Conflict-Resolution Specialist named Walter D. (“Walt”) 
DeLasandro Jr.” (38) who is enlisted to help the depressed person’s separated parents provide 
for her many needs, appears again in the story “Yet Another Example of the Porousness of 
Certain Borders (VI)” (a title which hints at the fact that characters have significance beyond 
the boundaries of their short story). In this later story, ostensibly a transcript of Walt’s own 
“Parents’ Marriage’s End,” we learn that his parents callously tossed a coin to decide who 
would keep their son (180). This information invites us to fill in the blank about what he—
whose parents treated him so poorly—might have thought of the narcissistic child who felt 
her parents did not provide enough. This information is for the reader alone (and, given that 
the name is used 140 pages apart, is easy to miss), but it reminds us that the therapist is a 
real person with a rich interior life. Though the depressed person’s therapist is largely absent 
from the depressed person’s point of view, even when that therapist commits suicide, the 
story is written so that the absence is felt by an attentive reader. The therapist is the saddest 
and least one-dimensional character in that room.103  
Unlike the so-called “depressed person,” the depressed people in “Trillaphon” and 
Infinite Jest are sick. Both share the same illness—described in “Trillaphon” as the feeling 
“that every single cell in your body is . . . sick” (10), and in Infinite Jest as the feeling that “every 
cell and every atom . . . was so nauseous it wanted to throw up” (74)—and both dislike the 
insipid “authoritative term[s]” for their condition (696). In “Trillaphon,” Wallace writes that 
“‘severe clinical depression’” (“Trillaphon” 9) sounds like it just means “really intense 
                                                          
103 D. T. Max suggests that “The Depressed Person” was a “revenge fiction” for Wallace, a “way of getting even 
with [Elizabeth] Wurtzel for treating him as a statue (or, she would say, refusing to have sex with him)” 
(Every Love Story 241). There are certainly commonalities between Wallace’s depressed person and 
Wurtzel, who says of her parents, in her memoir Prozac Nation: Young & Depressed in America (1994), 
“When they started doing battle night after night, I remember thinking that something was really wrong 
here because last I checked, I was the one who was supposed to have the problems” (59). Whether unfairly 
or not, Wallace does seem to sympathise with those who have to suffer the sufferer.  
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sadness” (10). In Infinite Jest, “psychotic depression” (696) suggests not only that “you just 
get like really sad, you get quiet and melancholy” (73), but that the pain is not even real. Yet 
it is significant that the reason they dislike the word depression is not because it is their 
doctors’ oppressive fiction, but because the word does no justice to what they are actually 
feeling. It is not the case, as it is in Puig’s and Lessing’s novels, that the patient’s emotional, 
spiritual experience is under threat from cold hearted doctors who want to categorise and 
anaesthetise it.  Wallace’s critics interpret the scene with Hal and his grief therapist as a 
postmodern parody of medical nomenclature in exactly this way, arguing that Hal is forced to 
come up with the right answers to satisfy the therapist’s rigid clinical definitions of grief 
(Thomas 288; Toal 316-17). Yet the sad irony in this scene is that if anyone needs help feeling 
and processing grief, it is Hal. It is a bad thing that Hal feels a complete lack of emotion when 
he discovers his father’s head exploded in a microwave, and the therapist is not oppressive 
for recognising this. Wallace’s literary showmanship in this scene is as clever as always, but it 
emphasises the fact that Hal is the one with the problem. We learn about his episode with 
the grief therapist when Hal re-performs his performance for his brother Orin over the 
phone—note that this abstracts us away from Hal’s body and feelings and focuses, like the 
medical footnote, only on the academic, detached voice. Orin’s responses to Hal’s story are 
often “just what the grief-therapist said,” so the reader effectively experiences the grief-
performance as if for the first time (256), and both the performance to the therapist and the 
performance to his brother have exactly the same emotional weight for Hal, which is to say 
none at all. As is the case in “The Depressed Person,” however, this is not the case for an 
empathetic reader. When Orin interrupts Hal’s retelling of the story to say “‘Lyle said all that? 
That doesn’t sound like Lyle’” (255), it is a reminder that Hal is lying to his older brother, 
feigning his cool emotionlessness just as well as he feigned his grief for the therapist. We learn 
much later on that Hal is “empty,” afraid “of being really human,” and is “really lonely for” 
the emotions that he “despises” in himself (694-95). Perhaps the grief therapist—who 
encourages Hal to get in touch with “how . . . it feels” (252)—is onto something?  
Wallace’s doctors seem to be, for the most part, earnest. Unfortunately, if the 
therapists do manage to make some cracks in the glass, their success is always mitigated. Dr. 
Curtis Jay is the only character in Broom to explain to Rick why his desire to possess Lenore is 
dangerous and abusive: “Are we mature? Do we love truly? . . . have we the wherewithal to 
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allow that Other to be a Self?” (347). He also insightfully explains the state of the novel’s 
affairs to Lenore, warning her in one sentence how she might deal with both Rick and the 
conspiracy that is building up around her: “We are helpless and inefficacious as parts of a 
system until we recognize the existence of that system” (333). Because he is an unethical 
buffoon for the rest of the novel, however, they do not listen.  
Meredith Rand has more success. Though it is not a professional psychiatrist who 
helps her, her husband Ed, an attendant at the mental health hospital and a “natural 
therapist” (482) gets her to stop cutting herself because he is “blunt” (488) and “said . . . 
basically that I needed to grow up” (498). Though this would not help everyone, it is what she 
needs to hear. Rand’s chapter in The Pale King is itself a kind of therapy session in action. She 
tells her story to the character Drinion who, unlike other people who only see her beauty, 
pays attention to her words. That Drinion’s name begins with “Dr.” suggests that a genuine 
dialogue is possible, even with a doctor, if they can abandon their “professional lens” and the 
glass wall that comes with it (477). Except, of course, Rand also says that Ed was basically “just 
like a mirror”—another glass wall—and “he just showed you what was there” (482). The 
patient is only ever on one side of the glass, can never be sure if the connection with those 
on the other side is genuine (507), and ultimately has to help themselves. The end of Rand’s 
conversation with Drinion is as abrupt as the revelation that she probably no longer loves her 
husband (508). Though there seems to be some small connection made with both men 
through the glass, both relationships are severed, if they ever genuinely existed in the first 
place. For Kate and the narrator in “Trillaphon,” who don’t suffer what Kate calls the “self-
pity bullshit” (Infinite Jest 72) but the “Great White Shark of pain” (695), and cannot be saved 
no matter how caring the therapist, the glass wall of the bell jar remains hopelessly 
impenetrable. 
We can sympathise—as I suggest Wallace’s work also does—with Hal’s grief therapist 
and Kate’s ineffectual doctor. While the latter is of little help to Kate, Wallace reminds us that 
he is a “young mental health staffer” (69), that he is beholden to “strict methodological limits” 
that are designed to try and help helpless patients (71), and that he is not even “an M.D. yet 
but a resident” (71) and too young to be dealing with “hell” itself (651). He relies on the 
textbook definition of her illness because he literally has no other option. This does not make 
the medical language in Infinite Jest evil or incorrect. There are two versions of Poor Tony’s 
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seizure, for example. In the body of the novel the seizure scene is full of rich imagery, of pain 
like “the sharp end of a hammer,” the “squeak and rush of release inside his skull,” the way 
he “flopped around” like a “gaffed fish” (305). In the endnotes, however, there is a rather less 
affecting, academic definition of a seizure as a, “quote ‘episode of excessive neuronal 
discharge manifested by motor, sensory and/or [psychic] dysfunction, with or without 
unconsciousness . . .’” (1004n. 103). This description is not wrong. Like the patchwork 
anatomy of the Bad Thing in “Trillaphon,” the main, emotional narrative is not supposed to 
be a completely accurate account of illness but a description of what it feels like to Poor Tony 
specifically. The same can be said of Cusk and his anxiety disorder in The Pale King. As Hawkins 
puts it, the “drama in pathography . . . is no worse a distortion of reality than is the biomedical 
myopia of the case report” (13). The glass wall works both ways. The therapists in Wallace’s 
stories are not one-dimensional but in there, trying to peer through the wall and failing. The 
patients on the other side are suffering for real, and want to be helped. Each half of the story 
is valid, and Wallace’s work—which allows that “sitting there at the foot of a bed looking at 
somebody who was in so much psychic pain she wanted to commit suicide was incredibly 
depressing and boring and unpleasant” (69)—has as much sympathy for the doctor as it does 
for the patient in this situation. Therapy is not an evil in Wallace’s work, it simply throws a 
spotlight on how universally difficult it is for one soul to ever know another.104  
In an interview around the time that Broom was published, when it was suggested to 
Wallace that he “seems to impale modern psychotherapy,” Wallace’s response was that “I 
tend only to be able to have people say stuff that I think is serious if I’m simultaneously making 
fun of the character. I think that’s a weakness” (Conversations 9-10). This “weakness,” as 
Wallace saw it, is evident throughout his career, beginning as early as “Trillaphon” with the 
doctor named “Kablumbus” (5). The name reads like the combination of Columbus and 
blundering, implying that we should not expect the doctor to be a helpful guide on the 
narrator’s journey—on his anti-depressants—to his new world. The doctor in this story is by 
no means useless or incompetent, however. It is patient’s personal experience of illness and 
                                                          
104 Wallace’s glass walls are isolating whenever they appear. The tennis students in Infinite Jest play, for example, 
in a hollowed out area where any outside noise is “muffled” by the “spectators’ glass panel” (261). This 
glass is “like an aquarium’s glass,” so “thick and clean” that it makes the spectators’ sound “like the trapped 
survivors of something” and the players like they’re in “total silence” (261).  
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his medication that are entirely idiomatic and therefore unknown. The sad fact is that mental 
illness is ultimately suffered alone, and that the doctor, who can send the narrator to an 
arguably better place, cannot be anything but a bad guide because he necessarily has no 
access to the narrator’s interior. As the narrator writes, the true horror is the “realiz[ation] 
you’re under glass” (10): the realization that you are trapped in a place where whoever looks 
at you will not see what you need them to see.  
 
“A hell for one” 
The Sylvia Plate joke in Infinite Jest comes just one page after Mario reflects that it is 
“increasingly hard to find valid art that is about stuff that is real” (592). Mario is referring 
specifically to Joelle’s radio show that has gone off the air, yet the proximity of these allusions 
to two absent female artists (Joelle and Plath) is striking. Plath seems to have been a similarly 
valid, vital source for Wallace, especially when it came to writing Infinite Jest’s and The Pale 
King’s three most central female characters—Joelle, Kate, and Meredith. This poses a 
significant challenge to Toal’s argument that Wallace uses his female characters as mere 
“cipher[s],” a means to fleetingly define the illness that besets the novel’s more important 
men (317).105 Though all three are depthful enough without Plath’s help, the connection 
deepens their characters and informs their complicated relationship with therapy and 
therapists. While it is true that, as Janet Badia points out, reading The Bell Jar has become 
something of a “rite of passage” for young women (132) and therefore a cliché much mocked 
on television shows such as Family Guy (125), Wallace’s project in Infinite Jest is in part about 
recognising that there is “weight to yet another cliché” (610). There is nothing narrowly 
gendered or shallow about the way that Wallace represents depression: it is not some “empty 
but fixed diagnostic frame for selfhood” (Toal 305), nor a means to pathologize a 
contemporary “crisis in masculinity” (306), but a purposeful evil and a living nightmare for 
anyone who suffers it. 
                                                          
105 Toal also suggests that Wallace’s portrayal of depression in “The Depressed Person” as a “selfish and banal” 
condition is a consequence of the “difference of gender” of the story’s central character (322). Following 
on from my discussion of “The Depressed Person” above, my discussion in the rest of this chapter will make 
it doubly clear that unlike Kate, this ‘depressed’ character has no idea what depression actually feels like. 
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Having established the metaphorical divide between patient and therapist across 
Wallace’s therapy fictions, we can turn now to the other half of the picture: mental illness 
itself, and the language Wallace uses to describe the self that suffers it. In this final section, I 
will reveal how the metaphor of glass and the bell jar works alongside the heightened, 
religious metaphors of fire and hell that Wallace uses to describe pain. In Infinite Jest in 
particular, the metaphors of glass and fire are intimately linked. Wallace establishes this 
pattern early on, in the first Orin Incandenza chapter. Orin, Joelle’s ex-partner and Hal’s 
brother, is beset in his first chapter by the “heat just past the glass doors” coming from a sun 
that was “like a sneaky keyhole view of hell” (43). In the other direction, behind the door of 
Orin’s self, he is experiencing a private kind of hell, “entombed” as he is on this morning in 
“psychic darkness” (42). We have a hell within, largely invisible to those outside of Orin, and 
a hell without, just about kept at bay by the glass door. Plath’s metaphors are coded 
throughout this scene. It is here that we learn, for instance, about Orin’s technique of 
suffocating cockroaches with glass tumblers (like mini bell jars), which foreshadows Orin’s 
eventual demise at the end of the book when he is trapped in a giant “inverted glass . . . the 
size of a cage,” through which he is unable to get his captors to “acknowledge anything he 
said” (971-72). Whether we read this “surreal and bizarre” (972) event as a literal encagement 
or a metaphor for depression catching up with Orin—which no therapist can “acknowledge” 
through the glass—Plath’s influence on Orin’s beginning and end seem clear. Inside the glass 
cage the fire inside you cannot be seen or communicated, because the “heat” is kept “just 
past the glass” (43).106 Infinite Jest is Wallace’s most sustained study of depression and mental 
illness, and in the rest of this chapter I will focus on it and Kate Gompert, the novel’s most 
severely depressed character, in particular.  
                                                          
106 This image occurs throughout the novel, such as when Wallace describes the “sun” having “the attenuated 
autumn quality of seeming to be behind several panes of glass” (623). The combination of fire and glass 
appears in The Pale King, too. A short chapter begins: “Dream: I saw rows of foreshortened faces over which 
faint emotions played like the light of distant fire” (255). The narrator explains that this dream was “my 
psyche teaching me about” terrible, haunting “boredom,” and he recalls his anxiety as a child about the ill-
defined boredom of adulthood on the horizon: “it was an anxiety whose lack of a proper object is what 
made it horrible, free-floating. I’d look out the window and see the glass instead of anything past it” (256-
57). The fire inside the adults, the pain they experience when they suffer endless boredom, is as yet an 
abstraction to the child, who cannot get past the glass to really feel it.  
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Depression in both Wallace’s and Plath’s work is not just an absence of “vitality” 
(Solomon, Noonday 443) but a present and malign horror. Wallace clearly understood that 
the mind is not separate from the body, yet he consistently describes the soul as if it is 
somewhat separate to the mental and physical illness it suffers. In order to understand 
Wallace’s approach to illness we need to expand our picture of his influences once more. I 
will return to Plath again at the end of this chapter, but first we must look beyond the 
boundaries of twentieth-century literature. Like Andrew Solomon’s The Noonday Demon 
(2001) and William Styron’s Darkness Visible (1989), two of the better known memoirs about 
depression published around the turn of the millennium, Wallace’s Infinite Jest borrows from 
great works out of the Western canon that are preoccupied with the soul and hell. As Styron 
writes, when we describe the “veritable howling tempest in the brain” with the “innocuou[s]” 
word ‘depression,’ it warrants from others a reaction “akin to . . . ‘You’ll pull out of it’ or ‘We 
all have bad days’” (36-37). Thus, where Solomon takes his term for depression from the 
Bible’s Psalm 91:6 (“nor for the destruction that wasteth at noonday”), Styron takes his from 
Milton’s description of Hell in Paradise Lost (1674), in which “darkness” is not just the absence 
of light but the presence of shadow: 
A dungeon horrible, on all sides round 
As one great furnace flamed, yet from those flames 
No light, but rather darkness visible 
Served only to discover sights of woe, 
. . . 
. . . torture without end (1.61-67) 
We saw in the introduction that the writers who make Wallace "feel human and 
unalone" (Conversations 62) all seem to fall, significantly, into what might loosely be called a 
counter-enlightenment tradition. It is not the materialism of Hobbes and Hume that gives 
Wallace comfort, but the soulfulness (in the literal sense that their writing is full of the spirit 
and the soul) of writers such as Socrates, St. Paul, Rousseau, and John Donne. Keeping this 
and Wallace's early map of his method in "Trillaphon" in mind, it is enlightening to note that 
Infinite Jest is informed by three key sources that describe human beings in essentialist terms: 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet (c.1600), William Blake’s The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1794), and 
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William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902).107 In their own ways, each of 
these texts rejects what James calls “Medical materialism” (19), the mode of thought that 
gleefully diagnoses “our own more exalted soul-flights by calling them ‘nothing but’ 
expressions of our organic disposition” (19). Though James was much “bemoaned” at the time 
for his “personal credulousness” (Bradley x), he does not deny that the “mental machinery” 
(the biological material) is the primary source of human behaviour. He only argues with the 
medical materialist assumption that “explaining th[e] origin” of our “soul’s vital secrets . . . 
simultaneously explain[s] away their significance” (17). Blake, in a similar vein, challenges the 
empirical zeal of his own time, writing that though our senses are “ever so acute,” “Man’s 
perceptions are not bound by organs of perception; he perceives more than sense . . . can 
discover (“There is No Natural Religion” 8).108 As we saw in “Good Old Neon,” all of Wallace’s 
characters have interior lives that are “clos’d” to others’ “senses five” (Blake, Marriage [Plate 
6-7]). Each of these three sources is animated by the tension between materialism (“this 
quintessence of dust” [Hamlet 257]) and essentialism (“infinite in faculties . . . how like a god” 
[257]). In each of them there is more to human beings than meets the eye.  
                                                          
107 As David H. Evans argues, James’s Principles of Psychology and The Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion—later 
published as The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902)—is a key source for Wallace in Infinite Jest. Evans 
notes that when Wallace first describes Kate Gompert he draws explicitly on James’s description of his own 
depression (187-88), further expanding the network of influences in that early scene. William Blake’s 
Marriage, a religious epic about the conflict between good and evil, is the source for one of James 
Incandenza’s films: “Pre-Nuptial Agreement of Heaven and Hell. . . . Animated w/ uncredited voices; 35 
mm.; . . . God and Satan play poker with Tarot cards for the soul of an alcoholic sandwich-bag salesman” 
(988n. 24). Not only does Infinite Jest, in its penultimate chapter, flash back to when this fictional film was 
being made (971), but the novel was originally intended to open with a reference to “Blake’s Marriage . . 
.—followed by various definitions of addict and addiction” (Moore). Blake ties a loose thread through the 
novel. Finally, Hamlet’s plot structure, family dynamic, and its concern with mortality and madness—what 
Polonius calls the “flash and outbreak of a fiery mind” (230)—clearly maps onto Wallace’s novel, as we saw 
in chapter 2. 
108 As Matthew J. A. Green explains in Visionary Materialism in the Early Works of William Blake (2005), Blake 
was “far from rejecting empiricism entirely” (14). Green suggests that Blake is best understood as a 
materialist, Enlightenment writer, who shared with Locke a commitment to “mental liberty . . . and even to 
free enquiry over institutional authority and public opinion” (17), but who ultimately objects to the “narrow 
bounds within which Locke confines” the self (18).  
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Wallace’s work is part of the same spiritual tradition championed by the three 
Williams. Though James was a scientist and not a fiction writer, he understood that it made 
absolute sense to write about depression as a force of evil and its victims as “Sick Soul[s]” 
(104). In Infinite Jest, Wallace matches his description of depression to James’s exactly. Just 
as James moves through the different types of depression, from “mere passive joylessness 
and dreariness, discouragement . . . anhedonia” (117) to, on the next page, “A much worse 
form . . . positive and active anguish, a sort of physical neuralgia wholly unknown to healthy 
life” (118-19), Wallace uses the same terms to describe Hal’s “anhedonia . . . a kind of spiritual 
torpor” (692) before describing, over the next couple of pages, “the Great White Shark of 
pain. . . . It is a level of psychic pain wholly incompatible with human life as we know it. It is a 
sense of radical and thoroughgoing evil” (695). Wallace uses the same heightened, religious, 
entirely appropriate language to describe depression: it is a manifest “evil,” something 
“incompatible” with the human soul that suffers it. Siri Hustvedt argues that we “continue to 
live in a world of medical materialism” (Living, Thinking, Looking 29), one in which we expect 
easy answers about illness from “fMRI or PET scans with their colored highlights” (26). No 
scan of our brain matter can tell us much about an individual’s mental illness, however, 
because illness is “too mixed up with external stimuli and the personality of the sufferer” (26). 
In Infinite Jest, “personality” is just one character’s “personal term for soul” (810). As we know 
from chapter 2, in Wallace’s work there is always someone in there, and someone, therefore, 
who is suffering.  
Wallace uses the language of hell throughout Infinite Jest, especially when he writes 
about Kate Gompert. Like Plath’s Esther, who “had to live in hell before [she] died, to make 
up for missing out on it after death” (Bell Jar 214), Kate lives inside a “hell for one” (696). The 
“authoritative,” medical materialist term for her condition, “psychotic depression” (696), 
pales in comparison to her felt reality:  
The person in whom Its invisible agony reaches a certain unendurable level will 
kill herself the same way a trapped person will eventually jump from the 
window of a burning high-rise. Make no mistake about people who leap from 
burning windows. Their terror of falling from a great height is still just as great 
as it would be for you or me standing speculatively at the same window just 
checking out the view; i.e. the fear of falling remains a constant. . . . falling to 
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death becomes the slightly less terrible of two terrors. It’s not desiring the fall; 
it’s terror of the flames. And yet nobody down on the sidewalk, looking up and 
yelling ‘Don’t!’ and ‘Hang on!’, can understand the jump. Not really. You’d have 
to have personally been trapped and felt flames to really understand a terror 
way beyond falling. (696-97) 
Wallace makes the point here that the depressed person is not insane, only acting precisely 
as a sane person would if they were surrounded by flames: the terror is as “great as it would 
be for you or me.” Though Wallace stresses the invisibility of the pain by pointing to observers 
“on the sidewalk” too far away to see and understand the internal experience of the person 
at the edge of the jump, the distinction between the person within the building and the 
people without is one of circumstance only. The argument on these pages is very clear. 
Wallace uses the language of maths and logic—“fear of falling remains a constant” (696, my 
emphasis)—to communicate the fact that for the suicidal person, though their actions look to 
a sane observer like insanity, their choice to jump is a sane response to pain. Using a similar 
rhetorical mode, Wallace writes: 
Think of it this way. Two people are screaming in pain. One of them is being 
tortured with electric current. The other is not. The screamer who’s being 
tortured with electric current is not psychotic: her screams are circumstantially 
appropriate. The screaming person who’s not being tortured, however, is 
psychotic, since the outside parties making the diagnoses can see no 
electrodes or measurable amperage. One of the least pleasant things about 
being psychotically depressed on a ward full of psychotically depressed 
patients is coming to see that none of them is really psychotic, that their 
screams are entirely appropriate. . . . Thus the loneliness: it’s a closed circuit: 
the current is both applied and received from within. (696) 
Kate’s private interior identity is erased by the clumsy definition of her as the “psychotically 
depressed on a ward full of psychotically depressed,” while phrases like “outside parties” and 
“circumstantially appropriate” read like a kind of legalese, demonstrating just how far 
removed those parties are from Kate’s felt reality, because, absurdly, they rely on “see[ing] . 
. . measurable” evidence for pain that’s only “within.” As Hustvedt writes, the “notion that 
degrees of pain can be charted by numbers is ludicrous but routine. The attempt to avoid 
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ambiguity only increases it” (Shaking Woman 181). It is a “different world inside” (Infinite Jest 
459), so Wallace flips the sane and insane parties on their heads, turning the logical argument 
in favour of the sufferers themselves. The insane person’s reasoning follows simple cause and 
effect, as the last sentence makes clear: loneliness is a certainty: there is no escape: the 
sufferer is alone with the pain. Wallace gives space to the arguments of both parties on both 
sides of the glass wall, which are at complete odds but equally reasonable as far as each party 
is concerned. The doctors diagnose Kate as psychotic (there is no circuit in reality), but from 
her perspective there is nothing more real.  
Though Kate’s is the worst of all worlds, the fire and hell imagery that Wallace uses to 
describe the experience of the “so-called ‘psychotically depressed’ person” (696) is part of a 
pattern of imagery that runs throughout the entire novel. For example: when Hal breaks down 
in the first chapter, and the university admissions team try to describe the horrific sounds he 
had made, one says his face looked “As if he was strangling. Burning. I believe I’ve seen a 
vision of hell” (14). This idea that hell is privately contained is emphasised when Hal is taken 
to the hospital on a gurney, with the sun so bright he is “forced to roll [his] closed eyes either 
up or to the side to keep the red cave from bursting into flames” (16).109 The eyes as a window 
onto the soul trapped in hell is later echoed when Joelle, who is “knelt vomiting” following 
her attempt to commit suicide, sees “searchlit helicopters” in the night “against the fire of 
her closed lids’ blood” (240). Poor Tony, during a terrible period of Withdrawal, is raped by 
the personification of the passing of “Time,” which, like a Miltonic demon, “spread him and 
entered him roughly and had its way and left him again” (302-03). The consequence of Poor 
Tony’s poor choices in withdrawal is that he has a “seizure—a kind of synaptic firefight in [his] 
desiccated temporal lobes” (304). This “firefight” lights his descent into a private underworld 
(when he has his seizure he is literally on an underground train) where he sees “the fiery violet 
aura around the heads of the respectables who’d quietly retreated . . . each inside a hood of 
violet flame” (304). Like the description of Kate in a building on fire, Poor Tony is inside a 
private hell that only he can see. Just before Poor Tony is killed at the end of the novel, as he 
flees from Ruth van Cleve, his “breaths” are said to feel “flamish” (721). Addicts in AA are 
                                                          
109 Severs notes, interestingly, that Hal’s initials, HI, are in Japanese Buddhism the character for “fire, one of the 
five elements and associated physically with body heat and mentally with passion” (112). 
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themselves described as being “like Hindenburg-survivors” (349, my emphasis), escapees 
from flames of a different sort, and it seems significant that Gately, a recovering addict, has a 
smoking spot at Ennet House “on the fire escape” (194). Gately has memories of his mother 
trying to “ward off the blows” from her abusive partner “with a fluttered downward motion 
of her arms and hands, as if she were beating out flames” (447). His mother also sank into a 
depression when she would inevitably fail to stay sober, and “After a few weeks of this she’d 
spend a whole day weeping, beating at herself as if on fire” (449).110 
These images perhaps occur and reoccur in Gately’s mind because, for much of the 
novel’s second half, after he is shot in the shoulder, his “shoulder blooms with colorless fire” 
(619). It is significant that the fire is “colorless,” because this implies that it does not register 
on the visible spectrum and is therefore invisible to anyone except Gately. This does not 
mean, of course, that the pain does not exist: in hospital with his whole “right side . . . on 
fire,” Gately feels the pain is “like scream-and-yank-your-charred-hand-off-the-stove-type 
pain” (815). The pattern of fire imagery in Infinite Jest is clearly sustained and substantial. Just 
as an outside observer cannot see the colourless, invisible fire inside the minds of Gately and 
Kate Gompert, neither can they hear the “inaudible scream” that “resound[s]” inside the 
anxious Cusk (Pale King 335), nor the “soundless interior scream” of Poor Tony (Infinite Jest 
304). Invisible, inaudible, colourless, soundless: each characters’ private experience of pain is 
inaccessible to anyone outside them, especially to doctors on the other side of the glass. 
As Esther says in The Bell Jar, “I hated the very idea of the eighteenth century, with all 
those smug men writing tight little couplets and being so dead keen on reason” (131). 
Depression cannot be enlightened by language or the senses, and the case report is too 
“tight” and “reasonable” to articulate hell itself. When Esther plans her suicide, she describes 
“what [she] wanted to kill” as something that does not reside in the “skin” or the “pulse” (the 
material stuff of the body) but “somewhere else, deeper, more secret, and a whole lot harder 
to get at” (156). Similarly, in her poem “Elm,” Plath’s speaker says she is “inhabited by a cry. 
                                                          
110 This metaphor appears to have been much on Wallace’s mind at this time: in his interview with Larry 
McAffery, a few years before Infinite Jest was finally published, he notes that in healthier, non-“Western-
industrial” cultures, “getting rid of the pain without addressing the deeper cause would be like shutting off 
a fire alarm while the fire’s still going” (Conversations 23). 
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/ Nightly it flaps out / Looking, with its hooks, for something to love. / I am terrified by this 
dark thing / That sleeps in me” (Ariel 18). The “dark thing” is manifest, separate to the self it 
hooks into and “inhabit[s].” Depression, in Infinite Jest, is similarly malign. Wallace describes 
James Incandenza Sr.’s moods as “surround[ing] him like a field” (498), an idea that is echoed 
in the next section when Ken Erdedy sees that depression “seemed, though unmentioned, to 
hang fog-like just over the room’s heads” (504). By the end of the novel, when Hal is in serious 
withdrawal and heading towards his breakdown, he feels as though “Something like a shadow 
flanked the vividness and lucidity of the world” (896). These three scenes might be read 
figuratively, but alongside Wallace’s other descriptions of illness we are invited, I suggest, to 
take them literally. Geoffrey Day and Kate Gompert, for instance, seem to echo Plath’s 
descriptions very closely when they describe depression as a “total horror. . . . It rose in me, 
out of me. . . . I can say and mean only shape, dark, and either billowing or flapping . . . the 
shadow of the wing of the thing” (649; 651). Plath and Wallace do not portray depression as 
some vapid, “commodified subjectivity” (Toal 305). Like Plath’s winged, hooking creature, the 
shadowy monsters in Wallace are all too real.111  
Perhaps one reason Wallace is so critical of Elizabeth Wurtzel in “The Depressed 
Person” is that Wurtzel “imagines that depression is the self—fundamentally and essentially. 
Neither a condition to be cleared up nor a means to be employed, depression is and always 
will be a constitutive part of who she is” (Cheever 360). Debra Beilke traces two very different 
approaches to the representation of mental illness in literature. Looking in particular at Kay 
Redfield Jamison’s An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness (1995) and Kate 
Millett’s The Loony-Bin Trip (1990), Beilke argues that the two writers’ different approaches 
to the self in relation to illness have drastic consequences. Millett, on the one hand, is an 
“antipsychiatr[ic]” (33) and defensive writer, whose “lash[ing] out at psychiatry” and at the 
“diagnosis of mental illness” is a consequence of the fact that Millett (like Wurtzel) 
                                                          
111 Tom Shippey argues that when J. R. R. Tolkien describes Mordor in The Lord of the Rings (1955) as the place 
“where the shadows are” (qtd. in Shippey 129), he is making a metaphysical point about the nature of evil. 
Evil, in Tolkien’s work, appears to be both the absence of good and the presence of a malign force: “absence 
can take on a kind of life, can become presence – as it does for instance in Milton’s presentation of Death 
in Paradise Lost (129). Like Milton’s (and Styron’s) “darkness visible” (Paradise Lost 1.63), depression, in 
Wallace’s work, is not just the absence of light but the presence of darkness.  
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“conceptualizes her mind and her self as identical. . . . Therefore, psychiatric professionals 
who label her as ‘sick’ are dismissing her core self, her basic identity” (32). Jamison, on the 
other hand,  
separates her ‘real self’—or at least her idea of her real self—from the 
extremes in moods and behaviour she experiences cyclically. Statements such 
as . . . ‘a feeling as foreign to my natural self as being bored or indifferent to 
life’—all imply that mood extremes are not an expression of the real self, but 
of something else. (36) 
Like William James, Jamison is a scientist who “consistently and insistently refers to manic 
depression as an illness of biological origin,” but she also maintains some sense of a “core 
self—whatever that is, wherever it is located”—which is separate from her mind and body 
(36). Beilke argues that Millett’s “project can be counterproductive” (37). Though the idea 
that you are being attacked by some malign force is not as factual as the idea that the force 
is part of you, it is nevertheless “empowering” (37) and can feel true for the person with the 
illness.112  
Wallace’s work directly addresses this problem. In his 1987 story, “Solomon 
Silverfish,” for example, the character Sophie Silverfish is “cage[d]” inside a body with cancer 
(HRC 29.13, 7). Sophie feels “remote . . . unconnected” from her “shrinking” body (8), and she 
is saved, in some of Wallace’s most moving pages, by her husband’s stubborn Cartesianism. 
Unlike her doctors, Solomon Silverfish “knows that a sick Sophie is still in every important way 
a Sophie, not a collection of sticks and tubes” (10). This rock hard belief makes him “a magic 
person” to her, and the reason she is able to have “such a love for him in her soul that it was 
saving her even in very mortal sickness” (11, my emphasis). Solomon reminds his wife that 
“she is sick, instead of sickness. That what she is is not just what is in her” (11). As Wallace 
                                                          
112 This view runs somewhat counter to Susan Sontag’s argument, in Illness as Metaphor (1978), that illnesses 
such as cancer should be “de-mythicized,” because so “long as a particular disease is treated as an evil . . . 
not just a disease, most people with cancer will indeed be demoralized by learning what disease they have” 
(7). Though David B. Morris acknowledges the importance of Sontag’s landmark essay, he argues that “the 
effort to cleanse illness of all meaning discounts the therapeutic benefit that positive myths and meaning 
can supply” (270). 
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puts it in a later essay, “It’s your body that dies, after all” (Both Flesh 8). Sophie’s body is 
mortal but her soul is not. 
Mental illness is more complicated because it does not just attack the body but the 
thinking thing itself. Wallace consistently describes the horror of depression, what he simply 
calls “It,” as something that is both separate to the soul and absolutely bound up with it:  
It is a nausea of the cells and soul. It is . . . thoroughly painful and malignant 
and antagonistic to the self, which depressed self It billows on and coagulates 
around and wraps in Its black folds and absorbs into Itself. (Infinite Jest 696) 
Is the soul itself sick? Or is it imprisoned within a sick body and brain? “All of a sudden it sort 
of dawns on you,” says “Trillaphon”’s narrator, “that the Bad Thing is able to do this to you 
because you’re the Bad Thing yourself! The Bad Thing is you” (12). The narrator recognises 
the biological origin of his disease. He refers to his neuroses as “pop[ping] up all over the 
inside of my brain, sort of like wrinkly gray boils” (7), a description that locates a psychological 
problem explicitly within the brain’s grey matter and the physicality of the mind. The narrator 
is also uncomfortable with words like self and essence: he italicises “your self” (12) and 
hesitates when he refers to “your very . . . very essence” (11). At the same time, despite his 
ostensible hesitation the narrator does still use these terms, and describes the Bad Thing as 
“attack[ing] you” (11), as an antagonistic threat. 
Abigail Cheever argues that questions about the “relation between depression and its 
sufferer . . . prove more striking for what they suggest about selfhood than about depression” 
(350). Wallace’s story suggests that what the Bad Thing does to a person is enough to override 
the debate. As Hawkins puts it, sceptical criticism and theory about the “self” is made to 
“seem artificial, mandarin, and contrived” in pathographical writing where the self is 
“confronted with serious and life-threatening illness” (17): those “fictions, metaphors, and 
versions of self are contracted into a ‘hard’ defensive ontological reality—primed for action” 
(17). Wallace’s story revolves around this problem, ending—as so many of his fictions do—
with what seems at first to be an unsettling lack of closure. When the narrator hopes that he 
has escaped from the Bad Thing, he realises that this thought “is just highly silly when you 
think about what I said before concerning the fact that the Bad Thing is really” (19), at which 
point the story suddenly ends. The last word is, of course, some version of me, my self, my 
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essence. One interpretation of the ending is that the absence of the word suggests that the 
essence itself does not exist: the word, like the soul, is literally absent from the story. At the 
same time, we might read the severed ending as Wallace refusing to acknowledge this fact, a 
way to make the soul something the reader has to fill in for themselves, that we have to 
believe is there.113 Myths about illness—metaphors such as the soul, evil, hell, and “illness as 
a battle between two opposed forces” (Hawkins 21)—are in many ways untrue but also “the 
way illness is actually experienced by a surprisingly large number of people” (21). Wallace 
puts to the side the fact that depression has nowhere to come from but within the self. By 
talking about his characters as souls trapped inside their sick bodies, Wallace distinguishes 
them from the illness that emerges from those bodies. This both stresses that depression is 
no one’s fault and honours the struggle and suffering of those who have it. As far as Wallace’s 
characters are concerned, and even though they might wish otherwise, their souls are all too 
present.114 
Is a greater appreciation of metaphor the answer for Wallace’s doctors? We like to 
think that therapy is always improving. In a talk given in 1958, Carl R. Rogers could look back 
with “anger” at the “primitive” treatment of Ellen West—the famous anorexic patient of Dr. 
Ludwig Binswanger (165)—confident that if she were alive today the treatment would have 
been better. In West’s own words, she felt trapped “in a glass ball, I see people through a 
glass wall. I scream, but they do not hear me” (175). Rogers is optimistic that with a more 
empathetic approach, that “glass wall would have dissolved” (178). Wallace is never so 
optimistic. Where Rogers advocated “empathy . . . perceiv[ing] the internal frame of reference 
of another” (140), and Bracken and P. Thomas advocate a kind of “diagnosis” that is 
                                                          
113 We saw in chapter 2 that Stonecipher did the same thing, eliding the soul from his discussion—“where the 
body’s hydraulics were adjusted and operated according to the . . . ?” (148)—and, again, forcing the 
reader to fill it in for themselves. 
114 Marshall Boswell has compared the treatment of depression in Wallace’s work to Jeffrey Eugenides’s The 
Marriage Plot (2011), a novel in which Wallace stars—according to Boswell—as the character Leonard. As 
Boswell puts it, “Eugenides depicts Leonard's manic depression as a purely chemical phenomenon managed 
by mood stabilizers and antidepressants,” and Eugenides does not see, as Wallace did, a dependence on 
anti-depressants as a bad thing: “Eugenides depicts Leonard's various attempts to wean himself from his 
drugs not as acts of heroism but as the source of his trouble” (“The Rival Lover” 510). 
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“something other than the doctor defining the patient’s world from the point of view of a 
detached expertise” (133), these seem like impossible dreams in Wallace’s work, especially 
for those characters who suffer most. Kate’s doctor can never put Kate at centre-stage. It is 
not that he chooses to ignore or does not care about her subjective experience, but that he 
is all too aware he will never really understand it. As Wallace puts it, he “was compassionate 
but was not, of course, feeling what she was feeling, and . . . honored her subjective feelings 
by not even trying to pretend that he was” (74). He favours ‘objective’ evidence because he 
literally has no other option. However much Wallace’s therapists are trying—and they are 
trying—the glass wall will always be up.115 
Since Wallace describes the experience of illness so well, do his readers get a better 
understanding of Kate’s experience than her doctor does? Describing the role of fiction, 
Wallace said: “I don’t know what you’re thinking or what it’s like inside you . . . In fiction I 
think we can leap over that wall itself in a certain way” (Conversations 62). In “Think!,” one of 
Isaac Asimov’s stories, a character cheerily predicts that “telepathy” could be put to great 
“use in psychiatry and in the treatment of mental disease” (67), but we can probably be 
thankful that fiction does not work this way. The “intimacy with a character is,” Wallace 
admits, “a delusion” (62). Reading a description of pain is nothing like feeling the pain, and 
even if it was, feeling the pain—at least in our universe—would not enable a therapist to flip 
a switch and make it stop. Even when two people have the same metaphors for the sick soul, 
it does not save them. Kate, for example, has a single moment of respite in the novel, which 
comes in a very short chapter, set at “0245h,” when she sits and talks with Geoffrey Day.116 
In this scene, Kate sits with her “head all the way forward so her forehead touches her foot” 
(648), her body twisted into the “closed circuit” of pain that characterises the psychotically 
depressed person (696) (when Kate is introduced, she also “touche[s] one bare foot with the 
toes of the other foot,” making another closed circuit [72]). Geoffrey explains his own 
                                                          
115 Ellen West is the subject of one of Frank Bidart’s most famous poems, “Ellen West.” Bidart and Rogers both 
refer to the same source text, Rollo May’s Existence (1958), and Bidart quotes directly from West’s journals. 
Briefly mentioned in chapter 2, Bidart’s poem is, like Wallace’s work, profoundly dualist, describing West 
as someone who is “obliterated by her body, / buried in flesh” (In the Western Night 113). 
116 At another point in the novel Kate is comforted by alcohol—which she calls “novocaine of the soul“ (775)—
but in a world full of suffering alcoholics this moment is foreboding, not a relief. 
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experience of the “horror everywhere, distilled and given form. It rose in me, out of me” (649). 
Over the course of the chapter’s few pages and Geoffrey’s description, Kate’s head slowly 
rises from her foot as she begins to see that Geoffrey’s experience gets some way towards 
the feeling of her own horror: “I understood the term hell as of that summer day . . . I 
understood what people meant by hell” (651). Though he cannot “articulate it satisfactorily,” 
it is enough to get Kate to “loo[k] at him” (651); though she is normally warped in on herself, 
Geoffrey’s story resonates with her enough to break the closed circuit of pain between her 
head and foot. This does not save her or stop her pain, of course, but it is still important: 
though it is unhappy and unhopeful, it is the single moment in which Kate feels that someone 
else understands what she is going through.  
Ultimately, for both therapists and patients in Wallace’s fiction, the sad fact is that you 
ultimately suffer alone.117 Thomas is clearly right that therapy is “‘useless’” in Infinite Jest 
(288). However, Wallace’s continued engagement with Plath’s work throughout his career 
shows us that he had much more than parody in mind, and we do a disservice to his writing 
when we assume that he only makes fun of therapeutic practice. Wallace’s therapists are not 
postmodern and parodic, but emerge as part of his critique of postmodernism. Though 
therapy never works in Wallace’s world, what readers can get from reading his fiction is an 
appreciation that the glass wall has two sides. The mental health institutions in Wallace’s 
fiction are not evil prisons but houses for the genuinely sick, and the therapists and doctors 
who work in them are not caricatures. To suggest that they are belittles the tragedy that 
underlies Wallace’s therapy fictions. Though Wallace’s characters are not able to develop the 
constructive relationship that Esther and her therapist do, Wallace’s cynicism is less about the 
                                                          
117 In Reading as Therapy: What Contemporary Fiction Does for Middle-Class Americans (2011), Timothy Aubry 
takes Wallace at his word, arguing that his fiction’s “pragmatic aspiration to alleviate loneliness” is 
“therapeutic” (126). In my view, the glass wall is also a useful metaphor for the relationship between writer 
and reader. Wallace may have a therapeutic effect on a reader, but neither has direct access to the other: 
we ultimately read and write alone. Aubry does not mention Wallace’s therapists, but he builds his 
argument about Infinite Jest on the Alcoholics Anonymous groups in the novel that also “promot[e] 
empathy” (107). Though AA clearly helps some of Wallace’s characters—and is, in this sense, a working 
therapeutic model—it is still a community of individuals who are trapped inside their own heads, who have 
to focus on the “‘In Here’ that protects against a return to ‘Out There’” in order to survive (374). I will discuss 
AA in more detail in chapter 4. 
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therapists themselves and more about the horror they are expected, somehow, to alleviate. 
It is not that his therapists are mere failures. The fact that Wallace’s therapists are unable to 
help but keep trying anyway makes them far more tragic and meaningful than if they weren’t 
bothering to try at all. 
 Wallace is not suggesting that the conscious self should be the solipsistic centre of our 
lives. He’s saying that it is, whether we like it or not. The existence of the private, subjective, 
interior self is axiomatic in Wallace’s work. The problem is not how you dispel this naïve 
humanist fantasy, but how you survive the “Cartesian nightmare” we all live in (Both Flesh 
93).118 The neuroscientific or posthuman explanation of the interior self (i.e. that it simply 
does not exist) does not help people who are reminded of their entrapment on a daily basis, 
whether by illness or addiction or simply by being alive. As Solomon says of himself: “I have 
discovered what I would have to call a soul, a part of myself I could never have imagined until 
one day, seven years ago, when hell came to pay me a surprise visit” (Noonday 443). We can 
see then that the soul is a vital and complicated metaphor for Wallace. Wallace’s souls are 
trapped within the walls of their machines, and behind the glass walls that are automatically 
raised between therapist and patient. By using the metaphor of the soul, Wallace honours 
patient and therapist alike: both are alive and encaged and tragically unable to connect with 
one another. Wallace of course understands that mental illness and the mind are material, 
yet he also rejects the medical materialist model of selfhood, recognising that however untrue 
it is that human beings literally have a core self that suffers from their illness, it does no service 
to the people suffering to pretend that they are not in there to suffer. In chapter 4, we will 
consider Wallace’s America in more detail, and the role the soul plays in a society driven by 
                                                          
118 Rachel Greenwald Smith argues that literary critics’ “privileging of the ‘single human being’ as the location of 
feeling” in contemporary fiction “dramatically coincide[s] with the prevailing focus on the individual in 
contemporary society” (425-26). She argues that novelists such as Richard Powers should not be talked 
about as “humanist-realists” because that kind of reading has no “critical edge,” and suggests that if we 
ignore contemporary fiction’s postmodernist innovation in order to emphasise its “affirm[ation]” of “the 
individual human” instead, our critical readings will simply “naturaliz[e]” the “neoliberal ideology” that 
plagues us (439). My view is that Wallace’s experimental energies are in service of his own affirmation of 
the individual: these are not mutually exclusive. To affirm the existence of the thinking thing does not 
necessarily mean you advocate neoliberal selfishness or solipsism. Wallace’s souls are sick, not imperious. 
Their existence is a tragic fact, not a political statement. 
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technology that encourages its surrender. In this final chapter, we will also explore further 
the relationship between soul and body in Wallace’s work, and how their conflict makes a 
self.   
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Chapter 4 
“(At Least) Three Cheers for Cause and Effect”: Free Will, 
Addiction, and the Self 
 
Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by such slight ligaments 
are we bound to prosperity or ruin. 
—Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (33) 
“Both flesh and not” 
In his essay on the filmmaker David Lynch, Wallace argues that the “bothness” in Lynch’s 
films—an inherent ambiguity that frustrates the audience—is a marker of serious art: “we 
hate this ‘both’ shit,” he writes, it is what “we go to the movies to get a couple hours’ fucking 
relief from” (Supposedly 211). From his severed, ambiguous endings to the “second voice” 
that speaks in his footnotes (“Charlie Rose” 18:13-18:14), Wallace’s fiction thrives on 
bothness. This is especially true of Wallace’s characters, constructed as they are out of both 
body and soul. Consider Wallace’s ambiguous response when asked in an interview about his 
philosophical and mathematical beliefs: 
Personally, yeah, I’m a Platonist. I think that God has particular languages, and 
one of them is music and one of them is mathematics. That’s not something I 
can defend. It’s just something I’ve felt in my tummy since I was a little kid. 
(Conversations 123)  
How do we reconcile Wallace’s gut feeling (i.e., a material sense) that immaterial truths exist? 
His response is contradictory, because he bases a belief in essentialism on bodied feelings: 
feelings which, by their very materiality, make the immaterial indefensible. This is not just a 
muddled, off-the-cuff metaphor given in an interview, but a consistent bothness that shapes 
Wallace’s characters through all of his work. In Girl a character says he was “kicked roundly 
in the psychic groin” (153), alluding to a mind (the “psych[e]”) that is embodied and can 
therefore be wounded. In Infinite Jest, Wallace describes the “grip on [Orin’s] soul’s throat” 
(46) and “a kind of peritontitis of the soul” (346), both of which embody that soul, giving it a 
throat and a peritoneum to hurt. In Oblivion he refers to “blood-fed minds” (17), firmly 
attaching the mind to the bodied brain, yet in his essay on Roger Federer he refers to the 
tennis player as being “both flesh and not” (Both 5), implying there is more to the mind than 
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that which is blood-fed. Wallace’s ghosts, though dramatically detached from their bodies, 
still take corporeal shape: James Incandenza and Blumquist look like they did in life (they are 
clothed and appear to walk around), just as Lucien dies and “finds his gut and throat again 
and newly whole” (Infinite Jest 488).  
Wallace clearly, consistently, links the soul to the body, yet also allows that it can exist 
outside of that body. How do we reconcile Wallace’s exacting, scientific portrayal of his 
characters as evolved material beings with his and his characters’ lingering attachment to 
their souls? The two models of mind that we have seen Wallace portray in the previous 
chapters contradict each other: the Cartesian, wilful soul—the ghost sitting in charge of the 
machine it occupies—comes up hard against our contemporary posthuman understanding of 
consciousness as mere illusion, something which operates under the delusion that it is in 
control of the body and brain. In chapter 3 we have seen that the soul is an important 
metaphor for Wallace, one which honours the sick souls who are, as William James puts it, 
“congenitally fated to suffer from [the] presence” of “evil” (108). One of the major 
philosophical problems that Wallace raises with his bothness of body and soul is that of free 
will. Are Wallace’s characters autonomous? Do they have power over the own fate? Is the 
unconscious machine or the wilful ghost who haunts it in charge? 
This problem has profoundly deep roots, with much of the history of Western 
philosophy revolving around the question of free will. According to Robert Kane, free will is 
usually defined as being in opposition to a deterministic understanding of the natural world, 
which holds that people’s “actions might be determined or necessitated by factors unknown 
to them and beyond their control” (5). Kane and other contemporary philosophers organise 
the many nuanced positions on this problem into one of two categories, depending on 
whether the position places more emphasis on free will, on the one side of the equation, or 
determinism on the other.119 Compatibilism, or soft determinism, is the argument that there 
is no conflict between determinism and free will. We obviously cannot choose our own 
                                                          
119 Complicating these categories is the argument that the universe is not determinist but indeterminist. As Kane 
points out, however, an indeterminist universe is not much use for people looking to prove the existence 
of free will: a universe in which events are governed entirely by chance and randomness does not leave 
much room for choice (23). 
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design, but the universe is such that, even if a choice does not appeal to our inbuilt nature, 
we can still make that choice. Freedom is defined by compatibilists as the “absence of 
constraints” (14), and determinism is not a constraint in this view because we are free to 
make choices in spite of it. Incompatibilism, on the other hand, is the argument that free will 
and determinism cannot be reconciled. To keep things simple, incompatibilists take two basic 
forms. Those incompatibilists who reject free will completely are hard determinists who 
would argue that the choices we make are as much a product of determinism as anything 
else. Libertarians (distinct from the political position), on the other hand, are incompatibilists 
who believe in free will and therefore reject the idea that our lives are determined. This is the 
harder position to defend since it requires an “extra factor or other to explain how free will is 
possible” (39), usually in the shape of an immaterial soul.  
The problem of free will is fundamentally tied up with the problem of mind-body 
dualism: the more the mind or soul is connected to the body (which is governed by the same 
deterministic physical laws as any other material object), the less free it seems to be. 
Throughout the history of Western philosophy, free will is often explored in terms of the 
relationship between body and soul. Plato famously described the soul as a charioteer pulled 
in different directions by two horses, one representing good, lawful reason and the other base 
(bodily) desires. All humans are susceptible to becoming a “slave of irrational passion” 
(Phaedrus 41), but someone with mindful self-discipline can wrestle into balance the 
temptations of the body. For a middle ages philosopher such as Thomas Aquinas, the problem 
of free will was understood from a Christian perspective: if God has foreknowledge, since He 
knows everything that is to happen, do humans have any free will at all? For Aquinas, God is 
responsible for “mov[ing]” the will, but it is still the “will that acts”: humans can still will 
themselves to sin, “though God does not want the will to do this” (561). In the Renaissance 
and with the emergence of modern science the problem of fate or God’s foreknowledge was 
reframed once again, now as the problem of free will in a coldly deterministic, Newtonian 
universe. For Descartes, who allowed that the body is a purely mechanical object, the way to 
preserve free will was to elevate consciousness, the thinking thing, out of and above this new 
worldview. Descartes’s use of mind-body dualism to keep free will intact is a crystallising point 
in the debate, and he has become the figure that modern accounts still build their argument 
around. In the centuries following what Antonio Damasio calls Descartes Error, Cartesian 
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mind-body dualism requires more and more of a leap, and free will, along with the soul, has 
less and less hold. The deterministic nature of the material universe is such a keenly felt 
problem because if we are made of matter then we are necessarily governed by those same 
laws. This is all too clear in a neuroculture in which we understand ourselves to be “essentially 
[our] brains” (Vidal and Ortega 7). Either we invest in a completely immaterial, wilful soul, or 
we have to play down how free the will really is. 
The problem of free will was clearly very important to Wallace. From the letter he 
wrote to the Amherst Student in 1984 about another student’s “selfish (and so warped) idea 
of [his] freedom” to play loud music (“Letter to Amherst”), to Marathe and Steeply’s hilltop 
debate in Infinite Jest about all things American and free—“‘Freedom! Freedom!’ . . . Your 
freedom is the freedom-from” (320)—to Wallace’s portrait, published the year before his 
death, of two young Christians struggling with “what love commands of” them in the story 
“Good People” (2007), it is a problem that animated Wallace across his entire career.  
Where critics have explored this problem in Wallace’s work the focus has largely been 
on Wallace’s honours thesis on fatalism that he submitted to Amherst College’s Department 
of Philosophy in 1985. Fatalism, briefly, is a hard incompatibilist position, and not to be 
confused with determinism itself: as Kane puts it, determinism does not rule out the 
possibility of human beings making choices, but fatalism rules out the possibility of free will 
altogether. Wallace’s thesis has since been re-packaged and -published as Fate, Time, and 
Language: An Essay on Free Will (2011), signalling the turn in Wallace studies towards what 
Adam Kelly has called its third wave and a renewed focus on “Wallace’s philosophical output” 
(“Death of the Author”). The first two major studies in this vein—Gesturing Toward Reality: 
David Foster Wallace and Philosophy (2014) and Freedom and the Self: Essays on the 
Philosophy of David Foster Wallace (2015)—aim to recognise the importance of Wallace’s 
philosophical training and his continued, learned engagement with philosophy throughout his 
writing.120 Freedom in particular is a rigorous assessment of Wallace’s early thesis and its 
                                                          
120 Adam Kelly sees this treatment of Wallace’s philosophy as a development on from the second wave of 
Wallace studies, which had itself tried to move beyond the problem of postmodern irony in order to focus 
instead on “Wallace’s relation to philosophers and theorists” (“Death of the Author”). At this stage, 
however, Kelly argues that the emphasis was not on the philosophical debates themselves but on 
“Wallace’s own assimilation and response to” a particular theorist or philosopher, “with the often explicit 
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contribution to the philosophical field. Though it was not the book’s aim, Wallace’s body of 
fiction receives little attention, addressed only via a quotation or two from Infinite Jest, The 
Pale King, and one or two short stories. Where free will is briefly raised in Gesturing, the 
discussion also tends to revolve around the thesis and, additionally, Wallace’s 
commencement speech, This is Water, with no more than brief references to the fiction in 
between (Durantaye 27; Vermeule 117).  
My aim in this chapter is to expand the discussion about free will in Wallace’s work to 
his sustained engagement with the problem throughout his fiction, where it is felt directly by 
his characters. Though the early thesis is clearly worth our attention, to focus on it alone as 
we interrogate Wallace’s position is problematic, not only because it was written so early in 
the career of someone who came to “think of [him]self as a fiction writer” (Conversations 83), 
but because the thesis does so little to illuminate Wallace’s own position on the problem. The 
aim of the thesis was to address Richard Taylor’s fatalist argument, the idea “that it is not in 
our power to do anything other than what we actually end up doing,” a conclusion Taylor 
arrived at through “a small handful of bland assumptions about logic” (Ryerson 7; 8). 
Wallace’s response is an exercise in semantics, in which he uses Taylor’s own language to 
“make each step of Taylor’s argument perspicuous and explicit so that a fatalist couldn’t find 
any wiggle room” (12), thereby arriving at exactly the sort of “humdrum conclusion” that 
Taylor’s “humdrum assumptions” warranted (13). Wallace himself concludes:  
This essay’s semantic analysis has shown that Taylor’s proof doesn’t “force” 
fatalism on us at all. We should now recall that Taylor was offering a very 
curious sort of argument: a semantic argument for a metaphysical conclusion. 
In light of what we’ve seen about the semantics of physical modality, I hold 
that Taylor’s semantic argument does not in fact yield his metaphysical 
conclusion. And now the fact that it appears as though he can get his 
metaphysical conclusion from his semantic argument only by positing at the 
outset the truth of a doctrine thoroughly metaphysical, seems to warrant the 
following conclusion of our own: if Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon 
                                                          
assumption that Wallace was himself versed in all these figures and engaging in implicit dialogue with them 
in his fiction.” 
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us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics. And 
this seems entirely appropriate. (“Richard Taylor’s ‘Fatalism’” 212-13) 
Wallace’s conclusion points us away from his own thesis: he merely reset the board that 
Taylor unsettled, and there is everything still to play for in the metaphysical question of free 
will. Though Gesturing’s narrow focus on the later work, This is Water, is arguably more 
appropriate, since it is Wallace’s attempt to distil a career’s worth of work, to neglect to 
engage with that entire career in favour of a short text designed to be easily communicable 
does a disservice to the complexity of the problem and Wallace’s engagement with it. For his 
take on these complex metaphysical questions, we need to look to his fiction. 
Daniel R. Kelly and David H. Evans have begun this project. Kelly argues that the “‘one 
big thing’ [Wallace] knew [about] had something to do with the challenges and pitfalls of 
choosing” (111), and he surveys how the problem of free will manifests itself in Wallace’s 
different works: from the problem of addiction in Infinite Jest, to the problem of paying 
attention in The Pale King. David H. Evans’s discussion of free will in Infinite Jest is much more 
focused. Evans argues that the American philosopher William James is a “crucial figure for 
Wallace, a figure with whom he could recognize remarkable parallels” (172), and he points to 
two related concerns that the writers share: “the place of free will in a world where the self 
seemed to have been reduced to an effect of immense inhuman structures and processes” 
and the “possibility of religious belief in a culture dominated by scientific and naturalistic 
assumptions” (172). For James, a “world without choice is a world without agency, and so for 
James a world without humanity” (174). James’s solution, therefore, is to believe in free will 
against all the evidence: “My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will” (qtd. in Evans 
174). Evans argues that Wallace seeks to preserve the same basic humanity in the face of his 
own “postmodern situation,” a society of spectacle and anti-interior postmodern theory that 
“assail[s] the very category of the individual” (175). Though Kelly and Evans do not put their 
position into the terms that Kane describes, both seem to argue that Wallace is a 
compatibilist. Kelly argues that Wallace is someone for whom “life seem[s] to be shot through 
with opportunities for choice” that “can be made well or poorly” (127), while Evans argues 
that his characters come to a point where they can make a “critical choice” to “assert control 
over their own lives” (181), even if that choice is to surrender their free will to a support 
programme.  
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Neither Evans nor Kelly discuss free will in Wallace’s work in terms of consciousness, 
the soul, and embodiment.121 Indeed, Evans implies that Wallace would reject a “Cartesian 
subject or agent that precedes . . . action, something secure from the molestations of ‘physical 
laws’” (175). Yet we know that the Cartesian subject has considerable weight for Wallace. My 
aim in this chapter is to reconsider free will in Wallace’s work in terms of the relationship 
between body and soul. In the vein of the previous chapters, we will also see that Wallace’s 
engagement with the problem of free will forms a significant part of his critique of 
postmodernism. Where postmodern fiction is characterised by indeterminist worlds and will-
less characters, Wallace’s post-postmodern fiction reinvests in deterministic laws and 
addresses the place of free will in that new worldview. One of Wallace’s great themes is 
addiction, and while this has been much discussed, the governing metaphors that Wallace 
uses to describe what addiction does to people, what it does to their souls, have been 
completely neglected. In order to better understand Wallace’s metaphorical treatment of 
addiction, we will start by clearly setting out the nature of the relationship between souls and 
bodies in his work.  
 
Free Will vs. the Body 
Deterministic laws are a problem for individual persons because they govern the material 
stuff of the body. Following the cognitive revolution this is all the more problematic, since we 
now understand that human beings are entirely made of matter. We have seen in chapter 1 
that Wallace’s novels were set inside this worldview. Broom’s city, Infinite Jest’s Boston 
buildings and the United States, and Pale King’s IRS and other civic institutions are models of 
large-scale heads: complex, mechanical systems filled with corridors and wires. §10 of The 
Pale King is one page long and extends this idea. Wallace reflects on the view that a 
“government bureaucracy” is a “‘parasite’” (88), arguing instead that a  
bureaucracy is really much more a parallel world, both connected to and 
independent of this one, operating under its own physics and imperatives of 
                                                          
121 Neither does Michael J. O’Connell, who does argue briefly that Wallace gestures towards some “reality 
beyond biological determinism” (280). Though this, too, is a compatibilist reading of Wallace, it a loosely 
defined point in a broader attempt to situate Wallace’s work in the context of Christianity. 
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cause. One might envisage a large and intricately branching system of jointed 
rods, pulleys, gears, and levers radiating out from a central operator such that 
tiny movements of that operator’s finger are transmitted through that system 
to become the gross kinetic changes in the rods at the periphery. It is at this 
periphery that the bureaucracy’s world acts upon this one. (88) 
Like Wallace’s phrase “both flesh and not” (Both Flesh 5), the description here of something 
being “both connected to and independent of” is, I suggest, Cartesian in origin. Descartes 
knew that the ‘I’ was “not present to my body only in the way that a pilot is present to a ship, 
but that I am very closely joined to it and almost merged with it” (Meditations 64). Recognising 
that the body and mind were connected, Descartes located the point of interaction between 
them in the pineal gland, describing the process as follows: all “movements” and 
“sensations,” he writes, “depend on the nerves, which are like little threads or tubes coming 
from the brain” (Passions 220). The influence goes both ways. Just as the pilot directs the 
body, the body sends its “animal spirits” (220) to the pilot—the prime mover, the soul—to 
have it act in order to keep the body alive. Wallace’s passage describes this same process. The 
“operator” is at the “centr[e]” of this system (like Descartes’ pineal gland, which is “situated 
in the middle of the brain’s substance” [Passions 230]) and causes the physical (“kinetic”) 
movement that ultimately results at the system’s outside edge. The soul “acts upon” the 
world through the mechanistic body, though that body, like a bureaucratic system, can go 
through the motions on its own until it receives orders from on high (which, as in any 
bureaucracy, take a frustratingly long time to filter through).  
Wallace complicates this Cartesian picture of agent and cause, however, in the 
chapter’s second and last paragraph. He writes: “The crucial part of the analogy is that the 
elaborate system’s operator is not himself uncaused. The bureaucracy is not a closed system; 
it is this that makes it a world instead of a thing” (88). With this he writes against Descartes. 
The soul or operator is no longer immaterial, a divine substance that is ultimately separate to 
the whole system. The sequence of cause and effect that seems to originate with the operator 
and move through the body does not in fact begin with him. As Frank Bidart puts it, “We fill 
pre-existing forms and when we fill them we change them and are changed” (Desire 9). 
Wallace’s soul is not a divine, unworldly substance, but is part of the world. 
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If we look to the closing chapter, which continues the analogy of the self as a world 
and institution, we can clarify this further. The closing chapter of the novel is a sparse, 
symbolic sequence set in a timeless space: “The office could be any office” (539). Written in 
an inclusive second person, which suggests that this is a universal experience recognisable to 
any human reader, the narrator tells the reader/addressee that we are “trained observer[s] 
and there is nothing to observe” (539). In this empty space, the addressee is only loosely 
attached to the ground (they recline into their seat until they do “not feel [their] own weight” 
(539)) and they are told that “‘The way we start is to relax and become aware of the body. / 
It is at the level of body that we proceed’” (540). Echoing Burn’s argument that Infinite Jest’s 
severed ending seems to be designed to “break the closed circle and direct the reader outside 
of the book” (Reader’s Guide 29), this final sequence is, on one level, an invitation to the 
reader (a “trained observer”) to close the book (since “there is nothing [more] to observe”) 
and shift their consciousness from the page to their own bodies and the real world they 
inhabit. The strangeness of the abstracted office setting and the ethereal dialogue, however, 
suggests that this chapter should also be read as a model of something universal and timeless. 
The scene, I suggest, can be read as a kind of limbo before birth, with the addressee being a 
consciousness waiting to exist. They are an abstracted, bodiless entity to begin with, without 
weight, and the only way to exist is to enter a body, to fill a form that allows them to 
“proceed” (540) into life (“It is at the level of body that we proceed” [540]). Like all evolved 
creatures, we are embodied in the world through physical forms and our “fate,” as Bidart 
writes, “is to make something—if nothing else, the shape cut by the arc of our lives” (Star 
Dust 10). What the closing sequence tells us is that, metaphorically, we—the soul, the thinking 
thing—can only exist if we are placed inside a body (the machine that houses the ghost; the 
form that houses a soul). This does not bode well for the free will, if it can only exist in a vessel 
that is deterministic and emphatically unfree.  
As Antonio Damasio argues, Descartes’s famous dictum—I think, therefore I am—is 
wrong. Rather, “in the beginning [life] was being, and only later was it thinking. And for us 
now, as we come into the world and develop, we still begin with being, and only later do we 
think” (Descartes’ Error 248). Wallace’s closing scene, I suggest, is a portrayal of how the 
human ‘I’ evolved. The experience, reflects Wallace’s addressee, “is nothing like sleeping” 
(540) because once it fills a form, that form is no longer just a ‘dreaming’ animal (i.e. an 
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unconscious, machine-like being) driven by instinct and impulse, but a form that is filled and 
changed by human consciousness. Wallace recognises that on a grand evolutionary scale, the 
body comes first and the human ‘soul’ comes later, produced by that body and by the 
evolutionary process. This, I suggest, is why Wallace’s ghosts take corporeal shape. Wallace’s 
floating souls still have organs and clothes, because consciousness is a product of the body. 
Wallace’s souls are, paradoxically, bodied souls.  
The soul is traditionally understood as being a separate entity from the material body, 
and is therefore what Kane calls the most “obvious extra-factor strategy” for libertarians 
trying to save free will from the deterministic universe (40). Is Wallace a libertarian? His 
metaphorical presentation of human beings is certainly dualist, insofar as he portrays 
consciousness as something at odds with the body in which it is encaged. However, Wallace 
also continually undercuts the essentialism of his ghosts because the shape they take is 
literally determined by the bodies from which they escape. I suggest that Wallace is a dualist, 
but not a dualist in the traditional sense. He does not separate mind completely from body, 
nor suggest that the mind is literally divine. What he does is metaphorically separate the small 
I, the observer, from the rest of the material body as a way to acknowledge that it still feels 
to people like there is some continuous core part of them that exists, that can think, that can 
be unhappy with the bodies they suffer to live in. The tragedy of human experience has not 
been altered by the cognitive revolution and, as we have seen throughout Wallace’s work, to 
be conscious is to still feel “trapped inside” both a “physical self” and a “psychic self” 
(Conversations 32). Wallace’s souls are “both connected . . . and independent” (Pale King 88), 
both flesh and not: they are a meaningful, historically weighted metaphor for an ‘I’ that, 
though it may not be in charge, is nevertheless the part of the person that has to come to 
terms with the gods or with fate or with the body in which it finds itself. 
 
Free Will after Postmodernism 
In each chapter so far we have explored different ways in which Wallace bridges the 
postmodern with the post-postmodern. Wallace re-instates the writer’s body and brain, 
writing against a portrait of the artist as nothing more than a paper entity, an originless thing 
that stitches together tissues of citations. At the same time, Wallace is putting some faith in 
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the soul, writing against a view of the human being as an amorphous cultural category rather 
than as something unique and distinct from the rest of the animal kingdom. Wallace rewrites 
the relationship between patient and therapist—a relationship often parodied in 
postmodernism—as two souls trying hopelessly to communicate their experience from inside 
the body’s walls. In this final chapter I will bring these ideas together, arguing that Wallace’s 
reinstatement of the stubbornly material body and brain, unlike postmodernism’s boundless, 
textual bodies, paradoxically creates a space—literally, a vessel—for the soul in Wallace’s 
fiction.  
Wallace’s dualistic, humanist conception of character is a direct challenge to a key 
theoretical underpinning of postmodern fiction: the absence of cause, effect, and agency in 
the indeterminist postmodern worldview. In Paradigms of Paranoia: The Culture of 
Conspiracy in Contemporary American Fiction (2005), Samuel Chase Coale puts forward a 
model of the twentieth century’s literary movements that takes into account the scientific 
narratives that were being told alongside them. Coale argues that modernism, for example, 
is built upon a kind of Einsteinian relativity. As a movement it “assaulted” the ailing 
“Enlightenment values of rationality, logic, analysis, and conscious control” that had 
dominated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The determinism of William James’s 
era no longer ruled, because such stable “metanarratives” were replaced with the more 
unsettling explanatory theories of Freud and Einstein. Yet no matter how “fragmented and 
scattered” the reality portrayed in modernist literature might be, there is ultimately, 
“beneath [the] linguistic and structural pyrotechnics” associated with individual, relativistic 
points of view, an “‘author’-ized and recognizable world” that remains constant (2).  
Postmodernism, according to Coales, is built upon Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle 
and the fundamental, indeterminist uncertainty that is a consequence of the quantum 
universe. Postmodernism “extends” modernism’s “basic assault,” and “dismantle[s] and 
undermines those authorized concepts” yet further, “question[ing] every form of authority, 
including that of language itself” (2). The postmodern world is one in which, as Pynchon puts 
it in Gravity’s Rainbow, “cause-and-effect may have been taken as far as it will go” (105). For 
Coale, postmodernist literature “posits no bottom line. It demolishes any notion of origins” 
(3). There is no underlying constant. It is not the observer’s relativistic point of view but reality 
itself that is unreliable. This is an indeterminist universe, one that operates randomly and 
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chaotically. Consequently, postmodern fiction is dominated by a prevailing sense of paranoia. 
In a world (and in novels, such as Gravity’s Rainbow, about that world) that actively resists 
decoding, “Conspiracy, whether actual or theoretical, provides an antidote . . .: everything 
becomes a sign, a clue, a piece of a larger puzzle” (4). 
As Drew-Lynn puts it in Wallace’s story “Westward”: “Postmodernism doesn’t stress 
the efficacy of will, as you know” (Girl 249). Critics such as Peter Boxall and Stephen J. Burn 
have argued that post-postmodern literature breaks with the indeterminist postmodern 
universe in its return to history, family, the body, and causality. In Twenty-First-Century Fiction 
(2013), Boxall argues that theorists are “develop[ing] a new theoretical language with which 
to rethink . . . the stubborn materiality of the body” (16). Where postmodern literature and 
theory portray the ‘human’ as text, a culturally constructed and therefore unstable category, 
post-postmodern writers portray the ‘human’ as a somewhat stable, material entity with a 
shared nature across cultures. This coincides with a change in how writers portray their 
characters. Burn notes that that  
[w]here the emphasis on character seems to differ between postmodern and 
post-postmodern fiction . . . is in the degree of personal history dramatized by 
the author. . . . In, say, William Gaddis’s JR (1975), Coover’s Lucky Pierre, 
DeLillo’s Great Jones Street (1973), or White Noise (1985), the central 
characters—JR Vansant, Pierre, Bucky Wunderlick, Jack Gladney—may largely 
seem to be psychologically credible, but they do, however, seem to have 
emerged more or less out of nowhere. (24) 
Keeping in mind Burn’s argument that “Post-postmodernism explicitly looks back to, or 
dramatizes its roots within, postmodernism” (19), we can see a shift in the work of a number 
of Wallace’s contemporaries from postmodernism’s lack of causality to the central 
importance of “shaping influence[s]” (24).  
The writers discussed in previous chapters—Bidart, Egan, Mitchell, Adrian, Hustvedt, 
Gray—all seem to be part of this shift, recognising, as Jonathan Lethem puts it, that “Your 
parents are the first memo to come across your desk, on a page so large you can’t see past its 
edges” (The Ecstasy of Influence 3). Two friends of Wallace, Jonathan Franzen and Jeffrey 
Eugenides, engage with postmodern indeterminism quite explicitly. Franzen talks about how 
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he “internalized and tried to build on” the way in which Pynchon, in Gravity’s Rainbow, 
“creat[es] an immensely complex world in which conspiracy is the organizing principle” (“Art 
of Fiction”). Franzen explains, however, that in his first novel The Twenty-Seventh City (1988) 
he wanted to “go beyond the unseen conspiracy to a seen conspiracy” (my emphasis). Where 
Pynchon’s novel actively resists clear patterns of cause and effect, Franzen moves away from 
that lack of causality in the family sagas The Corrections (2001) and Freedom (2010), in which 
children are very much the product of their parents. The conspiracy is seen. The characters 
know about genetic influence and recognise the forces that have shaped their own identities: 
“Her granddad had once been a true athlete . . . which was probably where her height and 
reflexes came from” (Freedom 37). They are caused, and they know, to some extent, the 
causes. 
Jeffrey Eugenides’s Middlesex (2002)—narrated by “the most famous hermaphrodite 
in history,” a character with a “male brain” who “was raised as a girl” (19)—is about this same 
seen conspiracy, about coming to terms with one’s own “genetics . . . this map of ourselves . 
. . [that] dictates our destiny” (37). The novel is an epic “Homeric” song of the narrator’s 
journey to reconcile how he feels inside with how the world sees him. He ultimately has to 
come to terms with the “recessive mutation on [his] fifth chromosome” (4), his stubborn 
genetic destiny that pre-determined his life before it started: a sequence of cause and effect 
that cannot be ignored or overridden. Significantly, Middlesex seems to take its structure from 
Salman Rushdie’s seminal postmodern novel Midnight’s Children (1981). Each is arranged into 
“Books” with named chapters, a way for the narrators to organise sprawling narratives that 
begin with a comic amount of space given to the story of the grandparents, then the parents, 
of the narrator who turns up late to his own story.122 Midnight’s Children is organised, in part, 
around the leitmotif of “1,001,” the “number of night, of magic, of alternative realities” (300). 
Saleem says, for example, that there are 1,001 arrests (498) or 1,001 marriage proposals a 
                                                          
122 This narrative structure originates with Laurence Sterne’s The Life and Opinions of Tristam Shandy, Gentleman 
(1767), an influence that Eugenides acknowledges in an interview with 3:AM Magazine: “Of greater 
importance to me” was “the line from Tristram Shandy that runs through Kafka, Günter Grass and 
Rushdie.” In the spirit of chapter 1, Eugenides adds, in an interview with BOMB, that “Literary influence is 
like genetics, too. Rushdie got some of his fireworks from Günter Grass and Gabriel García Márquez. . . . 
But some of my stuff bears no relation to these writers. Different gene pool entirely.” 
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week (271) (see also: 177; 436; 441; 540; 569), and the allusion to the Arabian Nights is a 
constant reminder that Saleem’s narrative is a fabrication, an unreliable history built out of 
other texts. Middlesex, on the other hand, is organised in part around the leitmotif of the 
number “twenty-three”: there are twenty-three predictions made about the gender of 
unborn children (17), or twenty-three pairs of eyes in a room (148) (see also: 147; 403). 
Eugenides’s leitmotif is not a metafictive comment on his narrator’s artificiality but a 
reminder of his biological reality, of the “twenty-three paired chromosomes . . . which 
complicat[e] my life” (16). This is, as Boxall puts it, “past as material history rather than as 
narrative invention” (77). The character’s biology and his history are not just narrative and 
text but are (ostensibly) material facts. Obviously, the character itself is a work of fiction, but 
the novel is built on the idea that material sequences of cause and effect do exist and 
determine the character’s own existence. No longer describing an indeterminist, chaotic 
universe with no possibility for human agency and choice, the post-postmodernists reinvest 
in deterministic laws that create a space for a human agent. If the universe follows 
determinist laws, then human beings are both changed by the world, and, most importantly, 
can make changes to that world. 
 We can see how Wallace fits into this shift by setting The Pale King against another 
illuminating predecessor text from Wallace’s library, one which has so far been undiscussed: 
Joseph Heller’s Something Happened (1974). Something Happened is the unreliable, first-
person account of Bob Slocum, who, like Wallace’s IRS agents, works in a boring office. 
Wallace signals the importance of Heller’s novel in the background of The Pale King when 
Chris Fogle recounts an episode from his past when his father’s arm was caught in a subway 
train’s closing doors: “my father was being forced to trot with gradually increasing speed 
alongside it” (203). This is a direct allusion to the “inconvenienc[e]” in Something Happened 
when 
a man my age was killed in a subway station nearby . . . his arm caught in the 
closing doors as he tried to push his way on, but the train started anyway . . . 
and dragged him along the station platform until he smashed against pillars 
and the stone and metal walls of the tunnel into which the subway train 
roared. (345) 
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By matching Fogle’s story so closely to Slocum’s, Wallace implies that Slocum may well have 
seen Fogle’s father die. By filling out the life of Slocum’s “inconvenience,” Wallace performs 
an act of writerly empathy that is beyond Slocum himself, who is a true postmodern subject 
and a perfect example of what Wallace called, elsewhere, the “Great Male Narcissists who’ve 
dominated postwar American fiction” (Consider 51).123  
Slocum lives and works in a network of paranoia and uncertainty. At his office, each 
of the “one hundred and twenty people is afraid of the other one hundred and nineteen” (13), 
and Slocum’s paranoia extends to more foreboding American institutions such as the CIA, FBI, 
and even the IRS, which he worries might have “been investigating [him] surreptitiously for 
years” (15). The novel’s title itself becomes a paranoid motif, as Slocum often points to some 
vague conspiracy of uncertain circumstances that have dictated his selfhood and experiences: 
“Something must have happened to me sometime” (3); “I don’t know what finally became of 
Marie Jencks. I never even found out what happened to me” (98). Slocum is, like many of the 
characters in The Pale King, a stranger to his own nature (“I often wonder what my own true 
nature is” [73]), but unlike Wallace’s characters Slocum has no nature to uncover. There is no 
causal relationship between Slocum’s parents and himself: he has, rather, a “wretched habit 
. . . of acquiring the characteristics of other people” (72), a mess of cultural traits out of which 
he builds a sort-of self, only to wonder “who or what I really am” (74). Slocum is thus not one 
self but, like Rushdie’s Saleem Sinai, “1,000 me’s”: a diffuse, paranoid subject, who wishes he 
could “wiretap” those many selves (a conspiracy-theorist’s impulse, if ever there was one) to 
try and understand himself (399). This is, as we might expect, a vain hope that yields no real 
answers or meaning for Slocum or the reader.  
Slocum is estranged from himself because he is a tissue of citations, dissolute and 
absent to begin with. Where Heller’s novel begins with a descent into the “underworld[s]” of 
the office storage room (95), filled with “file cabinets,” paper, and the “dead records” of long-
deceased people (20), Wallace’s novel opens by excavating some “Very old land”: an 
underworld of body and soil, not paper and text. It is significant that Slocum’s father is erased 
                                                          
123 Slocum, who at one point imagines that he might “scratch eyeballs, molest teen-age girls and younger ones 
with trim figures” (455), is eerily similar to another Great Male Narrator: Nabokov’s Humbert Humbert, 
although Slocum lacks Humbert’s charm. 
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from existence altogether because Slocum does not remember him (“I didn’t miss him, since 
I didn’t remember him” [77]), while Fogle, on the other hand, though still self-conscious like 
Slocum, is shaped entirely by his “developmental wiring” (162) and his difficult relationship 
with his father. Because Slocum is so diffuse there is no possibility for heroism or any felt 
tragedy in his life. Paranoid to a fault, the novel ends with him railing against the conspiratorial 
forces that (he believes) move against him, resulting in him killing his own son. His attempt to 
preserve his life is, ironically, self-obliterating: the black joke is that by removing his son to 
prevent his own oblivion, Slocum secures it.124 Marshall Boswell argues that the 
postmodernist’s job was to “yank the ground from underneath the writers of [the] era, to 
produce . . . anxiety (the recognition that nothing is beneath us) and create a new zone of 
pure possibility” (Understanding 13). Bob Slocum has no solid ground beneath his feet: all the 
rules are broken, the staid limitations of biology and the material are buried, and he can be 
anyone. The irony, of course, is that he is no one. There is no pathos in this final scene, no 
‘tragedy’ in the classical sense. Slocum will not “at all costs find a shroud worthy of his valour, 
though Zeus be arrayed against him” (Longinus 152). As Slocum says, with ironic double 
meaning: “I just don’t have the character” (41).125 
Wallace’s characters are quite different. Hal can accurately introduce himself by 
saying that “I am not just a boy who plays tennis. I have an intricate history. Experiences and 
feelings. I’m complex” (11). Unlike Slocum, Wallace’s characters are sharply defined by their 
limitations, and one of Wallace’s most consistent themes (from his head-shaped settings to 
                                                          
124 As Kurt Vonnegut put it in his review of the novel, “This is black humor indeed—with the humor removed.” 
Slocum does have a daughter and another, brain damaged, son, but since he is a misogynist and a horrible 
father we can assume they will not be taking up the murdered son’s mantle. 
125 Coale suggests that the “postmodern victim, like Thomas Pynchon’s caricatures, Don DeLillo’s diffuse and 
anxious characters . . . feels only that bitter sense of absence, loss, and impotence” (11). Timothy Melley, 
who also writes about conspiracy in American fiction, is somewhat more optimistic. Melley suggests that 
paranoid fiction is not devoid of individuality and human agency, but rather that it suffers from “agency  
panic” (12): it “conserves its individualism by continually imagining it to be in imminent peril” (6). While I 
agree with Melley that postmodern fiction “rarely seem[s] to celebrate the fragmentation of the self” (15) 
as poststructuralist and postmodernist theory do, there is an important difference between writers such as 
Wallace and his contemporaries, who actively reinstate the self, and their postmodern predecessors. Heller, 
Pynchon, and DeLillo may not celebrate the death of the soul, but they don’t argue otherwise. 
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the characters’ skulls) is how human beings are shaped by and against those limits. Wallace 
seems to share with James Incandenza the view, as one of the titles of his films puts it, that 
we should give “(At Least) Three Cheers for Cause and Effect” (991n. 24). Though Wallace is 
often characterised, like James, as an unflinchingly modern, televisual American artist—“so 
modern he’s in a different space-time continuum to the rest of us” (Zadie Smith, “Best 
Books”)—part of what sets his work apart from something like Something Happened is his 
constant awareness of “the truth . . . that the world is incredibly, incredibly, unbelievably old” 
(Infinite Jest 389). Wallace often sets his very modern register against the ancientness of the 
world, particularly in his essays. In the State Fair essay Wallace describes “the old ice” that 
shaped the Midwestern landscape (Supposedly 84), and in the Cruise Ship essay he reflects 
existentially on the sea, towards which “there’s no way to know ahead of time how you’ll 
react. A test of the deep involuntary stuff of a man” (279). The conspiracy against which 
Wallace’s characters struggle, the “deep involuntary stuff” in their character, is literally 
ancient.126 This bothness of register is something he admired in other writers such as Kafka, 
who, while having a “thoroughly modern complexity” (Consider 64), are important because 
they somehow evoke “unconscious” truths, “the primordial little-kid stuff from which myths 
derive” (62). The place where Wallace most clearly expressed his views about the tragic, 
ancient limits that govern human lives is in his essays on tennis. 
In an autobiographical essay in 1990, Wallace described playing tennis as his “initiation 
into true adult sadness” (Supposedly 12). Where Wallace as a younger player was able to “play 
around” the limitations on the court provided by the “wind and bugs and chuckholes,” his 
own personal, bodily limitations were too great. Anticipating his phrase in the Kafka essay 
(“primordial little-kid stuff”) he writes that he “began to experience the same resentment 
toward whatever children abstract as nature” (13), coming to a deep resentment of “my 
physical place in the great schema” (13). This failure sets him apart from the great tennis 
                                                          
126 In Broom the conspiracy is rather more postmodern: Lenore feels her life is “determined” not by an 
impersonal universe (which she feels she could cope with) but by shady forces and people in her modern 
world that seem to be “us[ing]” her (66). Infinite Jest has a postmodern McGuffin—the “post-industrial 
capitalist mechanism” (792) that is the Entertainment—but Wallace portrays the film as being so dangerous 
precisely because it taps into some very old, primal need for pleasure and escape. The Entertainment would 
not be a problem if human beings had not evolved to enjoy pleasure. 
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players who would (at least ostensibly) be the subject of his future essays. In 1994 Wallace 
wrote about Tracy Austin’s memoir, describing her as the kind of athlete who “carv[es] out 
exemptions from physical laws . . . mak[ing] manifest God in man. . . . that exquisite hybrid of 
animal and angel that we average unbeautiful watchers have such a hard time seeing in 
ourselves” (Consider 143). Wallace appeals here to a humanist account of the divine nature 
of the human soul being at odds with the animal, mechanical body. Though the angelic Austin 
is, for a time, completely at one with her body, Wallace sees in this account of human life a 
necessary tragedy. He describes Austin’s life as “almost classically tragic” (148), her career arc 
“nearly Greek” (149), because the very thing that makes her immortally great, “a relentless 
workaholic perfectionism” (149), is also “her flaw and bane”: her body’s ability to push itself 
with “uncompromising effort in every last match” is what ultimately destroys that body (149). 
Wallace reflects again on human limitations in his 1995 essay on tennis player Michael Joyce, 
who was thrust into a life his parents choose for him (Supposedly 228n. 24). Wallace writes 
that the “restrictions” on Joyce’s life have been “grotesque,” but Joyce is said to be great 
because he has taken ownership of those limitations: he is a “complete man (though in a 
grotesquely limited way)” (254). Like Austin and unlike Wallace, Joyce is complete in the sense 
that he is able to work within his limitations. He lives as if what had been pre-determined (by 
parents, by the universe, by luck) was chosen by himself, meaning his limitations no longer 
look like limitations to him. For Wallace, such athletes prove that he himself is forever limited 
by nature’s conspiracy against him. Wallace, like other mere mortals, is not complete but 
divided, at odds with nature’s grand schema. 
In his final essay on Roger Federer, Wallace argues that the athlete is a spiritual being, 
and the beauty of sports something “to do with . . . human beings’ reconciliation with the fact 
of having a body” (8).127 Note the word “fact” here: embodiment is the hard reality. Wallace’s 
metaphysical argument in all his sports writing is that great athletes can reconcile themselves 
to that “fact,” to the “great schema” (Supposedly 13), to unforgiving “physical laws” (Consider 
143), to the “restrictions” inherent in human life (Supposedly 254). Wallace spends a lot of 
the essay on the mechanics of Federer’s technique, but concludes that there is something 
                                                          
127 I have skipped over Wallace’s 1996 essay on “Democracy and Commerce and the U.S. Open,” which is, as the 
title suggests, more concerned with the business of the sport than in existential self-reflection. 
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“within” that the “neural account leaves out” (31). Federer is “inspired” (33) in the classical 
sense—a soul breathed into the body—and Wallace finds beauty in the idea that the soul can 
own its body, can reconcile itself to the fact that it exists in a mortal, animal form. One of the 
threads through the Federer essay is the capriciousness of fate, that Federer can be gifted 
while the sick child who flips the coin at the start of the match is not. These limitations 
absolutely define Wallace’s subjects, and there is both tragedy and beauty in the fact that, as 
Wallace puts it in Infinite Jest, “WE ARE WHAT WE WALK BETWEEN” (81).  
In his 1993 interview with Larry McCaffery, Wallace described the postmodern revolt 
as being like a “wild disgusting fabulous party” that broke down all limits and restrictions: 
For a while it’s great, free and freeing, parental authority gone and overthrown 
. . . [but] you gradually start wishing your parents would come back and restore 
some fucking order in your house. . . . And of course we’re uneasy about the 
fact that we wish they’d come back—I mean, what’s wrong with us? Are we 
total pussies? Is there something about authority and limits we actually need? 
And then the uneasiest feeling of all, as we start gradually to realize that 
parents in fact aren’t ever coming back—which means we’re going to have to 
be the parents. (Conversations 52) 
This is quite the opposite of tennis, which is essentially about limitations, and therefore also  
an essentially tragic enterprise. . . . You seek to vanquish and transcend the 
limited self whose limits make the game possible in the first place. It is tragic 
and sad and chaotic and lovely. (84)  
If there is “Nothing to contain and give the meaning” (Infinite Jest 83), then there can be no 
meaning. Real tragedy and pathos can only exist when they push against limits. When there 
are no rules and everything goes, characters such as Bob Slocum are diffuse and emptied. 
Where the paranoid Tyrone Slothrop is manipulated and ultimately disintegrated by 
conspiring shady forces in Gravity’s Rainbow, or where the flat, numb, hollow character 
Michelle in DeLillo’s Great Jones Street says that the “body is an illusion” (225), Wallace’s 
characters are different. When David Cusk, for example, reflects that his anxiety attacks felt 
as though they came “not from anything outside of him but rather from some inner part of 
himself that was hurting or almost betraying him, as in heart attack” (Pale King 98), he knows 
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only too well that it is his own nature that torments him. There is no unsolvable global puzzle 
to try and solve in Wallace’s fiction (or, if there is, his characters are too busy with their own 
internal struggles to worry much about it).128 
Wallace’s subjects are, as he says of Kafka’s, locked into the grand schema’s big joke, 
living out a comedy that is also tragedy because their lives are constrained by the very 
limitations that are necessary for them to exist in the first place. As Wallace put it in his 
interview with David Lipsky, “Although of course you end up becoming yourself” (52). You are 
your brain, and you cannot be anything other than what your bodily limits allow. The tragic 
fact is that one has absolutely no choice in “the hand you’re dealt” (Pale King 209), but for 
post-postmodern writers you can know what the hand is and know your limits. There is even 
some hope that you—the ‘you’ that is so present and sharply defined by those limits—might 
reconcile yourself to them. Unlike the irreverent postmodernists who dismantled 
authoritative narratives, the post-postmodernists clearly put stock in the large-scale narrative 
about the evolution of the human body and brain. Unlike the postmodernist hero, who is 
dissolved in a meaningless world, the post-postmodern hero may be equally powerless but 
they are still in there, tragically and meaningfully encaged. 
Post-postmodern literature is marked by a turn towards both determinism and 
compatibilism. This literary turn is marked out by authors such as Jeffrey Eugenides, who 
writes that “free will is making a comeback. Biology gives you a brain. Life turns it into a mind” 
                                                          
128 This is not to say that postmodern characters are not tormented by their own internal workings. Burn has 
argued that Don DeLillo’s “pioneering incorporation of emerging neuroscientific research” in his novel 
Great Jones Street (1973) “may have influenced” Wallace (“Don DeLillo’s” 362). Burn shows that DeLillo 
drew in particular on Paul D. MacLean’s theory of the triune brain, in which “the reptilian cerebral chassis 
interrupts ordinary cortical cognition to inspire paranoid fears” (354). That is, the older animal brain—upon 
which man’s more advanced functions were built—is a persistent cause of paranoia and fear in the modern 
mind. DeLillo in some ways bridges postmodern themes (paranoia about systems that assault the human 
subject) with biology, though it is more that he biologizes postmodern paranoia, rather than bridging it with 
something distinctly post-postmodern, as I argue Wallace does. Tom Robbins’s Even Cowgirls Get the Blues 
(1976) also plays with contemporary brain models, referring variously to the “limbic system” (31), the 
brain’s “wad of wrinkles” (103), and “Blood bunched in [the] head” (159), but Robbins also writes about the 
comfort one takes in the idea that conspiratorial systems are in charge (50). The brain is just another 
conspiratorial figure for Robbins, “messing around with stuff it cannot or will not comprehend” (68). 
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(479). The acceptance of cognitive science and evolution gives characters weight because 
they are caused by their history, both as a member of the species and their families. As 
Wallace puts it, “Darwin’s tagline still fit” (Oblivion 65): the “bug-eyed native’s lurking just 
under the surface, we know” (Infinite Jest 243). But Wallace’s contemporaries do not simply 
turn towards scientific materialism at the expense of the humanity of their characters. 
Jonathan Safran Foer’s Here I Am (2016) opens with the “dividing” cells in a mother’s “brain” 
and the “roots” of a “family tree” (3), but it is also about the “soul” (4) trying to “fe[el] at 
home in [its] body” and all that it inherits (65). In Richard Powers’s The Gold Bug Variations 
(1991), the characters are the products of the same genetic destiny, who “all derive from the 
same four notes” (25), but they spend the novel uncovering the meaning in “this process 
[that] is taking place all over [their] bod[ies] at this instant” (248). Middlesex, too, is about the 
journey of a self inside a body who comes to terms with his biological “destiny” (37). Where 
Wallace is set apart from his contemporaries is in how little hope there is of this actually 
happening in his work. 
 
“An individual person’s basic personal powerlessness” 
When critics such as Daniel R. Kelly and David H. Evans have discussed the problem of free 
will in Wallace’s work, they conclude that Wallace is a compatibilist who, without invoking a 
Cartesian agency, affirms the power of conscious choice and our ability to control the way we 
think. This is the philosophy Wallace avowed in This is Water. Wallace’s fiction, however, 
seems to be at times both for choice and against it, and seems rather less secure in its position 
than Wallace was in the commencement speech.  
Infinite Jest is Wallace’s tennis novel and, as in his essays, tennis becomes a means for 
Wallace to reflect on much greater things than the sport itself.129 The novel portrays an 
                                                          
129 Three of Wallace’s tennis essays were written in the three years that Infinite Jest was edited between 1994 
and 1996, and we can see themes and specific ideas and phrases being repeated across the novel and 
essays. In his 1996 and 2006 essays Wallace characterises the relationship between Pete Sampras and Mark 
Philoppoussis, and Roger Federer and Rafael Nadal, as being like the war between Athenian democracy and 
Spartan aggression (Both Flesh 146; 10). Ancient civilisation is evoked again in Wallace’s description of 
Sampras leaving the court “bearing his shield and the Australian carried out upon his own (as it were)” (Both 
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emphatically deterministic universe in which “fathers impact sons” (32), and the tennis 
players’ lives—like Tracey Austin’s or Michael Joyce’s—are predetermined before the 
question of conscious adult choice would even make sense (“Like most sports academies, 
E.T.A. maintains the gentle fiction that 100% of its students are enrolled at their own 
ambitious volition and not that of, say for instance, their parents” [984n. 10]). The characters 
in Wallace’s novel are the products of complex histories of cause and effect. At the elite tennis 
academy, these histories are obscure and technical. Hal and Orin, for instance, are the 
products of an “all-out chromosomatic war”: where Hal looks vaguely “ethnic” like his father, 
“Hal’s eldest brother Orin had got the Mom’s Anglo-Nordo-Canadian phenotype” (101), a 
mishmash of genetic influences that speaks to the migratory patterns of his ancestor’s 
organisms. The residents of Ennet Recovery House, who mirror the E.T.A. students in many 
ways (note that ‘Ennet’ can be loosely read as ‘tennis’ backwards), have less obscure histories 
printed on the surface of their bodies in the form of scars and tattoos. Erdedy reflects that 
the other residents’ tattoos stand in for the problem of addiction generally: tattoos, like 
drugs, are profoundly permanent, because they are acquired on a whim but removing them 
is just trading “one kind of disfigurement for another” (208). For both groups of characters, 
causes, whether they are conscious of them or not, have clear effects: past events literally 
shape the post-postmodern individual. 
Structurally, Infinite Jest continually undermines the characters’ free will and 
emphasises that they have no control over the direction of their lives. The pivotal moment in 
Gately’s story is when he is shot. It happens near the midpoint of the book, and triggers his 
journey to the hospital where he will spend the rest of the novel trying to resist pain 
medication. The shooting is the end result of a very clear causal sequence that takes place in 
one long chapter from pp.538-619. This contained story, one of the few chapters in the novel 
where there is a considerable amount of forward movement, condenses the themes and 
metaphors of the whole novel, including the central question of free will. Briefly, it plays out 
                                                          
Flesh 155-56), a phrase which he repeats in Infinite Jest: “They returned from Long Island bearing their 
shields rather than upon them, as they say” (281). Both are an allusion to Plutarch’s Moralia (c.100), in 
which it is said that Spartan women would tell their sons “Either this or upon this” (241). Wallace’s 
evocation of classical culture again shows that he views tennis as tapping into something ancient and 
universal. 
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as follows: Randy Lenz and Bruce Green are walking together; Green is distracted, allowing 
Lenz to slip away and find an animal to kill (to satisfy his addiction to cruelty); when Lenz kills 
a dog, he is chased back to Ennet House by some Canadians; Gately becomes involved in the 
fight to defend the residents, and is ultimately shot. The chapter is really the story of Lenz’s 
addiction. It begins with his “consciously discover[ing]” that he has a deep unconscious desire 
in himself to kill rats and say “‘There’” (a word that “turned out to be crucial for the sense of 
brisance and closure” [541]), follows him as he pursues a greater and greater fix, and ends at 
the top of the food chain, with Lenz relentlessly beating an unconscious man “and going 
‘There, there’” (615): the ultimate, awful endpoint of his addiction to violence. By tracing the 
ways in which Wallace constructs Lenz’s addiction, and the pattern of symbols and metaphors 
that Wallace weaves throughout this chapter, we can begin to illuminate Wallace’s 
complicated position on free will. 
Wallace significantly intercuts this Lenz chapter with a short, three-page Orin scene, 
in which Orin falls for a new woman and feels this is “clear evidence of a kind of benign fate 
or world-spirit” (565). This recalls Orin’s other love in the novel, Joelle, and the chapter in 
which he meets her, where Wallace also writes about destiny. In this earlier chapter, Orin, 
who has “become exactly as fine a tennis player as he was ever destined to be,” tries to switch 
from college tennis to college football (289) in order to get to the cheerleader, Joelle, for 
whom he has a “schoolboy-grade crush” (289). It is only by a chance punt and another chance 
injury (of the previous punter) that Orin is able to join the team. Wallace writes: 
destiny’s kisses and its dope-slaps illustrate an individual person’s basic 
personal powerlessness over the really meaningful events in his life: i.e., 
almost nothing important that ever happens to you happens because you 
engineer it. Destiny has no beeper; destiny always leans trenchcoated out of 
an alley with some sort of Psst that you usually can’t even hear because you’re 
in such a rush to or from something important you’ve tried to engineer. (291) 
This earlier scene primes us to think about “destiny’s kisses” in the novel, and it is significant 
that we are reminded of it again in the middle of Lenz’s chapter, where a number of destinies 
177 
 
begin to intertwine.130 The Orin-intercut also primes us to read Randy Lenz, who opens the 
chapter walking through “Low-rent-dumpster-strewn residential streets . . . that become 
alleys, gritty passages,” and his distinctive, “billowing tall-collared topcoat” (539), as a 
manifestation of the kind of destiny that “leans trenchcoated out of . . . alley[s]” (291). 
According to Sven Raphael Schneider at the Gentleman’s Gazette, a topcoat is a kind of 
trenchcoat, and this one is significant enough for Wallace to mention it once per page for the 
next three pages that introduce this chapter. With each description the repeated details 
become more redundant and uninteresting, which ironically brings more attention to them 
as Lenz leans in and out of alleys: from “billowing tall-collared topcoat” to “Polo topcoat” to 
“open coat flared wide” to, finally, “billowing top-collared Lauren-Polo model he loves and 
uses a daily lint-roller on” (539; 539; 540; 541). The first key symbol in this chapter is Lenz’s 
billowing coat. Later in the chapter “his open coat fill[s] like a sail” (588), suggesting that the 
wind, an unconscious natural force, is propelling him along down some pre-determined path.  
At the beginning of this chapter Lenz’s routine has been frustrated by another 
resident, Bruce Green, who has taken to walking with him. When Lenz and Green hear some 
Polynesian music from a nearby party, Green’s face turns into a “flat mask of psychic pain he 
doesn’t even feel is there” (577). To explain this change, Wallace describes the “searing facts” 
of Green’s parents’ deaths, which are “so deeply repressed inside Green” that he cannot 
remember either that his mother had a heart attack when he gave her a can of Polynesian 
nuts as a Christmas present with a springed cloth snake inside (578), or that his father, as a 
consequence, also “cave[d] psycho-spiritually” (580), became a terrorist, and was sentenced 
to death. This repressed childhood horror becomes an adult scar: Green has a horror “about 
all things even remotely Polynesian” (581), and just as Lenz is pulled along by his unconscious 
desires, Green is pulled unconsciously, uncontrollably, towards the Polynesian music. When 
Green comes upon Lenz again, he sees that the “Polynesian-music speakers” are playing 
                                                          
130 I discussed “priming” in chapter 1. The idea that we can pick up on “a stimulus that is so brief” (Nørretranders 
170) that it can enter our minds without us being conscious of it is something that Wallace seemed to play 
with throughout his writing. We might use it to explain, for example, how Wallace’s fractured narratives 
slowly being to cohere as we read them. 
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music “from someplace up near where he sees the back of Lenz’s coat” (583): both destinies 
merge, the trenchcoat that pulls Lenz and the music that drives Green’s body forward. 
Significantly, the action in this chapter takes place on and around “Brainerd Road” 
(581). Though this is an actual road in Boston, its name suggests that Wallace is foregrounding 
the deterministic, material brain in this chapter. It is also perhaps as an allusion to the poet 
Joe Brainard, whose famous collection I Remember (1975) is, as Siri Hustvedt puts it, a 
“catalog of the author’s memories” (Shaking Woman 62). Hustvedt describes using the book 
in her “writing work with psychiatric patients,” and the remarkable way in which “inscribing 
the words I remember generates memories . . . often ones we hadn’t thought about for many 
years” (62-63). This is an exercise from which Green has clearly not benefitted. Green’s 
childhood trauma is said to have sunk into him, leaving “only an oily slick that catches the 
light in distorted ways” (581-82). This image of the oily substance inside him—a substance on 
which his conscious life slips—recurs when Wallace describes the “zithery drifting Polynesian” 
music as being like a “plasm” of sound (577) that has “the quality of a type of: ointment” 
(587). These two descriptions seem to draw on the phrase ‘a fly in the ointment,’ implying 
that Green is literally stuck, snagged on some unconsciously remembered horror that drives 
his behaviour.131 
At the sharp end of all of these events is Gately. With Lenz’s coat still “billowing” (609) 
as he riles up the Canadians, Gately fights them in an “automatic,” “adrenaline” fuelled, 
unconscious state (612) and is ultimately shot. Now Wallace uses a third and final pattern of 
images to close the chapter: stars and the laws of motion. Wallace emphasises the weight of 
his fleshy characters by consistently showing that they are governed by what the philosopher 
Meghan Griffith calls the “laws of gravity, motion, energy. . . . Laws [that] are often 
understood as ‘exceptionless regularities’” (17). Earlier in the novel Avril Incandenza, for 
example, is described as a “black hole” who, when she enters a room, turns “any sort of pacing 
. . . to orbiting” (521). This also explains why the members of her incandescent family all 
“inclin[e] very subtly toward Avril” at the dining table (745), like stars towards a black hole. 
                                                          
131 Wallace seemed to like playing with this phrase. In “Westward” there is the “fly in every fucking machine’s 
perfect lubricant” (Girl 246, my emphasis). Elsewhere in Infinite Jest, Joelle’s “Daddy’d warned her the 
sweetest syrup draws the nastiest flies” (739, my emphasis). 
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The academy’s tennis players are described as “Stars, shooting stars, falling stars” (1052), and 
are, significantly, members of an academy which is accredited by the “North American Sports 
Academy Association,” or NASAA (8). This pattern is picked up at the end of the Lenz chapter. 
Amidst all the chaos, characters are still governed by forces they cannot see. Residents stare 
“Copernicanly up [Joelle’s] flapping robe” (615), with as little choice about where to look as 
they had about avoiding the violence that has come their way. When he is on his back at the 
end of the chapter’s violence, Gately sees the stars “shine right through people’s heads” 
(617). Gately’s destiny is written in the stars, but he can only read it clearly here once all is 
over. His wound is the unavoidable consequence of an intricate, tangled web of causes and 
effects that he cannot untie. The same invisible laws that govern the movement of the stars 
also govern Gately, and they penetrated all the people around him as easily as bullets.  
For first-time readers, like the characters themselves, it is impossible to know what 
the ultimate consequence of Lenz’s small actions will be, and impossible to recognise the 
significance of these symbols (the coat, the oil, the stars) until, at the very least, a second 
reading. On that second reading, because the novel does not change, the chapter begins to 
feel very fatalist: from the moment Lenz kills his first rat, Gately is as good as shot. As a result, 
the entire chapter is full of dramatic irony. The reader knows what drives the characters, and 
what is coming for them, though they themselves are clueless. Though Lenz believes he 
belongs at the top of the food chain, he is as much a clockwork machine as the animals he 
kills: he may “cloc[k]” animals with a “hammer,” making a sound like a “pocketwatch” being 
smashed (540), but he does not notice that he himself is “tightly wound” (547), as clockwork 
as they are. As Wallace puts it in this chapter, only fools believe they are “exempt from the 
laws of physics and statistics that ironly govern everybody else” (604). He also makes the 
ironic joke that those same fools are “constitutionally unable to learn from anybody else’s 
experience” (604). In other words, fools like Lenz are pre-determined (by the constitution of 
their bodies and brains) to not believe that they are pre-determined. This chapter proves him 
quite wrong.  
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“Pre-Nuptial Agreement of Heaven and Hell” 
As we see with Lenz in this chapter, addiction follows a hard determinist path because an 
addict’s behaviour is ruled primarily by the unconscious wants of the clockwork body and 
mind. Consciousness—the ‘I,’ the soul, the observer inside that body—has no choice but to 
follow suit. This is a pattern into which almost all of Infinite Jest’s characters, in one way or 
another, fall. Yet because of the presence of the AA and other recovery communities in the 
novel, Infinite Jest is often regarded (particularly by critics writing post-This is Water, who see 
the commencement speech as the “skeleton key to [Wallace’s] entire body of work” [Daniel 
R. Kelly 124]), as a novel about characters who take some control of their own destiny.132 
Critics who view Wallace as a compatibilist might argue that Lenz is obviously a bad example 
of a twelve-step program member, since he makes no effort to reform. While it is true that 
some characters find their way to recovery, we cannot ignore the fact that the object around 
which the entire novel revolves—the addictive Entertainment—completely undermines the 
hopeful consciousness-raising of the AA anyway, whether the twelve-step program helps 
people or not. Wallace’s championing of hope and choice is usually framed as a challenge to 
his postmodern predecessors, to writers such as Don DeLillo who are predominantly ironic in 
their outlook. D. T. Max, for instance, writes that in Infinite Jest Wallace “was proposing to 
wash Pynchonian excess in the chilling waters of DeLillo’s prose and then heat it up again in 
Dostoevsky’s redemptive fire” (Every Love Story 214). Yet the Entertainment is lifted right out 
of one of DeLillo’s books to perform exactly the same hope-killing, will-negating, world-ending 
function. We have seen that Infinite Jest portrays a world that is emphatically deterministic. 
To understand where free will fits into this picture, if at all, we first have to understand the 
Entertainment, a symbol of self-escape and the biggest threat to free will in the novel.  
                                                          
132 For Timothy Aubry, Infinite Jest overloads its readers with entertaining postmodern tricks and irony in order 
to “bring readers into a state of dazzled intellectual fatigue, a state which might make them ready to 
embrace the salutary simplicity offered by addiction’s potential antidote, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA)” 
(“Selfless” 210). Daniel R. Kelly, writing post-This is Water, understands Wallace’s work as an incentive for 
readers to “wake up” and “pay more and better attention to choosing” (124). Likewise, Daniel Turnbull has 
argued that Infinite Jest’s “central focus” is, like This is Water’s, on “how we choose to attend to the world” 
(213). 
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Though critics often acknowledge Wallace’s literary relationship with DeLillo—a writer 
with whom Wallace corresponded, and who Wallace called one of the “stars [he] steer[s] by” 
(Conversations 62)—there has been a surprising lack of discussion of Infinite Jest’s 
relationship to DeLillo’s White Noise (1985) in particular.133 Only Timothy Jacobs has noted 
any connection, briefly gesturing to the similarity between Infinite Jest’s Entertainment and 
White Noise’s Dylar, a much sought-after drug that alleviates the fear of death (“Brothers” 
291n. 10). In fact, this connection has very significant ramifications for how we understand 
Infinite Jest’s (actually rather unhopeful) position on free will. The Entertainment and Dylar 
are both symbols of the ultimate self-escape, and they are both the epitome of a pattern of 
metaphors that runs throughout each authors’ fiction: the metaphor of information and input 
as water that floods the conscious mind.  
Where DeLillo describes, for instance, the “layers of oceanic sound” in the 
supermarket (White Noise 331), Wallace refers to the same “oceanic sound” in the E.T.A. 
cafeteria (Infinite Jest 627) and the “Atlantic surf” of a radio’s static in “Westward” (Girl 301). 
Where DeLillo describes, in one of his early and little known short stories, “Total Loss 
Weekend” (1972), the character CJ sitting in front of two “TV sets,” becoming submerged “like 
a diver” in the data in the room, Wallace uses the same metaphor of a diver in both Infinite 
Jest and The Pale King. Orin is said to have a “stance” that is “not unlike a diver’s” when he 
surrenders himself to “the crowd’s noise” (299). In The Pale King, the “fact-psychic” Claude 
Sylvanshine is overwhelmed by intrusive data, and Wallace significantly ends one paragraph’s 
long list of disparate facts with the “year of death for undersea explorer William Beebe” (123), 
suggesting that Sylvanshine himself is one such explorer. Wallace would use the water 
metaphor again in his introduction to The Best American Essays 2007 to describe his struggle 
with the “tsunami of available fact, context, and perspective that constitutes” the “Total 
Noise” of contemporary American culture (“Introduction: Deciderization” xx, my emphasis). 
Todd Gitlin, one of the key sources for Wallace in his theory-of-fiction essay in 1993 
                                                          
133 Critics such as Stephen J. Burn and Graham Foster, who have studied Wallace’s debts to DeLillo’s Players 
(1977), Amazons (1980), Ratner’s Star (1976), Great Jones Street (1973), End Zone (1972) (Burn, Reader’s 
Guide 26; 26; 35; 69; 70), Americana (1971) and Underworld (1997) (Foster 7), do not mention White Noise. 
Ralph Clare notes that Wallace’s description of existential angst in The Pale King in terms of noise is “akin 
to Don DeLillo’s description of death in White Noise” (190), but does not develop this connection. 
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(Supposedly 58n. 23; 74n. 34) calls this the “torrent” of information: that “seamless” stream 
of “everyday noise” in which “a collage of back-to-back stories, talk show banter, fragments 
of ads, soundtracks of musical snippets” all flow together into a conglomerate roar in the 
background of everyday life that “we are, by and large, not free not to choose” (8-9). This 
torrent is consciousness-killing throughout both Wallace’s and DeLillo’s writing.  
Recognising the shared role of both the Entertainment and DeLillo’s Dylar will reveal 
just how much White Noise informs Wallace’s novel. In the third part of White Noise, titled 
“Dylarama” (191), DeLillo’s protagonist Jack Gladney searches for Dylar, a drug that is said to 
“floo[d] the fear-of-death part of [the] brain” (243, my emphasis). In the penultimate chapter, 
which like the Dylar itself distils the noise of the whole novel into a single scene, Jack confronts 
the inventor of the drug, Willie Mink, who sits in front of a television screen surrounded by 
“auditory scraps, tatters, whirling specks” (353), data so dense it can only be caught as 
fragments in the conscious mind. As Mink swallows handfuls of Dylar, he merges with the 
room’s torrent, reciting meaningless trivia such as the conversion rate of “Fahrenheit to 
Celsius” (355). Drowned by the Dylar, Mink sits “misplaced” (355), fully merged with the 
room’s “white noise” (356)—he is himself “very white” (356)—and fully escaped from his 
consciousness of death. 
That Willie Mink appears in Wallace’s first novel, The Broom of the System, only two 
years after White Noise was published, suggests that Wallace was drawn to the character.134 
Addictive substances in Infinite Jest, whether they are narcotics, alcohol, or entertainment, 
have precisely the same effect as the Dylar, represented metaphorically as the conscious mind 
being subsumed by a torrent of information. When Joelle overdoses, for instance, White Noise 
is both figuratively and literally in the background. Mimicking DeLillo’s own phrasing (“you 
are the sum total of your data” [White Noise 165]), Wallace describes Joelle becoming 
hyperaware of details: “This room in this apartment is the sum of very many specific facts and 
                                                          
134 In Broom, Lenore tells her grandmother, Concarnadine Beadsman, a story called “‘Billy Mink Goes 
Dinnerless’” (363). While on one level this title echoes Thornton Burgess’s classic children’s story, a number 
of parallels also gesture towards DeLillo’s novel. Concarnadine, like DeLillo’s Mink, is “senile” (365) and 
confuses words for reality. Where DeLillo’s Mink hears “‘Plunging aircraft’” and expects real danger, (356), 
Concarnadine can only say the word “Roughage,” without “probably . . . hav[ing] any idea what the word 
stands for” (368). 
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ideas” (239). As the effects of the overdose get worse, so does the information overload in 
the room: Joelle becomes increasingly aware of the overwhelming “white- party-noise” in the 
background (240) while she “Breathes in and out like a savvy diver” (240), ready to submerge 
herself in the oblivion of total noise. Wallace describes another addict as “misplaced” (648), 
using exactly the same word as DeLillo (White Noise 355). When Gately is in the hospital and 
in terrible pain while awake, his consciousness is misplaced when he slips in and out of sleep, 
a process described as being like “coming up for air and then being pushed below the surface 
of something” (809), “like a big wooden spoon keeps pushing him just under the surface of 
sleep and then spooning him up for something huge to taste him, again and again” (845). To 
“escap[e] [your]self” (295), to be plunged into unconsciousness, is to be plunged into “tidal, 
amniotic” white noise: noise that is so dense and meaningless and loud that it cancels out the 
soul, the thinking thing, because you “literally [can] not hear [yourself] think” inside it (295). 
In Infinite Jest, it is into this roaring water that the addicts escape from the nightmare of their 
own conscious thinking: what Hal significantly calls the addicts’ “flight-from in the form of a 
plunging-into” (900, my emphasis).  
Wallace’s water metaphor is clearly set up in direct contrast to the fire metaphor that 
we saw in chapter 3. As Sylvia Plath writes, “drowning must be the kindest way to die, and 
burning the worst” (Bell Jar 166).135 If Wallace’s characters’ souls are surrounded by flames, 
it is only reasonable that they would plunge into water to save themselves from those flames. 
It is significant that when Poor Tony enters withdrawal, he has a seizure on the “Gray Line 
train from Watertown to Inman Square” (299). No longer on drugs, Tony is also no longer a 
resident of water town, no longer submerged, but is instead painfully Inman. He has been 
forced to have a “spiritual awakening” (137), and his soul has woken up again inside himself, 
Inman, returned to its entrapment. Tiny Ewell, too, begins his downward spiral in the “East 
                                                          
135 In The Bell Jar, when Esther takes pills in a suicide attempt, she describes “at the rim of vision, it gathered 
itself, and in one sweeping tide, rushed me to sleep” (179). Later in the novel, Esther wakes after her ECT 
treatment “out of a deep, drenched sleep” (227). Plath’s use of this water metaphor is perhaps another 
source for Wallace, though it goes back further still. In Thomas De Quincey’s early account of addiction, 
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1821), De Quincey begins the book by wondering aloud how he 
became an opium-eater: “Was it gradually, tentatively, mistrustingly, as one goes down a shelving beach 
into a deepening sea . . . ?” (13).  
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Watertown projects” (810), eventually taking to alcohol to “submerge” his woes “in an amber 
sea” (815). When Gately and Fackelmann overdose at the end of the novel, they are said to 
be “moving like men deep under water” (934), their “chins fall[ing] and ris[ing] at slightly 
different underwater rates” (935). When Gately is in hospital and reliving this memory, the 
fire in his shoulder is no longer mentioned. Instead there are only “serial shots of flames” in 
the memory that he sees on a television “reflected in [a] spreading puddle” (935-36). Going 
“underwater” (935) into the overdose-memory makes the flames of pain feel twice-removed, 
through the puddle and a screen, rendering them distant, electronic, and without their heat.  
A number of critics have discussed Wallace’s Entertainment but none has mentioned 
that addiction, either to the film or to drugs, is governed throughout Infinite Jest by this 
central water metaphor.136 The Entertainment itself is the ultimate addictive substance, and 
an exact replica of DeLillo’s Dylar.137 Wallace’s Dylar is perhaps even worse than DeLillo’s, 
                                                          
136 Stefano Ercolino discusses the Entertainment in the context of debates about modernity, the image, and 
“anti-ocularcentrism” (33). Kendall Gerdes argues that it is, in fact, “language” that is “a drug” in Infinite 
Jest (351), while David Morris reads addiction in Wallace’s novel in the context of “Hegel’s point that pure 
reason fails as a guide of human life” (1). Erik R. Mortenson compares Infinite Jest to William S. Burrough’s 
fiction, arguing that where “Burroughs’ tales are meant to shock us out of our preconceptions” about 
addicts, “Wallace’s piece does something more subtle: it creates an empathy that forces us to relate to the 
addict yrstruly” (45). Laura Catherine Frost puts Wallace’s Entertainment in historical context, and suggests 
that earlier, modernist metaphors of hedonism, intoxication, and hypnosis are now, in Infinite Jest, 
absolutely fatal (240). Casey Michael Henry is the only critic to discuss “Tides and oceanic shift” as symbols 
of the “inevitable forces against which [Gately] must struggle” (493), but he does not connect the water 
metaphor to drugs and input. 
137 In fact there are two Dylars in Wallace’s novel: the Entertainment, made by Hal’s father, which is so addictive 
that it renders its viewers “lost” and “empty of intent” (508), and the DMZ, the ultimate drug that has 
unsettling “ontological” effects on those who consume it (170). The two are closely linked. The DMZ is 
known as “Madame Psychosis” (170), also the name of Joelle’s alter-ego who stars in the Entertainment. 
Where Joelle’s role in the film is as an infantilising “Mother figure inclined” over the camera, “talking down 
to [the viewer] in both senses of the word” (789), the DMZ is said to cause effects in the “Tibetan-Dead-
Book vein” (996n. 57). This is an allusion that Wallace significantly shares with DeLillo, who calls the “Tibetan 
Book of the Dead . . . a guide to dying and being reborn” (White Noise 85), suggesting that Wallace’s DMZ, 
like the addictive film and DeLillo’s Dylar, destroys the conscious mind and infantilises the “reborn” user. 
That the Entertainment and DMZ are so closely linked in both name and effect suggests that for all intents 
and purposes they are, thematically, one and the same. The source for both Wallace and DeLillo is perhaps 
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since he makes it clear that it is literally impossible to resist the Entertainment. Whether the 
character is an entertainment-obsessed American or an anti-American Quebecois terrorist, 
anyone who “eventually and naturally” turns, with simple human curiosity, to see what is on 
the screen will be fatally hooked by it (79). There is no place for free will in this equation. 
Indeed, the soul and the will are precisely what the Entertainment annihilates. Characters are 
made “blank” by it, empty, “pithed” on “some deep reptile-brain level” (548). In other words, 
anyone with an evolved brain that enjoys, like a lab-experiment rat, “p-terminal stimulation,” 
will without exception “Giv[e] away their souls and lives” for it (474). Technology that is 
designed to tap directly into the body and brain’s desires can overpower even a “will of steel” 
(507). 
The release of such a film into America can only lead to an apocalypse, and the novel 
points us in that direction. Infinite Jest takes its apocalyptic structure straight from DeLillo’s 
novel, which moves inexorably towards Mink’s room of white noise. As Wallace’s novel draws 
to its end, the incoming snowstorm, the “worst blizzard to hit the region since B.S. 1998” (947) 
grows “increasingly heavy” (846). Recalling the “white buzz” of “snowball[ing]” sound in 
Mink’s room (White Noise 359), the overwhelming, “days”-long “churn[ing]” blizzard in 
Infinite Jest (949) is symbolic of the gathering white noise—the total overload—towards 
which the characters all plunge. There is a clear relationship, of course, between the blizzard 
and the water metaphor we have seen (when Lenz is high on cocaine he is taken “into regions 
of almost interstellar cold” [716] while his memories “tear as[s] across his mind’s arctic 
horizon” [557]; Ruth van Cleve is also addicted to “Ice,” the street name for methedrine 
[698]). Emphasising this pattern is the “WYYY” radio station, which Hal says “was apparently 
doing its weather-report via mimesis, broadcasting raw static,” a blizzard of noise (949). The 
novel pulls us towards blankness and misplacement on a national scale. As we dive into 
Gately’s memories in the later chapters, note that some of the main characters from his past 
                                                          
Aldous Huxley’s The Doors of Perception (1954), in which The Tibetan Book of the Dead is said to describe 
the “departed soul . . . shrinking in agony from the Clear Light of the Void . . . in order to rush headlong into 
the comforting darkness of self-hood as a reborn human being . . . Anything rather than the burning 
brightness of unmitigated Reality” (34).  
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are named “Mrs. Waite” (i.e. Mrs White; 847) and Whitey Sorkin (976).138 In the opening 
chapter, which, chronologically, describes the last events in the story, the coach who wants 
to recruit Hal to the University of Arizona is also named “Coach White” (4). The novel is framed 
on both sides by whiteness: it begins with the foreboding breakdown of an individual mind, 
and it ends by fulfilling that promise with a terrible blizzard: an America completely 
overloaded. Infinite Jest seems to be built in part upon the foundation DeLillo laid in White 
Noise.  
Yet there are differences between the two. A useful way to think about the effects of 
the Entertainment and Dylar is to consider Timothy D. Wilson’s description of the ‘Zone.’ 
“Perhaps the best use of consciousness,” writes Wilson,  
is to put ourselves in situations in which our adaptive unconscious can work 
smoothly. . . . There is a term for this in athletics: when a player is 
‘unconscious,’ she is performing at an optimal level without any awareness of 
exactly what she is doing. She is in the zone. (52) 
In his tennis essays Wallace describes the zone’s erasure of consciousness as the height of 
human achievement, something on the level of the divine. Yet in Infinite Jest it is more like a 
nightmare. John Wayne, one of the best young tennis players in the novel, appears “less alive 
than undead” (263), while Hal plays tennis to actively “avoid thinking,” “practising and playing 
until everything runs on autopilot and talent’s unconscious exercise becomes a way to escape 
yourself, a long waking dream” (173). Hal finds it difficult to shut off his ghost and just play, 
machinelike. As DeLint says of him, “Some days you can almost see Hal like flit in and out of a 
match, like some part of him leaves and hovers and then comes back” (682). What is the 
difference between Wallace’s characters and Roger Federer? I suggest that, where Federer is 
great in Wallace’s view because he is so perfectly reconciled to his own limits, Wallace’s 
characters’ limits are irreconcilable. Wallace’s characters are predisposed to pain, horror, 
dread, and, of course, a deep desire to escape. They therefore have to find the zone not 
                                                          
138 As with Billy Mink, Wallace’s allusions often point in different directions, both to other books and to the real 
world. Whitey Sorkin is perhaps an allusion both to the notorious Boston gangster Whitey Bulger, and—in 
keeping with the theme of white noise—to Michael Sorkin, another academic whom Wallace cites alongside 
Gitlin and DeLillo in his essay on fiction and television, “E Unibus Pluram” (Supposedly 23n. 1). 
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through reconciliation (how do you reconcile yourself to horror or flames?) but by the erasure 
of the conscious self altogether.139  
The effects of DeLillo’s Dylar and Wallace’s Entertainment are precisely the same. Where 
Wallace’s fiction differs from DeLillo’s is in the much greater feeling for what is lost. The 
metaphors of water and fire—of heaven and hell—work together throughout the whole 
novel, reminding us that Wallace’s characters are in pain, and have every reason to want to 
wash the pain away (by which I mean: flood their awareness of the pain away). Indeed, for 
most of the characters, their childhoods are so terrible and scarring that they seem literally 
driven to substances, pulled down a pre-determined path to eventual addiction. Given what 
we know of the characters’ souls’ experiences of hell, for them to make a “Pre-Nuptial 
Agreement of Heaven and Hell” (988n. 24)—a contract to sell their souls to end their pain—
seems perfectly reasonable, and completely unavoidable. In Wallace’s fiction, however, 
though drugs and the Entertainment are exactly as dangerous and will-negating as the Dylar, 
we still get the sense that there is someone inside the person that is suffering. DeLillo’s 
characters are flat, self-less, already dead. Jack Gladney calls himself “the false character that 
follows the name around” (20), suggesting that his name has more weight than the human 
being behind the word. In Wallace’s fiction, there is someone truly in there to be misplaced. 
Contrary to the popular view discussed in chapter 2, that Wallace’s addicts are without 
internal selves and they recover from addiction by being anti-interior, it is their very need to 
submerge themselves and “escape their own interior” (863) that prevents their recovery.  
Wallace’s fiction is built on an emphatically determinist worldview, but just as the 
Entertainment’s killing of the self emphasises that there is an interior self to be killed, so 
Wallace’s determinism continually emphasises that there is someone inside the body to be 
determined. The question is: does that interior self have any free will at all? Fogle’s epiphany 
in The Pale King is that he has the “ability to choose what I paid attention to, and to be aware 
                                                          
139 Escaping the self is both terrible and terribly appealing in Wallace’s writing. In his cruise ship essay, for 
instance, published the year before Infinite Jest and dealing with the same themes, he describes the 
harrowing ways that the cruise will erase “Your troublesome capacities for choice, error, regret, 
dissatisfaction, and despair . . . you will have no choice but to have a good time” (267). It is significant that 
the essay ends with Wallace visiting a hypnotist’s show, something he views with equal horror for the way 
it makes your head “no longer [your] own” (351). 
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of that choice, the fact that it’s a choice” (189). It is clear, however, that though you can 
choose what you pay attention to, what you pay attention to is really the only choice that you 
have. The will in this equation is not a motivator, only the observer of what is already going 
on beneath the level of consciousness. Yet by your attitude alone you can make a difference. 
Wilson explains that the reason the Alcoholics Anonymous dictum, “‘Fake it until you make 
it’” (214), is so successful, is because it requires that addicts consciously adhere to a 
“meaningful, adaptive narrative” with which they can move forward and beyond their 
unconscious addictive patterns, as opposed to the “repetitive, spiralling kind of thought 
whereby people can’t stop thinking about things in a negative light” (178). As Wallace puts it 
in Infinite Jest: “Do like your [sic] TOLD / If you want to get OLD” (375). 
But is it a choice if the only other option is your own death? The AA survivors are able 
to stick with AA because they have been driven to a “cliff’s edge” (348) and they either “do it 
or die” (357). Even their sticking with it is said to be out of their control: “GET BETTER A DAY 
AT A TIME ASSUMING THAT’S GOD’S WILL” (826). It’s up to God or the universe if you survive. 
There are no easy answers to this problem, least of all in Wallace’s novel. Though there is 
some validity to the idea that Wallace is, as This is Water suggests, a compatibilist, one who 
venerates the power of choice and our ability to choose how we think, this view does not 
account for the Entertainment, nor for the souls that are destroyed by it. As both Zadie Smith 
and John Jeremiah Sullivan put it: “Wallace was the opposite of an aphorist” (Smith, “Brief 
Interviews” 267); “In his books, so fluffy an idea would never survive the withering storm of 
panoptical analysis” (Sullivan). I suggest that Wallace is perhaps better understood as an 
incompatibilist, someone who does not think determinism and free will are compatible. The 
existence of the Entertainment curtails any notion that characters can learn to resist the 
ultimate high, just as the characters themselves are so obviously driven, in every instance, by 
their unconscious drives.  
This leaves us two options. Either Wallace is a hard determinist who believes there is 
no choice at all, or he is a libertarian, who believes in that special extra factor, a soul, which 
transcends the laws of the physical universe. I suggest that Wallace is both. These contradict 
each other, of course, but then Wallace’s work is so often characterised by this “‘both’ shit” 
(Supposedly 211). In Wallace’s fiction, hard determinism is a hard fact, consciousness and the 
will are as much a product of deterministic forces as the body, and the only choice, if you can 
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call it that, is what to think about what your body does without you. As one AA veteran puts 
it,  
99.9% of what goes on in one’s life is actually none of one’s business, with the 
.1% under one’s control consisting mostly of the option to accept or deny one’s 
inevitable powerlessness over the other 99.9%. (1004n. 100) 
The human soul, that tiny 0.1% of the person, has no choice but to accept or deny its lack of 
choice. In a sense this is a libertarian view: there is a soul in Wallace’s work, the “extra factor” 
necessary for free will (Kane 39), but in Wallace’s work the soul is basically powerless.  
In Wallace’s work, the soul is really just a metaphor for the embodied ‘I,’ but it is a 
profound metaphor. To write about human beings as souls trapped inside their bodies is to 
write about lives that are meaningfully tragic. Wallace’s characters all have to suffer what he 
calls “Corporeal Punishment,” the terror of “having a body” (Girl 262). Yet to acknowledge 
that someone is in there, that there is someone struggling to reconcile themselves to their 
own body and their own fate, is to honour the fundamental tragedy of human life: that though 
we have souls they can never be uncaged. There may not be any free will, but in Wallace’s 
fiction there is a person to suffer that fact. It is a losing battle but it is also a meaningful one. 
Mary K. Holland argues that in Gately’s final scene, his regression into memories of 
being obscenely high ironically “void any notion of heroic transformation” (“Art’s Heart’s” 
236). Holland sees Gately’s failure to resist as emblematic of the novel as a whole, arguing 
that Wallace, by relentlessly “locking [his] characters in endless loops of infantile desire” from 
which they are unable and unwilling to escape (239), ironically undercuts any possibility for 
recovery and hope, and thereby “fails to deliver on the agenda” that he “set for it” (218) in 
the “E Unibus Pluram” essay. During his hospital bed nightmares, Gately sinks into memories 
of his abused mother being “pulled spinning up into [a] tornado’s vortex” (816), imagining 
himself as a child running to the sea to hide by submerging himself in “deep warm water” 
(816). Holland suggests (without discussing the fire or water metaphor) that the novel’s final 
line—“he was flat on his back on the beach in the freezing sand, and it was raining out of a 
low sky, and the tide was way out” (Infinite Jest 981)—is an “image of fear and need” (Holland, 
“Art’s Heart’s” 236). The water metaphor suggests she is right: Gately’s submersion in the sea 
suggests that he was flooded by drugs in the end. There is another potential source for this 
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final water metaphor, however, that is perhaps more hopeful. In Bill W. and Dr. Bob (1987), a 
play depicting the founding of the AA, the character Bill says that “The tide’s gone out, and 
I’m staring at a lot of wreckage. And without booze, it’s a helluva lot worse!” (76). The fact 
that the tide is “way out” at the end of Infinite Jest suggests, in an echo of the play’s line, that 
Gately perhaps managed to avoid the torrent, to remain a recovering addict and not a lapsed 
one, at least for now.140 To be fair to Gately, even if he did decide (or a doctor decided for 
him) to take pain medication after being shot this would hardly be a failure. It is only because 
of his terrible bad luck to exist in the same deterministic universe as Lenz that puts him into 
the worst of all possible positions. This does not undermine Gately’s struggle to abide through 
pain, to keep on living: indeed it only heightens it, making it more tragic, because the only 
choice you have is to keep on not surrendering. 
Unlike the recovering Gately, Hal is a posthumanist who believes, as Wallace’s critics 
do, that he is devoid of interiority. He is wrong. Elizabeth Freudenthal incorrectly suggests 
that the opening chapter is “the novel’s only instance of first-person narration” (203). Hal’s 
first-person narration actually begins on p.851 (“I’d felt for almost a week as if I needed to 
cry” [851]) as his withdrawal gets steadily worse. We literally see his interior self wake up as 
the narcotising flood recedes: he turns out to be in there after all. The problem is that Hal 
does not know how to be a human being. This is not because he has no interior self: he 
emphatically does have one, he just doesn’t know how to treat it with anything more than 
ironic contempt. Gately recovers, in part, because AA teaches you how to be in there, how to 
respect and take responsibility for the machine you are stuck inside.141 One of the reasons AA 
succeeds is that it teaches addicts to deal with the causes, not the symptoms, of their 
addiction. When Gately goes sober and the flood recedes, he rediscovers long-submerged 
                                                          
140 Gately refers to the “AA founder Bill W.” in the novel (833), and we know that Wallace was given the book 
long before Infinite Jest was published: it is in his library, with the message “To David, Congratulations on 
year 1. . . . 11/6/90” (HRC).  
141 Gregory Bateson argues that “Bill W.’s stroke of genius was to” dismantle the alcoholic’s Cartesian view of 
themselves as individuals and encourage the surrender of the will to a recovery system (3). In Infinite Jest 
the group encourages the same surrender, but it is a long and arduous surrender because of the Cartesian 
self inside the addict: the interior self is always at war with itself, and has to work hard to keep praying and 
surrendering every day. 
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memories of times in his life that cause him great shame, and from which he wanted to flee 
into the flood. Hal, on the other hand, thinks in terms of symptoms only: he is just a machine, 
after all, and should be easily fixed. Hal does not understand that recovery is a long, arduous, 
spiritual process: he wants clear-cut “data on how long one might expect the wretchedness 
of giving up drugs to continue” (801). Hal’s posthumanist friend Pemulis advises him to find a 
different, better drug that suits his “machine”: “What happens if you try and go without 
something the machine needs?” (1065n. 321). Neither Hal nor Pemulis dare to think about 
why they might have needed to flood their interior selves and escape into drugs in the first 
place. The child of a narcissistic mother and a father who committed suicide, Hal bizarrely 
“finds he rather envies a man who feels he has something to explain his being fucked up, 
parents to blame it on” (805). Pemulis, who spent his childhood pretending to sleep while his 
father raped his brother, also does not “blam[e] his late father” because he doesn’t “consider 
himself fucked up or unfree w/r/t Substances” (805). They are oblivious. 
In his Kafka essay, Wallace wrote that young Americans cannot understand that “the 
horrific struggle to establish a human self results in a self whose humanity is inseparable from 
that horrific struggle” (64). The self is forged, for Wallace, out of the “horrific struggle” 
between soul and body, between the interior ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ in which it is trapped.142 A self 
is something you have to honour and respect, but Hal and Pemulis see no reason: as far as 
they are concerned, they are nothing more than machines with “switch[es]” and “wiring” 
(1065n. 321). They treat their own interior self, their souls, their “humanity,” with contempt. 
As a consequence, they do not understand that they are killing something when they take 
drugs. When Hal and Pemulis flood away their soul they give up on this struggle, surrendering 
their humanity in order to exist neatly, passively, as mere posthuman machines. Hal still has 
                                                          
142 Allard Den Dulk argues persuasively that Wallace’s work is profoundly existential, because in it “Becoming a 
self is the task of human life” (16). I disagree, however, that “there is no ‘true core’ that an individual always 
already ‘is’ or ‘has’” in Wallace’s work. It is true that souls are not “pre-made” in Wallace’s work (Consider 
64), but there is always a core interior ‘I’ that’s in there to do the making. For it to be shaped by its (often 
antagonistic) relationship with its body and brain, the core self has to exist in the first place. In Wallace’s 
work, it is everything in the “world” outside of consciousness (Dulk 16) that is in doubt. The thinking thing 
is emphatically present. 
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a self inside him, and he might believe it too if he did not live in the care of posthumanists. 
Hal might still recover his humanity, but the hard work is ahead. 
Though Wallace’s characters ultimately lack any control over their own destiny, 
Wallace does not write about them as soulless automatons. The soul might not be in charge 
but it is emphatically present in there, and their suffering is meaningful as a result. By 
reinvesting in the evolved, deterministic body, the selves within those bodies are made more 
coherent, more sharply defined by their limits than the diffuse postmodern characters who 
had none. Throughout his career Wallace was engaged with cognitive science, posthuman 
theory, and the philosophy of mind, but ultimately his fiction is about the human soul, about 
what it is like to live trapped inside the clockwork body and brain. He is not as optimistic as 
This is Water makes him seem. To quote Wallace quoting Kafka: “There is hope, but not for 
us” (Consider 64). There is hope in the post-postmodern novel, but little of it in Wallace’s.  
But Wallace also says that Kafka’s “gallows humor” is not all that Kafka’s stories “have 
got going on” (63-64), because Kafka’s tragedy “always also [has] an immense and reverent 
joy” (63). Wallace’s characters are encaged in their bodies, absolutely ill and will-less, doomed 
to suffer and die, but because Wallace celebrates the ‘I’ that is in there, they are, as a result, 
both meaningful and moving. Human beings will never be free of the fire in Wallace’s world, 
but by investing in something like the soul Wallace honours the struggle of those who have 
both the best and worst luck to be alive inside it. 
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